Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2013

Thinking Together about the Common Good: The Political
Implications of Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Conscience
Angela Concetta Miceli
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Miceli, Angela Concetta, "Thinking Together about the Common Good: The Political Implications of
Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Conscience" (2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 252.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/252

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

THINKING TOGETHER ABOUT THE COMMON GOOD: THE POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THOMAS AQUINAS’S THEORY OF CONSCIENCE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Louisiana State University
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Political Science

by
Angela Concetta Miceli
B.A., Thomas More College of Liberal Arts, 2005
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2010
May 2013

© Copyright 2013
Angela Concetta Miceli
All rights reserved

ii

Acknowledgements
I have written a dissertation in which I have reflected on how human beings depend upon one
another for all the essential things in life. Writing a dissertation, while perhaps not an essential
thing in life is such a task that indeed cannot be done in isolation, and I have depended upon the
goodness and love of many to complete this project.
First, I must acknowledge my debt of greatest gratitude to my parents, Louis and Virginia, who
sacrificed much so that I could be educated and could pursue every happiness, opportunity, and
success. They continue to love, encourage, and support me in all that I undertake, and I am most
grateful for the embodiment of sacrificial and unconditional love they have always given to me
and my siblings, Theresa, Joseph, and Regina. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation.
I thank my advisor, Dr. Ellis Sandoz, who has shown me the true meaning of pursuing the truth
in freedom and who has always encouraged me to speak that truth with courage. I am so grateful
to him for his gentle encouragement, his teaching, and his understanding.
To the members of my committee:
Dr. James Stoner, whose mentorship, guidance, and example have inspired my work as a scholar
in ways that I hope will continue to animate my career.
Dr. Cecil Eubanks, whose profound care for students, advice, and wisdom has shown me in
many ways how to be a teacher. His respect, attention, and care for me and to all of his students
extend beyond the classroom, and I am so grateful for the opportunity to work with him.
Dr. Leonard Ray and to Dr. Mark Gasiorowski, I thank them both for their kindness, patience,
flexibility and advice throughout my time at Louisiana State University.
Each member of my committee has given me an example of integrity and intellectual honesty
that I hope to give to my students.
To Tara Montelaro and Lezlie Haynes for always helping me and answering all of my questions.
To Wanda Ashley or ‘Miss Wanda,’ who attended to my many needs as a student.
To my teachers at the Thomas More College of Liberal Arts who formed within my heart a love
of learning and study: Dr. Peter Sampo, Dr. Mary Mumbach, Dr. Paul Connell, Mr. Brian Shea,
Ms. Deborah Enos, Miss Mary Bonifield, and Mr. Karl Cooper.
To the H.B. Earhart Foundation, who generously funded my years in graduate school at
Louisiana State University. This opportunity to study would not have been possible without
their support.
To the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, whose conferences I attended throughout graduate
school, which allowed me to forge lasting friendships with some of the most wonderful people I
have ever met and with colleagues that I will always cherish.

iii

To the members of the University of Notre Dame community, most especially to Dr. Mary M.
Keys. She invited to me sit in on a class on Aquinas in the spring semester of 2011, and then
helped me to find a welcoming community of friends at Notre Dame. Dr. Keys did everything
that she could to facilitate and encourage me in my writing process.
I must thank both the Jacques Maritain Center and the Center for Ethics and Culture at the
University of Notre Dame for their support of my writing and research. Dr. John O’Callaghan
and Mrs. Alice Osberger gave me not just resources, study space, but more importantly
conversation, support, and friendship. Because of their support, I was not only able to write this
dissertation, but I also was able to write and publish my first article and book chapter. Through
the Jacques Maritain Center, I also met Dr. Peter Koritansky, who not only helped me translate
some particularly difficult passages from Aquinas’s Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, but has
also extended his generous friendship and counsel.
The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture generously supported me in my last semester
with the Inaugural Edith Stein fellowship, providing me with the time, resources, and financial
support I needed to finish writing this dissertation. To O. Carter Snead, Angela Engelsen, Tracy
Westlake, and Stephen Freddoso, thank you. I could not have completed this without the
provision that you facilitated.
To others at the University of Notre Dame who helped me in as many ways that they could:
Steve Reifenberg and my colleagues that the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies,
Heather Denton in the department of Political Science, and Charlene Bollman at the Office of
Research.
To those with whom I had a brief but powerful conversation about my dissertation, Professor
Zachary Calo, Professor Rémi Brague, Professor Alasdair MacIntyre, Rev. Richard Hyde. Your
answers to my questions impacted me so profoundly and very often helped me to discover new
and exciting insights.
To all my family members and dear friends who supported and encouraged me, conversed with
me, prayed for me, and have always shown me understanding: Joseph Miceli, Theresa Miceli,
Regina Miceli, Pam and Randy Stout, Heidi Stout Tretheway, Holly Stout, Ashleen Kelly,
Veronica Roberts, Randy and Tamara Smith, Esther Terry, Craig Iffland, Omer Shaukat, Karen
Duker, Joan Burkardt, Amy Triche, Rocky Thompson, Margaret Perry, Elise Italiano, Gail
Alcarez O’Donnell, Flora Arzanipour, Kate Fairbairn, Mary Dustin, Heather Le, and Maureen
Noonan.
In a special way, I would also like to thank my neighbors, the Nagy family, who always shower
with me affection and whose children have taught me by their love both a practical application of
my dissertation and that there is much more to life than writing a dissertation.
To my students at Louisiana State University, Purdue University-Calumet, Indiana UniversitySouth Bend, Holy Cross College, and the University of Notre Dame: thank you for your
questions, your joy, and your passion. You kept me encouraged, and it is for you especially that
I write this dissertation.

iv

I profoundly thank my loving fiancé, Alan N. Stout for his constant encouragement, joy, faith,
love, and support of me in this process.
To the many that I have not named here, know that I am grateful for every way that you aided
me in this process.
Finally and most importantly, I acknowledge my deepest gratitude to Almighty God, who in His
Goodness, has shown me ever new His faithfulness and love in His constant provision and
providential way of unfolding His plan. May I be ever aware of and trusting in His holy and
loving Providence.

v

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter I: The Crisis of Conscience in the Modern World ............................................................ 1
I. A Crisis of Conscience ............................................................................................................ 1
II. What is Conscience?: A Theoretical Background ............................................................... 16
III. Why Aquinas?..................................................................................................................... 23
IV. Aquinas and Contemporary Politics ................................................................................... 28
V. Chapter Descriptions ............................................................................................................ 50
Chapter II: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of Conscience .............................................. 52
I. Theoretical and Historical Background ................................................................................. 54
A. Classical Sources .............................................................................................................. 54
B. Aristotle and Conscience .................................................................................................. 61
II. Theoretical and Historical Background ............................................................................... 79
A. Patristic Sources: Origins of ‘Synderesis’ in the work of St. Jerome .............................. 79
B. Augustine’s Contribution to Conscience.......................................................................... 83
Chapter III: Conscience in the Early Work of Aquinas: Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and
De Veritate .................................................................................................................................... 92
I. Introduction: Aquinas on Man and Politics ........................................................................... 92
II. The Structure of the Soul and of Moral Thinking for Aquinas .......................................... 101
III. Thomas’s Early Development of Conscience: Conscience in the Scriptum Super Libros
Sententiarum ........................................................................................................................... 109
IV. De Veritate: Conscience, Reason, and the Supremacy of Conscience ............................. 114
Chapter IV: Conscience, Law, Prudence, and the Common Good: Aquinas’s Account of
Conscience in the Summa Theologiae and Super Romanos ....................................................... 127
I. Reason as the Basis for Moral Choice and Freedom ........................................................... 127
II. Freedom, Law, Practical Wisdom, and the Place of Conscience in the Summa Theologiae
and Super Romanos ................................................................................................................ 135
A. Synderesis and Conscientia in the Prima Pars and in Super Romanos ......................... 135
B. Conscience in the Prima Secundae Pars: The Treatise on Law .................................... 150
C. Conscience in the Secunda Secundae Pars: Judgment of Conscience and the Virtue of
Prudence .............................................................................................................................. 160
Chapter V: Thinking Together about the Common Good: Toward a Renewed Understanding of
Conscience .................................................................................................................................. 166
I. Politics and Conscience ....................................................................................................... 166
II. The Enduring Problem of Synderesis ................................................................................ 169
III. An Anamnetic Politics: A Reorientation toward the Common Good .............................. 184
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 190
Vita.............................................................................................................................................. 199

vi

Abstract
This dissertation examines the problems confronted by claims of ‘freedom of conscience’
in contemporary political society, and argues that freedom of conscience is a critical foundational
component of any free political regime. Yet, conscience is often invoked as the final authority or
justification for any choice, regardless whether the action or choice violates the common good.
In this case, there is a risk that conscience can become identified with subjectivism, radical
individualism, or autonomy. I suggest that a re-examination of the theory of conscience found in
Aquinas, especially as it relates to human reason, natural law, and prudence, contributes toward a
better understanding of conscience and its place in political life, especially in shaping the
common good. I argue that Aquinas’s understanding of conscience points to critical individual,
relational, and transcendent elements that constitute and form conscience.
The first chapter examines what many scholars consider the contemporary ‘crisis of
conscience’ that has been experienced acutely in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and I
introduce Aquinas as the interlocutor whose understanding of conscience I examine.
The second chapter analyzes the sources that Aquinas draws from to formulate his own twofold
theory of conscience as consisting of synderesis and conscientia. Specifically, I examine the
important contributions of Aristotle, Cicero, Jerome, Origen, and Augustine. The third and
fourth chapters focus on Aquinas’s texts. Chapter three evaluates the development of Aquinas’s
work on conscience in two of his earlier works, viz. Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De
Veritate. The fourth chapter examines the Summa Theologiae and the Commentary on Romans,
wherein Aquinas situates conscience within the framework of natural law. The final chapter
juxtaposes Aquinas’s terminology of the primary level of conscience, synderesis, with an
alternative concept, viz. anamnesis. Political philosopher Eric Voegelin has also proposed this
term as a way of understanding human nature qua rational and political. This chapter considers
vii

both the possibility and implications of this alternative term for the primary level of conscience
and helps to clarify the place of conscience in political discourse.
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Chapter I: The Crisis of Conscience in the Modern World
“Could…religious people be granted exemption or exemptions from generally applicable laws, if
they went against a religious conscience? This may not have seemed so pressing in a country
whose legislators were explicitly motivated by Christian principles, and whose laws applied to a
broadly Christian society, where the main disagreements were between Christian
denominations…. It is different in the twenty-first century, when political debate is
characterized by deep disagreement between people with very different worldviews. The issue
of the possible protection of a religious conscience from the impact of generally applicable laws
has become a major problem.” 1
I. A Crisis of Conscience
In the American political experience, freedom of conscience has been considered to be of
primary importance within the constitutional framework of the political regime. We need only
consider the text of the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees and enshrines
freedom of conscience in the free exercise and establishment clauses. 2 We may also recall James
Madison’s First Inaugural Address in 1809, wherein he states his confidence in the new
republic’s commitment “to avoid the slightest interference with the rights of conscience or the
functions of religion, so wisely exempted from civil jurisdiction.” 3 More generally, the
importance of freedom of conscience in the liberal political tradition has been espoused by
Enlightenment liberal thinkers such as John Locke or John Stuart Mill. 4 Yet, in the
contemporary liberal political context, when ‘the primacy of conscience’ 5 is invoked as a
justification for political action or inaction (as might be the case of conscientious objector to war,
1

Trigg, Roger. Equality, Freedom, and Religion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87-88.
The original language in the Bill of Rights that actually referred to freedom of conscience was deleted, cf. E.A.
Smith. “Religion and Conscience in Constitutional Law.”Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective, Ed.
E.A. Smith. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966.
3
Madison, James. “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809.” Retrieved from Liberty Fund’s Online Library of
Liberty:
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1939&chapter=119064&layout=html#
a_2402984
4
Cf. John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration and J.S. Mill On Liberty. We must, however, acknowledge here
that that modern liberalism is varied and the two thinkers listed here are examples, and not meant to be an
exhaustive representation of the stance of the liberal tradition on conscience.
5
Cf. Lewis, Brian. “The Primacy of Conscience in the Roman Catholic Tradition.”Pacifica 13, October 2000. 299309.
2

1

for example), there seems to be a lack of a clear sense of both the meaning of conscience and the
pre-eminent source of authority that it claims. What does it mean to say that one should follow
his own conscience? From where do these promptings of conscience originate? Is conscience
simply one’s own subjectivity or private opinion that allows an individual to act as he pleases
without reference to or consideration of anyone outside of himself? Does conscience give a
person license to act in whatever manner he feels prompted to act? Does conscience make a man
a law unto himself? If every man is a law unto himself, then how could a political society define
a common good, since each person would have his own idea of what should be considered good?
These questions require us to ask further: what is conscience, why is it considered to be free, and
why should any political regime protect its freedom?
One theory could argue that conscience appeals to a ‘higher law’ than human law or
political regime as the source of its authority. We may recall Antigone’s defiance of Creon’s law
in favor of the law of the gods, the “unwritten and unchanging laws” that oblige her to bury her
fallen brother against Creon’s decree. 6 Yet, an appeal to a higher law is distinctly problematic,
because we are faced with the task of identifying the source, legitimacy, and authority of this
higher law. Furthermore, if conscience receives its knowledge and insight from a higher law,
how does a person have reliable access to it? If the divine is the authentic source of the law, as
Antigone claims, then this presupposes that everyone in any given society must share at least
some minimal belief in the same source of divinity. In the contemporary, liberal, pluralistic
political setting, such is not often the case. Perhaps the authority of conscience comes from
within the human person himself: “More often than not, it [that is, the source, legitimacy and
authority of a higher law] will be said to have its immediate source in man himself, either alone

6

Sophocles. Antigone. Trans. Ian Johnston. Text found at http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/Sophocles/Antigone.htm.
Quotation from line 512 English text and 455 Greek text.
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or in society, and assumes the form of an inviolable dictate of conscience to which priority is
given over all man-made laws.” 7 However, when one lives in political community, do we not
expect that the common good, which is protected by agreed upon laws, should take precedent
over any individual good presented by the dictates of conscience?
To remedy the problem of a higher law usurping legal and political authority, Ernest
Fortin points out that contemporary social science largely retreated to the theory of “legal
positivism… [That] denies the very possibility of an appeal from established law to an elusive
‘higher law’ whose existence is alleged never to have been demonstrated and on whose
principles there is supposedly no general consensus among men.” 8 Legal positivism posits law
as pure convention, based upon the will of the ruler or a ‘general will’ of the citizens: “The will
of the state, the formal general will of the citizens, is the source and criterion of law.” 9 Legal
positivism ultimately flows from a rejection of the intelligibility of any metaphysical order, even
to the point of rejecting its existence. 10 Yet, despite the rise of legal positivism and its attempt to
eradicate reference to a ‘higher law,’ that is to the natural law, human inquiry about the existence
of the natural law remains: “[The natural law] has always managed to resuscitate itself and
emerge revitalized from its occasional moments of eclipse.” 11 Such a higher law is meant to
govern right and wrong actions in society, and it circumscribes the limits of both the political
regime and the citizens within the regime. But this too is problematic, given that many of us live
in pluralistic cultures, and the dominant liberal ideology of our current political regime prides

7

Fortin, Ernest L. The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience.” Augustinian Studies Vol. 1,
1970, 133
8
Fortin, Ernest L. “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 134. Fortin also points the
reader to F. Oppenheim’s American Political Science Review 51 (1957) article entitled “The Natural Law Thesis:
Affirmation or Denial.” Pp. 41-53.
9
Rommen, Heinrich A. The Natural Law. Trans. Thomas R. Hanley. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), 110.
10
Rommen, Heinrich A. The Natural Law, Chapter VI.
11
Kries, Douglas. The Problem of Natural Law.(New York: Lexington Books, 2007), xiii.
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itself on being able to accommodate “fundamental disagreements over the nature of the good.” 12
Contemporary Western societies have “socially [divorced rules] defining right action on the one
hand and conceptions of the human good on the other.” 13
However, this ideological strategy presents an even more serious systemic dilemma.
How could it ever be possible to live peacefully in a political community that encourages and
embraces fundamental disagreements about the nature of the human good? The endpoint of such
logic is an effort to define right action and a coherent conception of the human good that “makes
it impossible to build up and preserve the moral order of individuals and communities.” 14 Some
might question why we ought to find an inconsistent notion of the human good a problem. Leo
Strauss explains this problem from the perspective of the social sciences. According to Strauss,
the distinction between facts and values, especially as espoused by Max Weber, is the root cause
of the political problems experienced in the modern era. The fact/value distinction, according to
Strauss, advances a theory of a ‘value-free’ methodology to the study of the social sciences.
Strauss explains that:
[Weber] denied to man any science, empirical or rational, any knowledge, scientific or
philosophical, of the true value system: the true value system does not exist; there is a
variety of values which are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with one another,
and whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason. Social science and social
philosophy can do no more than clarify the conflict and all its implications; the solution
has to be left to the free and rational decision of each individual. I contend that Weber’s
thesis necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil,
base, or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any
other preference. 15

12

MacIntyre, Alasdair. The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture.” The Review of Politics 52:3, 1990. 344361. Quote taken from page 355.
13
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture,” 346.
14
Pope John Paul II. Veritatis Splendor Encyclical Letter given on 6 August 1993. (Boston: St. Paul Media, 1993),
93.
15
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 41-42.
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This promotion of a ‘value free’ political science ultimately leads to the principal crisis of
political science that Strauss identifies as the inability of political science to confront and to
condemn the various manifestations of corruption within political society (e.g. totalitarianism),
affirming that “A social science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence with
which medicine speaks, for example, of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena as what
they are. It is therefore not scientific. Present day social science finds itself in this condition.” 16
Other scholars, such as John Haas, argue that this modern political problem pointed out
by Strauss in the above passages is fundamentally a “crisis of conscience” that has caused a
much deeper political and cultural crisis, “because the failure of conscience is not seen simply in
wicked men choosing to embrace evil in pursuit of their own selfish interests, but rather in the
attempt of entire societies [emphasis mine] to forge their common life without recourse to
objective standards of right and wrong.” 17 Here we are confronted by another important element
in our discernment of the nature of conscience and what its political significance should be.
Despite what is described above as a ‘crisis of conscience,’ viz. the inability for whole political
societies to identify a common human good, contemporary political liberalism continues to claim
that it values the freedom of conscience as the very basis of human rights. 18 Andrew Edward
comments:
The basic liberal right is freedom of conscience, but it is unclear to what extent freedom
of conscience is limited to the sphere of belief and thought, and whether it encompasses
freedom of association as well as freedom of speech, and whether it extends to
conscientious objection and civil disobedience. Our claims of equality are gauged in
terms of conscience. 19

16

Strauss, Leo. What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 95
Haas, John M. “Crisis of Conscience and Culture.” Crisis of Conscience. Ed. John M. Haas. (New York: The
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), 24
18
Cf. Edward, Andrew. Conscience and its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern
Subjectivity. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 3. See also the Introduction.
19
Edward, Andrew. Conscience and its Critics, 6.
17

5

Edward points out both that the very understanding of what conscience is (although considered
sacrosanct for many contemporary liberals) and why it is politically important, remains unclear.
Does freedom of conscience simply mean freedom for subjective thinking or opinion? Does
freedom of conscience mean freedom to worship in whatever religion of your choosing? Or,
does freedom of conscience refer to the freedom to order one’s life as a citizen of a particular
political society, governed by particular laws and rules, in whatever way is deemed morally
acceptable to an individual? Often in contemporary politics, conscience is invoked as the final
authority or as the justification for any choice, regardless of whether the action or choice taken
by the individual violates the law or the common good. We hear of the inviolability of the
‘primacy of conscience’ that must be protected even if the action taken is commonly considered
to be immoral. 20 In this case, there is a risk that conscience can become identified with
subjectivism, radical individualism, or autonomy. At worst, conscience is reduced to being
identified as emotions, feelings, opinions, or personal preference. Have the claims of conscience
morphed from being “a bulwark against government encroachment into a more generally
applicable right to individual autonomy?” 21 Alasdair MacIntyre identifies this truncated sense of
conscience as emotivism, that is “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically
all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling,
insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.” 22
For adherents of these particular manifestations of conscience, the primary political
problem is a lack of consensus on a common notion of the human good because each person
judges what is good based on opinions, preference, attitudes, conviction or feelings. However,

20

Cf. footnote 4 above.
Vischer, Robert K. Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between the Person and the State.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.
22
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
21
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as MacIntyre and others believe, conscience is not merely a means to confirm our subjective
desires or opinions, but rather it is and should be the means of discovering truth. Ernest Fortin
sums up this critical point, stating:
[Conscience] is not just an innate moral sense found in all or most men or a general
awareness of certain broad limitations to which human conduct is subject. Nor is it a
mere reflection or internalization of the ethical values and standards of a given society. It
cannot for that matter be reduced to a question of loyalty to oneself and to one's
commitments, whatever those commitments might be. And it is even less a simple matter
of sentiment divorced from reason and superior to it, as the romantic notion popularized
by Rousseau would have it. What it basically assumes is that man's life as a whole is
governed by rational principles that are naturally known and universally valid even under
the most extreme circumstances. 23
If this view of conscience is lost in a political society, that is to say, a view of conscience that is
governed by shared, universally known rational principles, this loss results in a lack of
homonoia, that “life of the spirit, which is common to all, [through which] the existence of man
becomes existence in community.” 24 In other words, if, as Aristotle says, that “every city is
some sort of partnership [that is] constituted for the sake of some good,” a political community
without agreement on the common good finds itself in serious crisis. 25 This is particularly the
problem of liberalism, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, “for it is a central tenet of recent liberal
moral and political theory that public institutions and more especially the institutions of
government should be systematically neutral as between rival conceptions of what the human
good is.” 26 Perhaps John Locke best captures this liberal understanding of conscience, arguing
that it is “nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our

23

Fortin, Ernest. “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 144.
Voegelin, Eric. “On the German University and the Order of German Society: A Reconsideration of the Nazi
Era.” The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Published Essays 1966-1985. Volume 12.Ed. Ellis Sandoz.(Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 7.
25
Aristotle. Politics. Trans. Carnes Lord. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1252a.
26
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture,” 346.
24
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own actions.” 27 However, this view remains a rather narrowly subjective concept of conscience.
The danger, at least as some have articulated such danger, is that the “resulting variations among
individual consciences [render] it almost useless for creating the measure of agreement necessary
to society.” 28 In short, if conscience claims simply mean personal preference, then conscience
claims become meaningless, and the claim with most force (whether persuasive or coercive
force) wins.
A related problematic understanding of conscience perceives it simply as the freedom or
right to do as one pleases, since it has come from one’s own conscience. In the opinion of some
scholars, such a formulation is a radical deformation of the nature of conscience:
The erroneous conscience…. [appears] as subjectivity’s protective shell, into which man
can escape and there hide from reality. Liberalism’s idea of conscience was, in fact,
presupposed here…. It is the faculty that dispenses with truth. It thereby becomes the
justification of subjectivity, which would not like to have itself called into question.
Similarly, it becomes the justification for social conformity. As mediating values
between the different subjectivities, social conformity is intended to make living together
possible. The obligation to seek truth terminates, as do any doubts about the general
inclination of society and what is has been accustomed to. Being convinced of oneself,
as well as conforming to others, is sufficient. 29
Joseph Ratzinger’s preceding quote points to two glaring contemporary problems. First,
conscience as radical subjectivism or radical autonomy becomes meaningless lending itself to be
easily swept up into social conformity—perhaps even an ideological social conformity that is
dangerous or unjust. Let us consider an historical example that illustrates the political
manifestation of this ‘problem of conscience’ discussed above. We need not look very far back
into history to see that the ideological ethics manifested in modernity led to a crisis in both the

27

Locke, John. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. I, ii, 8.Quoted in Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision:
Continuity and Vision in Western Political Thought.(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 337.
28
Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision, 337.
29
Ratzinger, Joseph. “Conscience and Truth.” On Conscience. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 16-17. On
the liberal transformation of conscience into social conformity, see Sheldon S. Wolin Politics and Vision, Chapter 9.
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knowledge and practice of sound moral judgment and actions. In 1963, Hannah Arendt
published her coverage and reflections of the Eichmann trial, entitled Eichmann in Jerusalem,
and stunned her readers with the harrowing conclusion that Nazi commanders such as Eichmann
carried out their crimes with a banal attitude of indifference toward the clear violation of human
dignity and the destruction of human life. The trial of Eichmann exemplified as she says, the
“strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil.” 30 According to Arendt, the most
perplexing and disturbing question at the center of the Eichmann trial was his complete lack of a
‘crisis of conscience’ (meaning he experienced no moral qualms) for his role in the death of
millions. Arendt writes: “[And] as for his conscience, [Eichmann] remembered perfectly well
that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been ordered to
do—to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with great zeal and the most
meticulous care.” 31 In his defense, Eichmann argues that he was simply following the Kantian
principle that “a law was a law, there could be no exceptions.” 32 Eichmann, it would seem,
escaped the prompting of conscience in this matter, by appealing to legal positivism. Those who
put him on trial did not find such a defense very convincing.
Eichmann suffered no ‘crisis of conscience’ not because he lacked the capacity, but rather
because his willful acceptance of the Nazi ideology had dulled and deformed his conscience so
that the social and political values of the Nazis, i.e. hatred and liquidation of Jews, had been
“internalized and, as such, [operated] as the individual’s conscience. Conscience thus [became
for Eichmann] social rather than individual.” 33 This deformation of conscience into a social

30

Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.(New York: Penguin, 1994), 288.
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem, 25.
32
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem, 137. Arendt does try to exonerate Kant from Eichmann’s invocation,
remarking that Eichmann distorted Kant’s philosophy to become what she calls “a version of Kant ‘for the
household use of the little man.’” See page 137.
33
Wolin, Sheldon S. Politics and Vision, 343.
31
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collectivism, with its emphasis on social conformity to an ideology certainly does not and did not
exonerate Eichmann, for as Eric Voegelin rightly reminds us, “No one is obliged to take part in
the spiritual crisis of a society; on the contrary, everyone is obliged to avoid this folly and live
his life in order.” 34 Where was this interior order in Eichmann that should have caused him to
act differently? The problem in the case of Nazi Germany was the complete and willful closure
of the mind of an entire society to the promptings of conscience, and the equally willful
acceptance of a collectivist ideology in its place. If false conscience is explained here as social
or collectivist conformity, then perhaps by contrast we might discern some sense of what
authentic conscience actually is. Traditionally, conscience has been understood as the ability to
discern between good and evil and to choose what is good accordingly. 35 It thus has both a
legislative and active connotation. Conscience tells the individual what is right or wrong, and
dictates appropriate action based on this judgment. It is not simply a means of “[confirming] our
subjective desires, [but rather] the means of discovering objective truth and acting upon it.” 36 Of
course both before the Nazi regime and after it, the very idea of ‘objective truth’ has become
controversial for most of Western societies. After all, the Nazis claimed an ‘objective truth’
based upon on what they believed were empirically, biologically, and scientifically verifiable
facts about the superiority of the Aryan race. Yet without a doubt, we know they were wrong.
But their claim to an objective truth was channeled a priori through a seemingly legitimately,
collectively defined and politically acceptable process of legal positivism. Can any person or
any body politic validly claim authority on truth objectively by pursuing this strategy?
The example of the totalitarian Nazi regime expresses another related way in which the
meaning of conscience is violated. In the Eichmann example, there is a clear lack or a willful
34
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ignorance of the proper function of conscience that discerns right from wrong and directs action
accordingly. But many within this regime objected to the Nazi atrocities precisely on the basis
of conscience, such as the Scholl siblings, Hans and Sophie. 37 They were categorically denied
the capacity of conscience to validly question or reject the ideology and actions of the Nazi
regime, illustrating a fundamental and required characteristic for any ideologically based regime:
the destruction of the freedom of conscience that governments should protect. 38 Joseph
Ratzinger comments, “The destruction of conscience is the real prerequisite for totalitarian
followers and totalitarian rule. Where conscience prevails, there is a limit to the dominion of
human command and human choice, something sacred that must remain inviolate and that in its
ultimate sovereignty eludes all control, whether someone else’s or one’s own.” 39
While the extreme example of totalitarianism may seem obvious to us, and even passé for
contemporary Western political societies, there are perhaps several new frontiers that threaten
the freedom of conscience even within our own American regime. For example, Ryan T.
Anderson writes that the recent passage of the Obama administrations’ health care plan (the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or PPACA) significantly attenuates the protection of
conscience for health care professionals who may object to the assertion that abortion should be
provided as essential basic health care for women. Anderson writes, “While the Senate was
drafting the bill, it explicitly rejected the Weldon Amendment, long accepted language that
provides conscience protection for those opposed to abortion, particularly for health care
providers. . . . Conscience protections that apply in most other areas of federal law do not apply
37
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to PPACA.” 40Even more recently, the department of Health and Human Services in the United
States issued a mandate that some religious organizations and institutions have called a flagrant
violation of conscience protection and religious freedom in the United States. 41 This mandate,
delivered by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebilius,
requires that nearly all health insurance plans offer and pay for contraceptive services,
sterilization procedures, and abortifacient drugs to women of reproductive age. Such actions
seriously violate the consciences of Catholics, other Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other
religious and non-religious citizens alike. 42 These religious organizations, institutions,
businesses, and individuals claim a violation of conscience because they will be forced by the
coercive power of a federal mandate to provide, to promote, and to pay for services for their
employees that they declare morally objectionable on the grounds of their religious faith. The
alleged compromise offered for conscience protection that the current administration has
contrived excludes religiously-affiliated hospitals, universities, and other institutions as well as
individuals or families from exemption. Nor have any rules been put in place for such a
compromise. 43
The current debate on healthcare in the United States raises several fundament issues
regarding the idea and fundamental expression of freedom of conscience. This controversy
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initially brings into focus the issue of why the objection of conscience should be held as essential
in any free society, especially when conscientious objection could be used by some to shirk their
civic responsibilities or to deny any citizen what the state deems an essential good or service that
should be available to all by law. It could be argued that justice demands that all citizens must
contribute to the common good of their political community, even if that contribution makes
demands on them that they would prefer not to perform, such as taxation, an example quite
familiar to Americans. How ought a political society both promote and protect the common
good and the rights of individuals, including the rights of conscience? This debate must also
consider the relationship of religious beliefs and creeds to the very idea of conscience and the
right to religious freedom. Religious freedom, of course, is deeply engrained in the American
political psyche via the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; and Americans have
historically protected and promoted religious freedom through preferential policies both at home
and abroad. 44 Former American diplomat Thomas Farr even argues that promotion of religious
freedom in countries such China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia should be a primary goal of American
foreign policy. Rather than promoting a secular worldview that views religion as “inherently
irrational and emotive,” Farr argues that the United States should promote religious freedom
‘properly understood.’ 45 Farr explains:
Properly understood, then, freedom of religion is the right to pursue the religious quest, to
embrace or reject the interior and public obligations that ensue, and to enter or exit
religious communities that reflect, or do not reflect, one's understanding of religious
truth. If people are not free in all these senses, they cannot be said to be living a fully
human life. To restrict this right unduly, or to persecute someone for exercising it
peacefully, is to mount an assault on human dignity. In political terms religious freedom
44
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is the right of every person to an immunity from coercion by civil or other human
authority in pursuing, or not pursuing, the truths of religion. 46
Religious freedom presupposes another, more fundamental right, viz. the right of conscience.
The right of conscience “has a natural public dimension. Moral obligations flow from a
conscience that is bound by its apprehension of religious truths, whether derived by faith, reason,
or both. Those obligations often require a religious believer to take or refrain from taking certain
actions. Accordingly, freedom of conscience implies a right to live publicly in accord with the
truths one has discovered during the religious enterprise and to enter the public square with those
truths.” 47 Farr offers several contemporary examples of nations that do not allow such freedom
of religion or the freedom of conscience. 48
The protection of the conscience also conflicts with the deeply held democratic value of
equality. Roger Trigg explains that since equality is connected with political justice, “which
entails equal treatment before under the law,” oftentimes ‘conscientious objectors’ to a particular
public policy may find their position in conflict with the pursuit of equal treatment of all citizens
under the law. 49 Let us consider a very pertinent and recent example in the United States: samesex unions and marriages. On June 19, 2012, a female employee (Jane Doe) of St. Joseph’s
Medical Center in Westchester County, New York filed a class action suit against the center
because she could not get medical insurance benefits for her spouse, a woman (Jane Roe). 50
Although same-sex marriages are now recognized in the state of New York, St. Joseph’s Medical
Center—a Catholic institution—is regulated by the federal, not the state government; thus it is
46
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lawfully protected by the Defense of Marriage Act conscientiously to object, on the grounds of
its religious creed, to providing such benefits to same-sex partners. 51 Janes Doe and Roe are
challenging the Catholic institution and the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.
The argument is as follows:
New York State law consummates and recognizes the marriage of same-sex couples as
legal and binding and requires that those marriages should be accorded the same rights,
benefits and privileges as a heterosexual marriages pursuant to the Marriage Equality
Act [Marriage Equality Act is New York state law]. Because DOMA [Defense of
Marriage Act, i.e. federal law] unlawfully discriminates against same-sex spouses, it is
unconstitutional and therefore should not be used as a basis to deny Plaintiffs their right
to medical benefits under the Plan. In the absence of DOMA, ERISA [Employment
Retirement Security Act of 1974] would (and should under the Tenth Amendment)
follow the law of New York and thus mandate non-discriminatory coverage. 52
Roe and Doe claim that they are subject to a discriminatory law and are not being treated equally
under the law. This case illustrates how these two different rights claims, viz. conscience rights
and equality rights, are often in conflict with one another in democratic societies. Janes Roe and
Doe claim that a right to marriage and its benefits is being denied to them. Theirs is an issue of
equal treatment and justice. However, St. Joseph’s Medical Center claims that the right to
freedom of conscience and freedom to exercise their religious beliefs precludes them from
legitimizing the rights claims of Roe and Doe. Roger Trigg explains:
Rights, in this instance those of homosexuals, often appear to trump any claim to a right
of religious freedom [and of conscience]. When such rights clash, it seems, the solution
is for one to win, and not for any attempt to be made to satisfy both sides…. Much
depends on how highly we rate individual freedom, and the freedom of institutions,
particularly religious ones. When the issue of equality is to the fore, bringing in its trails
appeals to human dignity and human rights, it may be tempting always to override such
considerations. 53
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Mary Ann Glendon points out the problem of framing public discourse in the context of rights,
arguing that it has led to an overall impoverishment of political discourse in America. She writes
that the framing of American public discourse in terms of clashing ‘rights’ leads to:
An intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty [that] corrodes the social foundations on
which individual freedom and security ultimately rest. . . . It is a crisis at the very heart
of the American experiment in self-government, for it concerns the state of public
deliberation about the right ordering of our lives together. In the home of free speech,
genuine exchange of ideas about matters of high public importance has come to a virtual
standstill.54
Since conscience protections, the freedom of conscience and of religion, and the very nature of
political and human rights are increasingly questioned and at odds with each other (and in some
places even denied) in many nations, including, it would seem, in our own American regime,
perhaps a deeper investigation of the meaning, intellectual roots, and political relevancy of
conscience is in order. 55
II. What is Conscience?: A Theoretical Background
In the previous section, I have outlined what many scholars consider the contemporary
‘crisis of conscience’ that has been experienced acutely in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. In summary, three main factors have been identified that are linked to an obfuscation
of the meaning and political role of conscience. First, the lack of a shared sense of the common
good has led to what some call a ‘crisis of conscience’ in contemporary liberal democracies.
This shared sense of the common good has traditionally been based upon a philosophical
anthropology assuming a rational basis for morality, which seems to be increasingly rejected in
favor of individual autonomy, personal preference, and individualism. A political regime that
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tries to protect the rights of conscience risks that conscience claims may be wrongfully or
unjustly used to promote a radically displaced autonomy. The political community may lack the
means to discern or rebuke this abuse of conscience protection, a protection that establishes the
appeal to the common good that serves the community and its laws. Second, the example of
totalitarianism discloses how the ideological commitments of a regime destroy conscience by
insisting on the total adherence to its own collectivist ideas as a substitute for individual
conscience. Third, when the right to freedom of conscience is not promoted or protected by the
law, then there is no other safe or reliable method for anyone to object to any perceived injustice
perpetrated by the regime. Without such safeguards, political society becomes detrimentally
dependent upon “the law of the stronger [rather than] the strength of the law.” 56 Put differently,
instead of a government of laws, the regime becomes a government of men, arbitrarily based on
the will of the powers that be. This synopsis illustrates an intimate connection between the
freedom of conscience and social and political life. However, a more complete understanding of
this relationship requires knowing what conscience is.
The idea of conscience first emerges from the combination of two ancient Greek words,
viz. oida, meaning ‘I know,’ and the prefix sun or syn, meaning ‘together,’ as Eric D’Arcy, W.D.
Davies, and C.A. Pierce each discuss in their studies on the origin of conscience. 57 The Greek
term for conscience, syneidesis, was used initially less as a technical or philosophical term and
more as a term in popular parlance. For example, Eric D’Arcy, Douglas Kries, and Ernest Fortin
point out that the Greek term for conscience, syneidesis (and later used by the medieval
56
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Scholastics as synderesis) is rarely used in Plato and never used in Aristotle. 58 The Greek word
was used to mean “to share knowledge with oneself,” “to know with oneself,” or “to be a witness
for or against oneself.” 59 This understanding of syneidesis points toward the common
understanding of conscience as something that exists at the core of each individual person,
hearkening to him about a particular action or choice. However, the Greek term could also mean
“[to] know together with” or “[to] share (with someone) the knowledge that.” 60 This meaning
points to the reality of thinking together with others about something. C.S. Lewis also points out
that the prefix sun can have “a vaguely intensive force, so that the compound verb [i.e. sunoida
or synoida] can simply mean ‘I know well,’ and perhaps a little more than ‘I know,’” thus
pointing toward an interior awareness or consciousness in an individual human person. The
corresponding Latin term conscientia becomes the literal translation for syneidesis, and it is a
compound word comprised of ‘cum’ meaning with and ‘scire’ meaning to know. Conscientia
was first used in a philosophical sense by the Epicureans. 61 Both in the Latin and Greek classical
usage, the sense of the word also implied a kind of secret knowledge shared between two or
more persons or a sense of being in someone else’s confidence. 62 In the typical Classical usage,
this knowledge is also presumed “to be of evil unless the reverse is explicitly stated.” 63 The
critical point for understanding this pre-Christian Greek meaning and use of syneidesis is to note
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that it was specifically evoked as some interior faculty or some shared knowledge that painfully
chastised and judged a person for his evil actions. Additionally, it is often associated with the
divine for example; the Furies attack Orestes for his conscience in the Aeschylus’s Orestia. 64
D’Arcy and Davies both demonstrate that the ancient use of the term syneidesis does not
necessarily act as a guide for future actions or contain a positive connotation of a ‘good
conscience’ that guides action. 65 A ‘good conscience’ in this Classical sense exists when a
person is aware of no evil deed that he has done. Conscience in its ancient, pre-Christian sense,
functions in a ‘judicial’ manner by passing judgment on a past action and causing pain in the
soul if the action is found to be evil. 66
The meaning of syneidesis and conscientia shifts significantly in the writings of St. Paul.
According to Eric D’Arcy, the idea of conscience is transformed and expanded in St. Paul’s
writings to mean a moral guide for discerning appropriate human actions. D’Arcy demonstrates
that conscience, “is to play a directive role before an action takes place… in St. Paul, conscience
is credited with a legislative function, and it induces an obligation in the proper sense.” 67
However, as Ernest Fortin points out, St. Paul does not develop a comprehensive theory of
conscience but frames his discussion of it as it relates to the place of the Gentiles in the Church
and their relationship to the tenets of Mosaic Law. 68 It is in the early Christian Church Fathers
that we see the beginning of the cultivation and expansion of a theory of conscience that
incorporates its significant role in the discernment between right and wrong moral action, as well
64
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as a judicial role on past actions. A robust theory of conscience that operationally blends the
judicial, directive, and legislative functions of conscience, according to D’Arcy, begins in the
early Church Fathers. 69
The etymology of the word points to a very important aspect not explicitly stated in the
previous section. Both the Greek syneidesis and the Latin conscientia are compound words that
denote a shared knowledge, whether that knowledge is shared with another, with the divine, or
with oneself. Perhaps part of what makes conscience so difficult to define is this very
etymological meaning. On the one hand, this knowledge can be shared with someone else
(making it common with someone other an individual) or it is shared with another or others or
with the divine. Thus, conscience has both an individual, social-relational, and a transcendental
dimension. Robert Vischer explains what he calls the ‘relational’ dimension of conscience:
Conscience cannot be adequately explained as a freestanding individual construct. It
might be expressed and defended by the individual, but its substance and real-world
implications are relational by their very nature. Cultivating and maintaining the
conditions necessary for these relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if
we are serious about freedom of conscience. . . . Conscience, by its very nature, directs
our gaze outward, to sources of formation, to communities of discernment, and to venues
for expression. 70
Vischer points out perhaps one of the most critical points for understanding conscience: by its
nature, it points beyond itself. Even though it is expressed in an individual human person’s
judgments and actions, these judgments and actions are made within the context of something or
someone else. In effect, a proper understanding of conscience will require an investigation of
this relational dimension of conscience. 71 The relational dimension, or perhaps more aptly the
relational dimension of conscience is somehow influenced and formed by human relationships,
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and by institutions of civil society such as churches, universities, and businesses as well as by
political institutions. Gaining a better sense of the foundational elements of conscience to
understand both the individual and the relational dimensions will enable us to accurately address
the current crises of conscience, especially with respect to why the freedom of conscience ought
to be politically protected. Put differently, “if our society is to facilitate an authentic and robust
liberty of conscience, it cannot reflexively favor individual autonomy against group authority; it
must also work to cultivate the spaces in which individuals come together to live out the shared
dictates of conscience.” 72
Thus far, we have ascertained two different functional properties of conscience, viz. the
ancient judicial function of conscience and the Pauline directive or legislative functions. We
have recognized that the claims of conscience have been invoked politically by individual
citizens as a protection against government coercion. We have also identified a relational
dimension to conscience, as individuals make moral decisions in the context of their
relationships and communities. However, these still do not determine what the essence of
conscience actually is. For this assessment, it will helpful to consider medieval Scholasticism
because for the medieval scholars, classifying the different functions of conscience had become a
standard practice. 73 When the concept of conscience began to be more deeply explored in the
medieval universities, the academic literature relied largely on scriptural commentaries produced
by two of the early Christian Church Fathers, Origen and Jerome. We will also examine these
texts in the following chapter, but for now, suffice it to say that both Origen and Jerome
classified conscience as an integral and indispensable element of the human psyche. As
medieval scholars developed theological and philosophical anthropologies based upon the

72
73

Vischer, Robert K. Conscience and the Common Good, 6.
Potts, Timothy C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy.

21

Scriptural commentaries of these and other Patristic writers, and theorized about the structure of
the human soul, their specific academic study of conscience reached its zenith in the medieval
universities, becoming “a standard component…[in] university seminars (written up as Debated
Questions) and textbooks (Summae).” 74 Between the years 1145-1151, Peter Lombard wrote the
standard textbook on theology for the medieval university, and it was a compulsory prerequisite
for the ‘masters’ students to write a commentary on this text. This commentary included a
significant contribution to be made on the topic of conscience. 75 Within Peter Lombard’s work,
drawing from the Patristic sources, the medieval theory of conscience began to develop its twofold classification to describe its function. The primary, ineradicable structural element of
conscience is the defined by the term Greek synderesis (the corruption of syneidesis) as
mentioned above. The Latin term conscientia is used to describe a second component of
conscience, which is the component part of conscience that applies to human acts. The medieval
debate concerning conscience largely centers on where these two elements of conscience reside
in the soul (the will, the reason, etc.) and how they both function in guiding human choice and
human action, especially in relation to the experience of evil.
One distinguished medieval scholar, Thomas Aquinas, takes up this question of
conscience not only in his scholarly commentary on Peter Lombard’s work, but also in his own
academic disputations and Scriptural commentaries, and perhaps most famously, in his own
textbook for beginning theology students, the Summa Theologiae. It is essential for our political
investigation of Aquinas’s idea of conscience that we look to the context of both his
philosophical anthropology and his discussion of law. Aquinas connects his philosophical
anthropology to law and politics in several critical ways that prescribe the limits that politics
74
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must observe with respect to the human person; and these limits are based upon both respect for
and observance of the freedom of conscience as embodied in the law and in legal practice.
Aquinas’s respect for the freedom of conscience is based in his understanding of the human
person. I will argue that the relational dimension of conscience is also to be found in Aquinas’s
work, also based upon his understanding of the human person, particularly on his fundamental
assertion of a shared rational basis for moral thinking. Therefore, this dissertation will probe the
political implications of Thomas Aquinas’s discourse on the idea of conscience in order to
comprehend his distinctive contributions to our understanding of the role of conscience as a
fundamental, valid, and authoritative factor influencing political thought, political philosophy,
and political society. I will examine the ways in which the philosophical anthropology of
Aquinas, one that offers a vision of the human person as both a rational and political being,
contributes to a balanced understanding of both the individual and relational aspects of
conscience.
III. Why Aquinas?
At first glance, it may seem odd that Aquinas be considered a suitable source to engage
the political problems of conscience that are endemic to modernity, especially when we consider
that his most influential work, the Summa Theologiae, is a text directed to beginning theology
students in the medieval university. Although he included in this work a ‘Treatise on Law’, he
wrote no treatise on politics proper. He left his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics almost
entirely unfinished, commenting on only the first two and half books of the text.76 Aquinas
never dedicates a complete work to the political question par excellence: “What is the best
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regime?”; and when he does deal with this question, he gives seemingly contradictory remarks. 77
However, we can begin to appreciate the idea of the political significance of Aquinas’s work
with a brief consideration of some relevant biographical facts about his life. 78 The exact date of
Thomas Aquinas’s birth is unknown, but it is thought to be between 1224 and 1225. The
thirteenth century into which Thomas was born was not a quiet or congenial time:
What we must expect to find in the thirteenth century is constant change; changes
produce movements, and movements occasion clashes…. Among them must be noted
the conflict between secular and papal powers, evangelism and the rise of mendicant
orders, spread of the mystical and prophetical doctrines of Abbot Joachim, and the
growth of scholasticism in the schools of Western Europe. 79
The rise of scholasticism, to which Thomas himself heavily contributed and helped to define,
was the West’s intellectual response to the re-introduction of the Aristotelian corpus by
prominent Muslim and Jewish scholars. Thomas came into this academically vigorous and
politically restive cultural milieu as one of nine children born to nobleman Landulf d’Aquino and
Theodora in Roccasecca, Italy. Thomas was a younger son and therefore not to inherit the
family estate, so his parents inclined him toward a distinguished ‘career’ in religious life that
would befit a nobleman at the near-by Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino. They brought
him there around the age of five to begin his education as a future Benedictine monk. It is said
that his parents had hoped he would become abbot of that influential monastery, and they were
quite devastated when Thomas acted against their wishes and chose instead to enter the
mendicant order of the Dominicans in 1244, with which he became acquainted while he was
studying arts and philosophy at the University of Naples from 1239-1244. 80 As a man of noble
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birth, Thomas was expected to maintain a nobleman’s office, such as abbot of one of Italy’s
finest monasteries – a monastery to which the family of Aquino had given much of their wealth.
Thomas, however, was himself a man of conscience. He rejected such an office and such a life,
instead embracing a humble lifestyle as an impoverished monk. It is famously told that
Thomas’s brother, Reginaldo was sent by their mother to kidnap Thomas when he left to join the
mendicant Order of Preachers so that the family could attempt to convince him otherwise. 81
The radicalism of Thomas’s conscientious decision cannot be overstated. During this
period of history, the Roman Catholic Church was perhaps one of the wealthiest and most
powerful political forces in medieval Western Europe. The D’Aquino family was very involved
in the politicking between popes and emperors, and Thomas’s brother Reginaldo, a courtier of
the emperor, was put to death in 1246 for having conspired with the papacy to murder the
emperor Frederick. Placing Thomas in the abbey of Monte Cassino was a politically astute move
for the Aquino family, who sought to promote best the family and expand its fortune. Yet,
Thomas’s opinion on these religious and political disputes is made obvious not only in his
defiance of the family’s wishes when he left the Benedictines for the Order of Preachers, but also
in his academic writings. For example, in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
Thomas writes that, “the Pope, in virtue of his canonical office, is the spiritual head of the
Church and nothing else; every other political or worldly accretion to this essential spiritual
authority is a historical accident.” 82 Such a comment at this time in the history of Christendom
was in fact quite radical.
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Not only was Thomas defying his family’s wishes by joining a mendicant order, but he
also challenged medieval society at large and especially the academic culture that emerged at the
new universities, who were all skeptical of the newly established mendicant orders. Thomas
Aquinas experienced the outright animosity from the ‘secular’ clergy (meaning that these were
not members of religious orders but were still priests) toward the mendicants in the university. 83
In 1256, Thomas, along with Bonaventure, a Franciscan, were both denied membership in the
theology faculty at the University of Paris because they were mendicant friars, and so they had to
wait until the next year when they were begrudgingly accepted by Canon Christian de Verdun
under the firm command of the Bishop of Paris and several papal Bulls. 84 During the rest of his
academic career, Thomas was constantly balancing his written academic treatises with treatises
and disputations defending the mendicant orders, especially their place in the university and in
the Church, and particularly against accusations that they were antichrists invading the university
and perniciously infecting the life of the whole universal Church. 85
The character and nature of Thomas’s work also illustrates his resolute adherence to the
promptings of his own conscience. As a Dominican scholar, he allied with fellow mendicant
orders such as the Franciscans in the fight for their rightful place in the university; but when it
came to the study and exegesis of Aristotle, Thomas certainly came into conflict with both his
fellow mendicant and diocesan ‘secular’ colleagues. Aquinas engaged the works of Aristotle and
his non-Christian commentators with a respectful rigor and an honest commitment to truth
during a time when Aristotle’s work was considered heretical by many members of the academy,
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thereby earning him a reputation among his colleagues as being academically dissident and
dangerous. 86 According to Vernon Bourke, Thomas’s reputation as dangerous can be
summarized in three points. The first point just mentioned above, that as a mendicant religious,
fellow professors were suspicious of him. Secondly, he was severely criticized for his
interpretation of Aristotle by the ‘Latin Averroist’ school led by Siger de Brabant. The Latin
Averroists and Aquinas differed on matters relating to the structure of the human intellect, the
eternal status of the world, and the function of the human will. The Latin Averroists taught that
“the human will is a passive potency that is actuated in its volitions by intellectual judgments
regarding good and evil. To many [medieval] theologians, this was tantamount to denying free
will.” 87 Aquinas’s reply to this particular conflict (he argued that the will was partly passive and
partly active) caused grave suspicion of him among the more conservative theologians in the
medieval university. 88 This points to the third element marking Thomas as ‘dangerous’: “More
and more he became an object of suspicion to the more traditional theologians in the Orders,
both Dominican and Franciscan, and to the diocesan authorities.” 89 This conflict culminated in
1277 when Bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris issued a condemnation of 219 philosophical
postulates including 20 academic theories based on the insight and teaching of Aquinas. A
fellow colleague at the University of Paris, John Peckman, who later became the Archbishop of
Canterbury, used his Episcopal authority to condemn many of Thomas Aquinas’s ideas in his
diocese. 90 This historical background information illustrates that despite considerable
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opposition, Thomas tenaciously pursued truth as honestly as possible and in accord with his own
conscience. Furthermore, it provides an excellent support to our premise of the importance of
his ideas upon the proper understanding of conscience within the order of political society.
IV. Aquinas and Contemporary Politics
It was not until after Thomas was elevated to sainthood in the Roman Catholic Church
in1325 that his teachings were no longer condemned as heretical. Despite the lifting of this
stigma of heresy, Thomas Aquinas was not then and certainly not even today always appreciated
or fully embraced by many scholars. After a surge in Thomistic studies in the twentieth century
post World War II, many contemporary scholars, and especially political theorists remain
skeptical about Aquinas’ contribution to political philosophy qua philosophy. There are some
who even insinuate that the doctrine of natural law and especially the Thomistic treatment of
conscience, for instance, are untenable without the aid of revealed theology, and therefore should
be considered unscientific and unacceptable as a philosophical theory based purely on a common
human reason. For example, Leo Strauss argues in Natural Right and History:
The Thomistic doctrine of natural right, or more generally expressed, of natural law is
free from the hesitations and ambiguities which are characteristic of the teachings, not
only of Plato and Cicero, but of Aristotle as well. . . . The doctrine of synderesis or of
conscience explains why the natural law can always be duly promulgated to all men and
hence be universally obligatory. It is reasonable to assume that these profound changes
were due to the influence of the belief in biblical revelation. If this assumption should
prove to be correct, one would be forced to wonder, however, whether the natural law as
Thomas Aquinas understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i.e., a law knowable to
the unassisted human mind, to the human mind which is not illumined by divine
revelation. 91
Strauss is uncomfortable with the doctrine of conscience, or ‘synderesis,’ a term for one level of
conscience employed by Aquinas, not only because this idea does not appear in any Classical
texts, but also because it demands that the precepts of natural law, which are universally
91
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available and knowable to all men in all times be absolute, unmalleable, and unchangeable. Yet,
he writes, such precepts “must be mutable in order to cope with the inventiveness of evil.” 92
Instead of natural law based on precepts known to men through their consciences, Strauss opts
for what he calls Classical natural right theory, a theory which avoids the extremes of both the
absolutism of natural law (or at least absolutism as he perceives it) and of moral relativism,
which claims no distinction between right and wrong.
According to Strauss, the natural right theory of Plato and Aristotle is mutable because it
recognizes:
A universally valid hierarchy of ends, but [according to natural right] there are not
universally valid rules of action…. [W]hen deciding what ought to be done, i.e., what to
be done by this individual (or this individual group) here and now, one has to consider
not only which of the various competing objectives is higher in rank but also which is
most urgent in the circumstances. What is most urgent is legitimately preferred to what is
less urgent, and the most urgent is in many cases lower in rank than the less urgent. But
one cannot make a universal rule that urgency is a higher consideration than rank
[emphasis mine]. For it is our duty to make the highest activity, as much as we can, the
most urgent or the most needful thing. And the maximum of effort which can be expected
necessarily varies from individual to individual. The only universally standard is the
hierarchy of ends. This standard is sufficient for passing judgment on the level of
nobility of individuals and groups and of actions and institutions. But it is insufficient for
guiding our actions. 93
Closer scrutiny of this passage from Strauss gives a better sense of his rejection of the doctrine of
conscience, especially in relationship to the natural law. According to Strauss’s analysis of
Aquinas, conscience is what makes intelligible to all human beings the basic precepts of the
natural law. Natural law commands an absolute set of precepts that give to us universal rules
governing human action. Strauss assumes a perspective in his assertion that any set of absolute
or universal rules governing human action is unacceptable to and incompatible with the shifting
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currents of political reality. Political reality, in his view, requires that certain individuals,
groups, or institutions exist under particular conditions, and therefore must disregard universal
rules in favor of universal hierarchy of ends for the preservation of society. 94 What is acceptable
for political society is a ‘universally valid hierarchy of ends,’ or a way of determining the ‘less
urgent’ ends from the ‘more urgent’ ones. Yet, Strauss at the end of this passage introduces
another element in the determination of urgency; that is, our duty to make the highest activity the
most urgent and the judgments we make of the nobility of individuals, groups, and institutions.
What remains unclear in this Straussian schema is a method or criteria by which to determine the
most urgent ends or highest activity to achieve these ends within a society. His natural right
theory claims no such capacity. Strauss leaves us wondering what, if anything, can provide such
criteria.
Strauss relates another more significant objection to natural law and the doctrine of
conscience. He contends that the Thomistic view of natural law, one that proposes real, tangible,
and universal criteria for judging right and wrong moral action, is based upon biblical revelation,
and therefore inaccessible to those who do not profess belief in such revelation. 95 Revelation is
dependent upon a divine source for its legitimacy and not all may agree on the nature and
authority of such a divine source. It is this problem that Strauss’s student, Harry Jaffa, explores
more extensively in his Thomism and Aristotelianism. Jaffa explicitly compares the writings of
Aristotle with Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle to disclose a more accurate description of
the difference between natural right and natural law. Like Strauss, Jaffa recognizes that modern
social science operates by a rejection of systems of values, and is challenged by “any effort to
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bring ‘values’ within the compass of science.” 96 Contemporary social science presumes all value
judgments that determine what ‘ought’ to be done as essentially arbitrary and radically
unscientific. 97 How to determine whether a system of values is actually true is a territory that the
social sciences acutely avoid.
Jaffa more forcefully contends that any promotion of values in the public sphere
associated with religion must be avoided. He acknowledges that religious faith may determine
values within its believers, but a fundamental principle of contemporary democratic liberalism is
to keep religious values outside the public sphere and inconsequential to political decisions.
Jaffa proposes instead a reconsideration of Aristotelian political and moral philosophy based
upon natural reason as the primary guide for value judgments and objective political decisions.
According to Jaffa, Aquinas’s system does not offer the same basis. He writes:
[I]n Thomas’ own system theology, or, more correctly, revealed theology, takes
precedence over the teachings of natural reason. And, although Thomas affirms the
independence and the separability from revealed theology of the teachings of natural
reason, those who dissent from his theology have the understandable suspicion that such
‘harmony’ as Thomas finds between the teachings of reason and of revelation is primarily
due to a corruption of the former…. [This may has also lead] to the further suspicion that
the doctrine itself, to be susceptible to such ‘harmonization,’ must somehow be deficient.
If it can be ‘harmonized’ with a system of revealed theology which appears in all its vital
aspects so manifestly opposed to it, how can it have any real inner core capable of
providing independent practical guidance? 98
Jaffa’s essential question regarding the appropriateness of the application of Aquinas’s thought
to political science is whether there is “anything in the nature of man…which leads him to know
the goodness and desirability of certain kinds of moral conduct, analogous to the way in which
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he is led to recognize the intrinsic goodness of theoretical knowledge?” 99 Thomas Aquinas
answers affirmatively to this question, pointing to conscience, or more precisely, the primary
level of conscience called synderesis as the natural habit of the human person by which human
beings know naturally (that is, instinctive to their nature as human beings) the first principles of
practical reason as expressed in the natural law. Synderesis, therefore, acts as a guide to
recognize and discern moral choice and action. 100 Jaffa questions the existence of such a natural
habit: “Is there a natural habit by which we are commanded to do the acts of the virtues, and by
which we have a sufficient knowledge of these actions to be able to carry out the commands?
This would evidently have to be the case if the natural law is promulgated; and of course, if it
were not promulgated it would not have its strictly legal character.” 101 For Aquinas, synderesis
is connected to human knowledge of natural law, which directs human choice and action. It is
through conscience that all human beings apprehend the first principles of practical reason.
However, Jaffa rejects the place of natural law as a guiding system of values for the
social sciences. Synderesis, he contends, is too vague a concept and it is not found among the
Classical authors, particularly not in Aristotle:
One thing…is perfectly clear, namely: that there is no mention of synderesis (or of any
possible equivalent) by Aristotle…. Thomas borrows the idea of a natural habit of the
principles relative to the end, which Aristotle sets forth with regard to speculative
knowledge, and says that the same thing must be true of moral action. Why it must be
true Thomas nowhere says. Nor does he offer any evidence that it is true. 102
If human beings do not have a clear knowledge of natural law, how then are moral choices to be
made? What determines the criteria and standards for morality? Further, how can communities
and society at large think together about the common good? Jaffa offers a solution based upon
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his reading of the natural right tradition of Aristotle. He advocates a Classical natural right
approach that provides a regime-centered morality. It is worth quoting Jaffa at length to
understand his point:
[L]egal justice commands all the acts of all the virtues from the point of view of the
common good, as conceived by any given political order or regime. But some political
orders are better than others. Therefore, the general character of morality will vary from
regime to regime. Now if the general character of morality varies, then the precepts of a
universal code cannot determine what is naturally just for all men everywhere [emphasis
mine]. Thomas’ rigid scheme is inconsistent with Aristotle’s principle that what is just is
roughly equated with what is legally just, if what is legally just depends upon the nature
of the regime and not upon a code of natural right. But what if it be supposed that the
constitution or regime is a very poor one? We refer, first, to Aristotle’s statement at the
end of Book IV, concerning shame: the good man will defer to the standard of common
opinion, even if it be wide of the truth . . . . The good man, therefore, defers to the law of
imperfect communities, and hence to its moral code; and what the good man does is
morally right. In other words, not to obey the law and the customs of one’s community is
usually unjust, and hence contrary to natural right. As natural right enjoins obedience to
any legal justice which may reasonably be said to aim at the common good, it would
seem to follow that for the most part, it would seem to follow that for the most part, the
mutability of natural right follows, pari passu, the mutability of constitutions. . . . The
common good is the end of the political community. Some communities have very
imperfect notions of what constitutes the common good, yet the preservation of that
imperfect order may yield more of what is truly good than any attempted change. 103
Jaffa proposes the Aristotelian paradigm of a regime centered morality, one that is deeply rooted
in the common good of the community, even if that concept of the common good could be
distorted, unjust, or imperfect. A universal code of morality, one that would be accessible to all
human beings by nature through their conscience poses a problem and a direct challenge to a
moral code determined by a political regime—a moral code that may require simply by its dayto-day demands on its citizens a violation of a fundamental tenet of that moral code, viz. to
promote and to secure the common good.
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In her study Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, Mary Keys
closely examines Jaffa’s challenges to Aquinas and offers an alternative interpretation of
Aquinas’s work in relation to political science. She argues that Aquinas’s insights into political
life, specifically his emphasis on virtue and the common good can help to “moderate as well as
ennoble civic endeavors.” 104 Keys first explains more fully the meaning of the common good,
especially as contemporary liberal democratic societies conceive of it. She specifically calls
attention to the American example, which seeks to reconcile the claims of individual rights and
responsibilities and the comprehensive concept of the common good of all citizens. She
challenges the American regime’s conception of the ‘common good.’ By emphasizing the
insistence in American politics on a strict separation between Church and State, Keys illustrates
the difficulty for us today to imagine “a virtue-promoting, morally substantive, version of the
concept that is not religious or a religious one that is not unreasonable and repressive when it
informs practice.” 105 Aquinas’s natural law theory is often conflated with such religious belief
that is ‘unreasonable and repressive.’ But Keys rejects the imposition of this interpretation of
Aquinas, and argues instead that it is precisely because of his religious orientation, that Aquinas
is able to explore “new panoramas and possibilities for philosophic questioning and
development, many of which remain socially and politically relevant even for those who did not
share his religious convictions.” 106 As an explanation of how Aquinas is able to achieve this,
Keys argues that he examines three Aristotelian political-philosophic foundations; viz., the idea
that human beings are by nature political beings, the classification of regime types corresponds
to the “conceptions of citizenship and civic virtue,” and the idea that political science should
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offer an account for the best possible regime. 107 Keys asserts that the Aristotelian account
particularly of the second and third foundations is unsatisfactory for Aquinas, because Aristotle
does not take seriously enough the “common good of justice and its transpolitical reach,” but
rather “[forsakes] foundational work too quickly in favor of focusing on regime particularities
and preservation. Where the political dialectic of regimes leads Aristotle to a thorough inquiry
of the best regime…in Politics VII and VIII, for Aquinas it prompts a return to the source, to the
common and even universal moral dimensions of social and civic life.” 108
Keys continues to examine Aquinas’s concept of the common good and universal moral
dimensions of social life found particularly in his account of the natural law: “Aquinas’s natural
law theory comprises a subtle yet significant philosophic revision of Aristotle’s framework,
incorporating a new theory of principles of practical reasoning to complement Aristotle’s
speculative first principles and adding an account of synderesis and conscience to Aristotle’s
psychology.” 109 Why does Aquinas introduce these new elements of a natural law, viz.
principles of practical reason, conscience, and synderesis? Why and how would these ‘new
foundations’ help to amplify and to clarify our understanding of political reality? Although Keys
argues that Aquinas shifts the emphasis of morality to the interior of the human person, how
might his understanding of the common good contribute to a relational sense of conscience?
In Strauss, Jaffa, and Keys’ accounts of Aristotelian political science, the focus is on “the
specific principles, aims, institutions, flaws, and mechanisms for strengthening the various
regime types, including oligarchy and tyranny.” 110 The result of such a focus is a regimecentered determination of morality that may too easily transgress the freedom of the human
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person, especially in an unjust regime, such as oligarchy or tyranny. What would be the fate, for
example, of the conscientious objector in such an unjust regime? We have had many recent
answers to this question in the Middle East where in the past two years, we have seen a majority
of the people in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen objecting to (and in some cases,
ousting) their political leaders, most of whom are considered corrupt dictators or even tyrants. In
these regimes conscientious objection was disapproved and incapacitated with the only possible
resolution being subversion and revolution. Aquinas’s theory of natural law moves beyond
regime particularities and offers other criteria upon which we can know the common human
good and how to achieve it. It places “greater emphasis on the interiority of the individual and
on the court of conscience where that individual is always responsible to others.” 111 The critical
insight for Aquinas’s account is the transpolitical end (telos) of all human beings. Therefore,
Aquinas emphasizes that “[the] political community aims at or seeks the common good, the
highest good to be found and approximated or achieved in human affairs and by human actions.
Political community does not itself constitute that good.” 112
Ernest L. Fortin, along with Mary Keys, also stresses the importance of a theory of
conscience as an element of the human person that essentially limits the scope of positive law
and political regimes. According to Fortin, the political importance of conscience is based upon
its “appeal to a higher law in the light of which particular laws and the acts commanded by them
are deemed objectionable or unjust. . . . The crucial political implication [of conscience] is that
human life requires a universality that it did not have and could not have as long as the polis and
its regime represented for most men a total way of life. Civil society is displaced as the locus of
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virtue and the object of man’s deepest and most noble attachments.” 113 Fortin explains that one
of the central insights of Aquinas’s contribution to political philosophy is his theory of natural
law that allows for the realization and actualization of
[A] human excellence [that is] no longer defined or circumscribed by the conditions of
political life. Through knowledge of the natural law man accedes directly the common
order of reason, over and above the political order to which he belongs as a citizen of a
particular society. By sharing in that law he finds himself, along with all other intelligent
beings, a member of a universal community or cosmopolis ruled by divine providence
and whose justice is vastly superior to that of any human regime. . . . Civil society ceases
to be uniquely responsible for the totality of moral virtue and is itself judged by a higher
standard to which human actions must conform universally. 114
What is emphasized in Aquinas’s account of our knowledge of the natural law is not only the
idea of conscience, but also its foundation in shared human reason which points all human beings
to a shared end—an end that is not and cannot ever be fulfilled by any political regime. This is a
critical element in Aquinas’s notion of conscience, and it is one that distinguished his own theory
from those of his contemporaries.
Fortin elaborates his assertion that Aquinas’s most unique contribution to political
science is the natural law. Some justification for this assertion can be seen by considering
Aristotle’s externally directed question, “What is a good man?” Aquinas refines the question
slightly by adding a new dimension, “Why should one be a good man?” and “How does one
choose moral good?” The new dimension turns the question to the interior life of the individual
human person, and the guide to that interior life is defined by Aquinas as conscience, which, he
describes as a habit of reason. But for Aquinas, there is an additional dimension to conscience,
viz. the connection between human reason and the Divine. Conscience points the person beyond
his own beliefs or individual preferences. Fortin explains:
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As a law of nature, the natural law shares in reason and cannot be reduced exclusively to
the will of God. The actions that it commands or forbids are intrinsically good or bad;
they are not good or bad simply as a result of their being commanded or forbidden by
God. As a law, however, it also contains an explicit reference to God’s will, to which it
owes its moving force. It thus stands midway between the natural right doctrine of the
nonreligious philosophic tradition on the one hand and the strict voluntarism of the
nonphilosophic religious tradition on the other.” 115
The very notion that natural law is grounded in human reason yet still capable of being
influenced by a Divine source of authority is precisely what makes it a difficult theory for
contemporary political science.
Yet the idea of a universality of the natural law as proposed by Aquinas leads to another
political problem. Fortin and Keys posit that Aquinas is not satisfied with the Aristotelian, or
even the more general Classical account of political life that places the consummate human good
within a political regime. Any moral order determined solely by a political regime is
problematic for Aquinas. Aquinas emphasizes in his account of political life the shift away from
the exterior political regime to the interior dimension of the individual human person, and that
interior life is guided by the principles of conscience that transcend the social-political order in
which the individual lives and participates. Thereby, Aquinas’s theory of conscience advances
the contention that one’s adherence to conscience over the positive law merits the respect if not
the approval of society at large since the man who appeals to its dictates is presumably faithful to
a law that transcends both himself and society. 116 Further, this law that transcends any particular
political regime is accessible to all and shared by all – pointing toward the relational element of
conscience.
The appeal to conscience has its authority in some greater, interior law that commands
our obedience even to the point of disobeying the legally coercive power of a given positive law.
115
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Yet, those who enforce the positive law are not always accepting of an appeal to conscience; for,
as Fortin points out, “it is frequently impossible to determine with any degree of certitude
whether [a conscientious] dissenter is sincere or merely guided by selfish motives, especially if
the law from which he seeks exemption makes harsh or unpleasant demands on him.” 117
With this argument, both the existence and legitimacy of appeals to conscience are frequently
denied. We might consider the famous example of Socrates who was charged with transgressing
the laws of Athens. Rather than disobey the promptings of his conscience (or his daimon since
the terms ‘conscience’ is not a word that Socrates used), Socrates suffers the penalty of death.
Socrates’ death dramatically illustrates that when the power of conscience threatens the power of
a political regime, conscience often loses.
Fortin claims that Aquinas’s unique and most essential enterprise was his integration of
Christian principles into Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophy. This vision differed from his
contemporaries, who viewed the sciences of the world from a more Augustinian point of view,
which interpreted the sciences as illuminating man’s final end—the sciences form an integrated
whole illumined by faith. Aquinas, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the
science of faith and those of philosophy, although like Augustine before him, however, he
assumes no fundamental disagreement between faith and reason. 118 However, when the
perennial questions are posed about how human beings ought to live and to order themselves
both individually and in communities, this vision of Aquinas anticipates that different answers
offered by faith and by reason become more acute. Reason may answer that the right order to
life is based on convention, or advocate that the natural right tradition may offer the solution that
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human beings should live according to the true principles of nature. But those principles are
accessible to only a few of the truly wise philosophers.
Faith, or more precisely, Christian faith, offers a vision of living well that is accessible to
all because Christ came to save all and all human beings share the same telos of eternal life.
Thus, there is a shared sense of the common good that all humans have. Living well means
following Christ and acting in accordance with the will of God that is known through “the grace
of the Spirit [that] constitutes supreme virtue or the best life possible for a human being.
[However,] is it possible to claim that [these] seemingly quite different ways of life can be the
best possible ways of life?”119 Natural law seeks to alleviate the tension between the presumable
conflicting answers of faith and reason by integrating both in the account for basic human
inclinations. However, still unaddressed are two essential contentions concerning the theory of
natural law, specifically, the epistemological questions of the knowledge it contains and the
mode of intelligible access to its precepts. In other words, how can individual human beings,
each of whom may disagree about the nature of the good, uniformly know the basic moral
principles offered in the natural law? In answer, Aquinas points to conscience.
Yet again we come full circle as we regard the assertion of Douglas Kries. Kries
contends that it is precisely the idea of conscience that the contemporary scholars of political
science finds difficult to accept. Natural law assumes a basic knowledge of moral principles
based on the doctrine of synderesis. The doctrine of synderesis assumes that the knowledge of
moral principles is no longer “the purview of philosophers alone. . . . The strenuous ascent out
of the cave through the dialectical process embedded in liberal education is not essential;
synderesis gives the human intellect the basic tools for solving the problems. Nor is the
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knowledge of natural right any longer limited to philosophers.” 120 Kries further clarifies this
hesitation to accept such knowledge of moral principles:
Theologians, particularly those of the Reformed Tradition of Christianity, tend to reject
natural law teaching because, as a concept imported into Christianity from arrogant
philosophy, it underestimates the complete fallenness of human nature, including the
human intellect’s inability to grasp moral truth on its own. Philosophers, on the other
hand, particularly those who adhere to ancient or classical natural right teaching and
suspect that natural is a concept imported into philosophy from irrational Christianity [i.e.
political philosophers who follow the thinking of Leo Strauss on this particular topic],
tend to reject natural law because it overestimates the intellectual abilities and proclivities
of human beings who are not philosophically adept. 121
Kries argues that for natural law to have any authority in the public sphere, it will have to either
“reconsider or even set aside certain aspects of its teaching on conscience.” 122 He examines
several contemporary schools of thought that conflict with natural law specifically because of its
insistence on a universal knowledge of basic moral principles through conscience, and he argues
that simply “bracketing the claims about conscience” could perhaps allow for a stronger
consensus on moral claims. 123 The weakness of Kries’ conclusion is that he does not explain
how the claims of conscience could be ‘bracketed out’ or what the implications of doing so
would be. What kind of moral consensus could be made if it remains unclear as to how and
whether human beings can know anything about morality? Significantly, he also does not
examine whether or not the claims of conscience, particularly as given in Thomas Aquinas’s
account of the natural law, are in fact a true.
Additionally significant to this debate concern the matter of conscience is presented by
Alasdair MacIntyre. In Whose Justice, Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre situates his
treatment of Aquinas’s account of conscience in the context of his account of human
120
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inclinations, moral knowledge, and action. Aquinas teaches that human beings engage in
practical rational activities, especially in ethical decision-making. Ethical decision making, that
is to say, the decisions made with the consultation of conscience, is therefore intimately linked to
natural human inclinations and to human reason. MacIntyre explains:
There is the directedness of each person qua being toward persisting in that being,
toward self-preservation. There is the directedness of each person qua animal expressed
in the purposiveness of the bearing and education of children to participate in the forms
of human life. And there is the directedness of each person qua rational and social being
in the purposiveness of the pursuit of those rational goods which include the pursuit of
knowledge of God. 124
According to MacIntyre, it is essential that our human inclinations are ordered, and the order of
these inclinations determines our pursuit of particular goods. Yet, the order of these inclinations
(and hence of the human good) requires the proficient exercise of our rationality when we are
faced with a decision regarding a variety of goods. For example, “We subordinate our need for
self-preservation if the lives of our children or the security of our community are gravely
endangered.” 125 The choice to subordinate our own good (i.e. self preservation) for the good of
another requires the exercise of ethical (i.e. practical) reasoning. But how does one make this
choice? MacIntyre replies, “Each individual has within him or herself, on Aquinas’ view, a
capacity for giving the right answers, but this capacity has to be elicited.” 126 Conscience is the
wellspring of this capacity. MacIntyre’s response to what conscience elicits is couched within
the context of the knowledge of good and evil, which directs moral action. If, as Thomas
Aquinas asserts, the first principles and precepts of natural law are universally known to
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individual human beings because they are self-evident, how can moral disagreements exist? Or,
as MacIntyre explains,
If Aquinas’s account is true, we should, so it seems, expect to encounter a much higher
degree of uniformity in moral belief and moral judgment than we actually find. It is also
that on Aquinas’s account the primary precepts of the natural law satisfy the requirements
of practical reason and all sets of precepts incompatible with them fail to do so. We
should also expect…that in rational enquiry and debate the superiority of those precepts
would generally become evident without any great difficulty. But this too is not the case.
So there is a problem. 127
The question of moral consensus presupposes at least three other fundamental questions, viz.
what is good and how do human beings know what is good, and further, how might we discern
the ways to pursue good and to avoid evil? 128
John Finnis also offers a unique view of the natural law and how it fits into to
contemporary political dialogue. Known as one of the ‘New Natural Law’ proponents, Finnis’s
central argument regarding the natural law is the rejection of the influence of either an account of
nature or metaphysics that grounds the natural law. 129 He bases his argument by drawing both
from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on this text. Aristotle
and Aquinas identify four distinct ‘orders’ of science. He writes:
Central to [Thomas Aquinas’s account of social theory, political theory, legal theory,
and theory of justice] is the conclusion that the sciences are of four irreducibly distinct
kinds: (1) Science of matters and relationships unaffected by our thinking, i.e. of the
‘order of nature’...; (2) the science of the order we can bring into our own thinking, i.e.,
logic in its widest sense; (3) the sciences of the order we can bring into our deliberation,
choosing, and voluntary actions, i.e. the moral, economic, and political sciences
compendiously called philosophia moralis; (4) the sciences of the multitude of practical
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arts, the technologies or techniques which, by bringing order into mater of any kind
external to our thinking and willing, yield ‘things constituted by human reason.’ 130
There are several key points that are essential to understanding social and political life according
to Finnis’s account. First, he places human actions and political society “constituted by human
actions” in the third order listed above, i.e. in the order of deliberation, choosing, and voluntary
action. This is central to Finnis’s argument, for he contends that “human actions and societies
cannot adequately be described, explained, justified, or criticized unless they are understood as
also, and centrally, the carrying out of free choices. For neither the making of free choices nor
any of their consequences regarded as such can be reducible to nature, logic, or technique,” that
is to say, the making of free choices cannot fit into any other order of reality as classified
above. 131 It is precisely the element of free choice, writes Finnis, that many political scientists
since Thomas Hobbes reject when theorizing about social and political phenomena. 132
For Finnis, it is essential that the philosophia moralis is placed in this ‘third order,’ the
realm that relates to human actions and is governed by practical reason. He insists that it remains
entirely outside of and unconnected to questions about what is (which would pertain to the first
order according to this schema). To sum up the point, Finnis maintains that an ‘ought’ cannot be
derived from an ‘is.’ 133 He writes:
[The] epistemic source of the first practical principles is not human nature or a prior,
theoretical understanding of human nature (though a theoretical knowledge of the
efficacy, as means, of certain chooseable conduct is relevant to our knowledge of first
practical principles). Rather, the epistemic relationship is the reverse: any deep
understanding of human nature, i.e. the capacities which will be fulfilled by action which
participates in and realizes those goods, those perfections, is an understanding which has
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amongst its sources our primary, undemonstrated by genuine practical knowledge of
those goods and purposes. 134
These first practical principles are listed as the precepts of the natural law in Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae. 135 According to Finnis, the first principles of practical reason are not dependent
upon a theoretical knowledge of human nature. They are pre-philosophical and self-evident
principles that guide human action through the natural law. But how can we call these first
practical principles the principles of natural law if they are not based upon a theoretical
understanding of human nature? Finnis answers: “One understands human nature by
understanding human capacities, those capacities by understanding human acts, and those acts by
understanding their objects.” 136 By arguing that, “capacities are known from their activities and
natures from their capacities,” Finnis constructs his argument so that practical and theoretical
intellects are autonomous. 137 Finnis’s point is an epistemological one: “His point is that we
come to knowledge of human nature from knowledge of human action; therefore we do not come
to knowledge of human action or of what we ought to do from nature.” 138 This would seem to
solve the problem of deriving a moral directive (ought) from a claim of nature (is).
An additional critical question that Finnis raises is “Is that pre-philosophical grasp of first
principles independent of our knowledge of brute facts about the world?” 139 Further, how would
conscience fit into knowing these first principles and how they relate to the ‘brute facts’ about
the world? Thomas Aquinas never anticipated a ‘naturalistic’ fallacy of deriving an ‘ought’ from
an ‘is, and according to Ralph McInerny, the fixation of the New Natural Law proponents on the
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fact/value distinction (or the is/ought problem) presents a dubious theory of practical reason
because its capabilities have been truncated. McInerny explains:
A view of practical reason which regards knowledge of the world to be irrelevant to it
is clearly a view different from what we encounter in Aristotle or St. Thomas. The theory
of practical reason developed by St. Thomas is a good deal more complicated than
the…view Grisez and Finnis seem to espouse. 140
McInerny asserts that Aquinas presents a much more substantial theory of practical reason than
the New Natural Law theorists allow for; and their rejection of certain facts about the human
person as ‘morally irrelevant’ undermines Aquinas and seriously weakens the impact of the New
Natural Law theory as presented by thinkers such John Finnis and Germain Grisez. 141 Our own
assumption argues that more complete treatment of these controversial questions relating to
human nature, its relationship to natural law, and the relationship between conscience, practical
reason, natural law, and moral action can be found in a closer re-examination of Aquinas’s
treatment of them. 142 The New Natural Law theory attempts to fuse the process of ethic decision
making to a particular understanding of practical reason, but Gerald McKenny observes that
perhaps there are simply too many disagreements about the nature of human reason, and it has
become “futile…simply to appeal to reason in the face of moral disagreement today. In this
respect, the Christian natural law tradition appears to share the fate of the Enlightenment project
itself, which proved unable to ground moral and political values in reason alone.... Both fail to
140
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show in a convincing way how this tradition [i.e. the natural law tradition] can effectively
overcome moral disagreements today.” 143
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre restates this same position but
connects to the particular component of justice within the framework of politics. He contends
that there are many variations on the meaning of justice, causing an atmosphere of “conflicting
conceptions of justice” which stems from the underlying problem that Gerald McKenny points to
above, viz. the discord about the meaning of practical rationality. 144 We should consider how
MacIntyre makes this connection. While MacIntyre certainly acknowledges that the questions
related to theories of morality and to the meaning of justice are legitimate matters for speculative
inquiry, he makes a critical connection between these two theoretical questions and their
practical implications:
Fundamental moral disagreements are indeed a matter for theoretical, philosophical
enquiry, just because in such moral disagreement each contending party presupposes a
view of human nature for which truth is claimed…. But disagreements concerning
the truth of this or that theoretical account of the human end initially come to our
attention, not directly but indirectly, at first in the form of practical disagreements about
how we ought to act here and now. 145
MacIntyre suggests that our encounters with critical moral, social, and political disagreements
are intricately linked to the disagreements about human ends, and this debate leads to conflict
about what ought to be done here and now. One of these very disagreements is precisely about
the capabilities of our practical reason. Here, we pose the question, what has any of this to do
with our conscience? Aquinas answers by indispensably situating conscience into a resonating
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relationship with practical reason. Therefore any proper understanding of conscience
presupposes a proper understanding of practical reason.
The foregoing discussion reviewed the treatment of Aquinas within contemporary
political science. His work and ideas continue to provoke vigorous debate within political
philosophy. We considered how Strauss and Jaffa hold that the doctrine of synderesis (and of
natural law) is a specifically Christian accretion that deviates from the Classic tradition of Plato
and Aristotle. Kries’ solution to this problem is simply to set aside or bracket out the claims of
synderesis: “If the traditional emphasis upon the universal knowledge of natural law is bracketed,
then, the realm of what could be asserted as belong to the natural law would be broadened.” 146
Yet, other scholars like Mary Keys and Ernest Fortin take very seriously the critiques of Strauss
and Jaffa, but assert that the strength of the natural law foundation of Aquinas’s political
philosophy is its “greater emphasis on the interiority of the individual and on the court of
conscience where that individual is always responsible to others, whether individuals or
communities.” 147 We examined how other scholars such as John Finnis and the New Natural
Law co-theorists solve the problem by arguing that the contents of synderesis are universally
knowable, although they believe that it is not necessary to offer any account of metaphysical
reality. 148 Alasdair MacIntyre, while sympathetic to the goals of the New Natural Law project,
remains skeptical that an accurate or adequate account of natural law can be given without
reference to some kind of expression of metaphysics. Russell Hittinger further criticizes the
New Natural Law theorists on this point: “Any effort to extract a part of the ethic [in this case,
the ethic of natural law] in the absence of its proper foundations, or to assign that part to some
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other foundation, is tantamount to constructing a materially different ethic.” 149 The fundamental
question is, “to what degree is practical reasoning itself dependent on an order of being that is
not simply arbitrary but one with its own intrinsic order in nature, in human nature?” 150 We are
led once again to the problem posed by Jaffa and Strauss: Is the natural law and doctrine of
synderesis intelligible without reference to divine Revelation, or at least to some theory of
metaphysics? Medievalist Brian Tierney offers a helpful view on this matter. In his study On
the Idea of Natural Rights, Tierney argues that the medieval philosophers (of which Aquinas is
one) were not arguing only from the assumption of “Christian revelation or from some allembracing natural-law theory of cosmic harmony but from an understanding of human nature as
rational, self-aware, and morally responsible” [emphasis mine]. 151 He proposes that to
understand Aquinas’s vision of conscience and natural law, we ought to examine his account of a
shared human nature as rational. This theme will be explored throughout the dissertation.
However, it cannot be denied that Thomas Aquinas is unapologetically Christian. As
such, he also argues that there is indeed a highest human good (summum bonum) for the human
person that cannot be fulfilled by the political regime. 152 The highest good and last end of the
human person for Aquinas is achieved “through union with God...in which along man’s
happiness consists.” 153 The highest human good for Aquinas is the Beatific Vision – a friendship
(relationship) with God formed through faith in love. I suggest that although Aquinas writes
within a fully Christian tradition, his work is an “essential resource for political theorists today,
precisely because it delves deeply into the philosophic-anthropologic and ethical foundations of
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social and civic life, and so better enable us to envision the purpose of politics.” 154 These deeper
philosophic-anthropologic and ethical foundations, I argue, are precisely Aquinas’s most
essential insights into human conscience. Specifically, by a deeper examination of how Aquinas
classifies the two-fold nature of conscience as synderesis and conscientia, especially relating
them to a shared rationality as expressed in the natural law, Aquinas offers a balanced (and
timely) approach to the individual, relational, and transcendent dimensions of conscience. By
examining his theory in these contexts, I aim to offer a robust re-consideration of the political
relevance of conscience and to offer a concrete vision of how Aquinas might help enable us to
think together about the common goods in our shared moral, social, and political life.
V. Chapter Descriptions
In the next chapter, I will give a more detailed historical analysis of the sources that
Aquinas draws from in order to construct his own theory of conscience, arguing that Aquinas’s
most innovative contribution is his reliance upon Aristotle, particularly Aristotle’s account of
reason, and upon Augustine’s theological framework. The third chapter will focus on the
intrinsic connection of conscience to practical reason and how Aquinas posits that human beings
come to know moral precepts in his two earlier works on conscience, viz. his Commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard and his Disputed Questions on Truth. The fourth chapter will
examine the connection Aquinas makes between conscience and law, particularly the natural
law, and it will also address how Aquinas would argue for freedom of conscience in political life.
I will examine the Summa Theologiae and Aquinas’s Commentary on Romans. The fifth and
final chapter will juxtapose Aquinas’s terminology of the primary level of conscience as
synderesis with an alternative term proposed by Joseph Ratzinger, J. Budziszewski, and Eric
Voegelin, viz. anamnesis. I aim to examine whether synderesis or anamnesis best contributes to
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a robust theory of conscience that encapsulates all of its dimensions: individual, relational, and
transcendental. Political philosopher Eric Voegelin has also proposed the term anamnesis as a
way of understanding human nature qua rational and political. This concluding chapter will
consider the implications of this alternative term for the primary level of conscience and seek to
re-propose the importance of the primacy of conscience for our own political discourse.
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Chapter II: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of Conscience
“We must allow the innermost element within us to speak. And that element knows that the
Good exists…. Now this Good does not hover vaguely somewhere in remote and inaccessible
space. It is in contact with me; it touches me. There exists in me something that responds to the
Good, as the eye responds to light—Conscience.” 1
When we consider the political relevance of a theory of conscience, we should recall an
essential element of free government, viz. government based on consent. This consent, argues
Charles N.R. McCoy is “based on man’s moral freedom.” 2 Consent also requires others with
whom you consent about common shared goals. Conscience, I argue, is the bulwark of man’s
moral freedom upon which free government is based and by which government is also limited,
providing a “safeguard against mere conformity and conventionality.” 3 In this chapter, we will
examine the foundational framework and sources from which Aquinas structures his theory of
conscience in order to understand the connection he makes between human conscience and
human freedom. This will give critical insight into the function of conscience in the formation of
the law and in the promotion of freedom of the human person. Thomas explains conscience in
the Summa Theologiae in the context of human nature and law (particularly the natural law).
Thus, in this dissertation I will examine the political implications of Aquinas’s particular context
when he discusses conscience. However, the Summa Theologiae is not the first place where he
outlines his views on the matter, and his own thinking develops as new academic discoveries
come to the medieval academy, particularly the introduction of Aristotle’s writings and the
Islamic and Jewish commentaries on Aristotle. However, before we investigate the particular
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works in which Aquinas develops his theory of conscience, we should first consider the sources
from which he draws that influenced his own formulation.
Aquinas draws from two important sources in the development of his theory of
conscience, viz. Classical sources, most importantly Aristotle, and the early Christian Patristic
sources, perhaps most importantly, Augustine. I argue first that Aquinas’s interpretation of
Aristotle’s work is a critical element to understanding the specifically political significance of
Aquinas’s account of conscience. Aquinas was also heavily influenced by Neo-Platonic sources
and ancient Roman sources, but I will focus primarily on how Aristotle influenced Thomas’s
formulation on conscience. The Patristic sources are equally important for Aquinas, especially
the contribution of Augustine. I will examine how Augustine’s emphasis on free will plays an
important role in the formation of Aquinas’s theory of conscience that Aquinas uniquely
connects with Aristotle’s understanding of human reason. The work of two other crucial
Patristic sources, viz. Jerome and Origen, launched the very idea of conscience (particularly of
synderesis) as a matter of inquiry and investigation for medieval university scholars. While this
chapter will briefly survey the some of the other critical Classical and Patristic sources upon
which Aquinas draws, I will focus the majority of this chapter on the important contributions of
Aristotle and Augustine, as these two thinkers were at the center of the academic controversies
during Aquinas’s time. 4 Aquinas’s great genius is the synthesis of Aristotle’s “view of practical
reasoning and…[Augustine’s] development of the Pauline doctrine of the defective human
will.” 5 The chapter will be divided into two main parts examining the theoretical and historical
background of the term synderesis, which is used by the Scholastics to explain conscience and its
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function in moral and political life. The first section will address the Classical sources,
especially the Aristotelian contributions. The second section will focus on the Patristic
contributions, particularly the use (and subsequent corruption of) of the term syneidesis by
Origen and Jerome, and Augustine’s contribution to understanding conscience.
I. Theoretical and Historical Background
A. Classical Sources
Although a theory of conscience is not explicitly elaborated by the Greek philosophers, I
will argue that some critically important elements of Aquinas’s account of conscience depend
much upon Aristotle’s moral theory, particularly Aristotle’s articulation of practical reason. 6 I
will also briefly sketch the roots of conscience in ancient Roman philosophy—translated as
conscientia. D’Arcy helpfully characterizes the Classical use of synderesis/conscientia as
‘judicial,’ meaning judgment of past actions, and Davies explains the Hellenistic roots of the idea
of conscience and points to important Epicurean sources for the term. 7 Most scholars agree that
in each of these Classical sources “the use of conscience in a moral context refers primarily, if
not exclusively, to a sanction or reward for past acts.” 8 The Greek word synderesis used by the
Scholastics is a corruption of the word syneidesis. Although not considered a purely
philosophical term, in ancient Greek works spanning from the sixth century BC to the seventh
century AD, the term syneidesis and its derivatives appear in “every possible sort of writer…It is
in fact an ‘everyday’ [word], and belonging rather to ‘folk-wisdom.’” 9 C.A. Pierce argues that
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the Greek term syneidesis does not have a systematic philosophical development prior to its
Christian usage, but instead was used colloquially and picked up by St. Paul in his pastoral
letters. The common usage connoted three important elements with respect the nature, reference,
and function of syneidesis. 10 First, it was considered to be “an element of human nature as such;
but at the same time of human nature as integrally involved in an ordered universe.” 11 This is a
very important piece of evidence, because this usage connects the term to a sense of some kind
of natural law (an ordered universe) within which human nature participates. Natural law is
considered by some to be a purely Christian invention, but Pierce cites a writer as early as
Xenophon (410 B.C.) for this use of the word in this sense, certainly predating Christianity. 12
Secondly, the use of the prefix syn-, which is a reflexive pronoun, illustrates that the term is
concerned solely with an individual man’s interior acts: “the knowledge a or awareness that a
man has, the witness that he is in a position to bear-is internal.” 13 According to Don Marietta,
the term “syneidesis is derived from the verb synoida, a compound of oida (eidenai), which
means to know immediately or intuitively, as opposed to acquiring knowledge through reasoning
(noein). This sense of the verb continues to be basic to the meaning of the nouns syneidesis,
synesis, and syneidos. Conscience is a form of knowing.” 14 The meaning of these terms have
various usages typically referring to consciousness or awareness, according to Marietta,
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gradually came to be used as meaning an awareness of one’s evil deeds. 15 He argues that the
development of the moral meaning of syneidesis derives from the
Hellenistic concern for ethics and the individual's inner attitudes fostered the
development of the concept of conscience. The term syneidesis and its cognates were
used in reference to both ethical and non-ethical matters. The Greeks did not distinguish
between conscience and consciousness as speakers of English do. The ethical and nonethical aspects (which are distinguished by the English word "conscience") were
conveyed by the same word, and only the context indicated the moral quality of the
object of the consciousness. This shows that syneidesis was basically a form of awareness
or knowing. 16
The ancient usage of the word, however, is almost always of past actions. Thus, the reference of
syneidesis “is to the specific past act or act…committed by the subject himself…. [N]ormally the
act, acts, condition or character are bad.” 17 Conscience in the Classical usage and reference,
albeit popularly so, has a judicial quality that judges a person for his own bad actions that
transgressed the order of nature as it is. As a result, the function of conscience is that it causes
pain and torment in the psyche of the one who suffers its pangs. The ancient Greek connation of
syneidesis is “the pain suffered by man, as man, and therefore as a creature involved in the order
of things, when, by his acts completed or initiated, he transgresses the moral limits of his
nature.” 18
When the term is translated in the Latin conscientia, Cicero is the primary pre-Christian
author in whose writing the term conscientia is frequently found. 19 The term conscientia is
usually thought to be developed most prominently by the Stoic thinkers of antiquity, particularly
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the Roman Stoics. However, scholarship in the latter half of the twentieth century on the topic of
conscience suggests that there is not a strong Stoic development of the term, but instead an
Epicurean usage that is much more pronounced. 20 W.D. Davies writes:
When we ask whether the Latin writers reveal in Stoicism an emphasis on conscience, the
answer is in the negative…. [T]he use of ‘conscience’ in Stoicism cannot have been
central, and whenever the term does occur in Stoic connections, it undergoes
modification. Thus the strong conscience, desiderated by Seneca, really signifies strong
character. The Latin writers, therefore, lend no support to the view that conscience was a
peculiarly Stoic doctrine, while they suggest that, in its Latin form at least, conscience
was a concept much employed in literary circles. 21
Further, when Cicero does mention conscience, it is usually when explaining or responding to
the Epicureans. 22 For the Epicureans, conscience has a particular purpose, one that perhaps
tends toward an anti-political end. According to Ernest Fortin, the “hallmark of the Epicurean
doctrine [of conscience] is that it integrates conscience into a hedonistic framework.” 23 To
illustrate the point, I will consider the first book of Cicero’s De Finibus wherein the interlocutor
Torquatus gives a summation of the Epicurean view of philosophy in an effort to convince
Cicero of its veracity. In his account, Torquatus defends the view that man’s final end and
ultimate good is the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Not to be considered
simplistically as an intemperate man, Torquatus qualifies the argument:
What does [a person] perceive and judge as the basis for pursuing or avoiding anything
except pleasure of pain? Some Epicureans wish to refine this doctrine: they say that it is
not enough to judge what is good or bad by the senses. Rather they claim that intellect
and reason can also grasp that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake, and likewise pain
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to be avoided. Hence, that there is as it were a natural and innate concept in our minds by
which we are aware that one is to be sought, the other shunned. 24
Torquatus next offers a utilitarian method of discerning pleasure and pain. Painful things or
situations can only be pursued if they lead to a more pleasurable end; pleasurable things or
situations should be avoided if they cause a more painful end. He elucidates his point by using
as examples the four cardinal virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. 25 Each virtue
demonstrates a particular way in which pleasure is better than pain. According to the Epicurean
view, “the root cause of life’s troubles is ignorance of what is good and bad…. It is only the wise
person, by pruning back all foolishness and error, who can live without misery and fear.” 26
Wisdom ought not to be pursued for its own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure it yields by
removing fear and misery. Likewise, temperance ought to be pursued to keep a person from
pursuing pleasures so indiscriminately that he becomes a slave to the passions. Courageous
actions lead to glory—again still a greater pleasure than the act of courage itself, by Torquatus’s
telling.
The interesting case Torquatus makes is with respect to justice, because he does not
actually address specific ways in which just actions can give pleasure, but he does address how
unjust actions in the form of dishonesty, foolhardiness, lust, and cowardice (which are vices
associated with the other cardinal virtues) can give pain. It is in this context that Torquatus
mentions conscience. Justice, he argues, contains in itself pleasure, because it never harms
anyone, brings benefits, and quiets the spirit. 27 Then Torquatus adds, “Foolhardiness, lust, and
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cowardice unfailingly agitate and disturb the spirits and cause trouble. In the same way, when
dishonesty takes root in one’s heart, its very presence is disturbing. And once it is activated,
however secret the deed, there is never a guarantee that it will remain secret.” 28 Torquatus
deflects from the question of justice and turns instead to other vices such as he names above–
considered by him to be vices because they disturb the spirit with the fear of being found out:
“But even if those who appear to be well enough fortified and defended against discovery by
their fellow humans still live in fear of the gods…. Any contribution that wicked deeds can
make to lessening the discomforts of life is outweighed by the bad conscience, the legal
penalties, and the hatred of one’s fellow-citizens.” 29 Conscience does function ‘judicially’ as a
judge of past actions, punishing with fear the person who acts with ‘dishonesty, foolhardiness,
lust, or cowardice.’ However, it is not because the Epicurean believes that these acts are bad in
themselves, rather because the person committing them will always fear that his actions will be
discovered. The pangs of conscience that the Epicurean may suffer are simply based on the fear
of being found out or discovered, either by his fellow men or by the gods, but they do not alert
him to disorder in his soul. None of the virtues are pursued for their own sake, but simply as a
means to an end, “Those who accept [the virtues] do so only by necessity or for the sake of a
lesser evil. Far from being a primary phenomenon, [the virtues arise] out of the situation created
by man’s universal desire for his own advantage, if need be at the expense of others.” 30 For the
Epicurean, conscience seems to have a role that alerts a man when his interests could be at stake
because of a past action he committed.
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Cicero specifically replies to Torquatus’s emphasis on a guilty conscience, calling it a
weak and feeble argument. 31 In his De Legibus, Cicero offers a very different view of moral
virtue, particularly of justice. While by the Epicurean account, justice is used as a means, Cicero
advocates a view of nature that human beings are “born for justice, and that right is based, not
upon men’s opinions, but upon nature.” 32 Justice is thus natural to human beings, and they are
so constituted,
As to share the sense of Justice with one another and to pass it on to all men. And in this
whole discussion I want it understood that what I shall call Nature is [that which is
implanted in us by nature]; that, however, the corruption caused by bad habits is so great
that the sparks of fire, so to speak, which Nature has kindled in us are extinguished by
this corruption, and the vices which are their opposites spring up and are established. But
if the judgments of men were in agreement with Nature, so that, as the poet says, they
considered ‘nothing alien to them which concerns mankind,’ then Justice would be
equally observed by all. For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from
Nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of
Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. And they have received
Law, they have received Justice also. Now all men have received reason; therefore they
all have received Justice. 33
It is not conscience, but rather right reason that for Cicero guides man to live according to virtue
and to act justly. Moreover, this right reason is given to all human beings and is reflected in both
nature and in law. He does, however, mention conscience in connection with remorse of acts of
vice. A guilty conscience, according to Cicero, reflects Nature’s injunction to act justly by
tormenting one who acts against it. 34 Cicero’s emphasis, especially contra the Epicureans, is that
by nature human beings are enjoined to be just, “Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist
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in Nature,” or perhaps more properly “in our natural inclination to love our fellow-men.” 35 What
we see in Cicero are several important developments. First, he insists that virtue and particularly
justice are not means to an end or for the purpose of serving utilitarian ends, but are natural to
human beings and in accordance with right reason. This right reason is based upon law that is
applied to command and prohibition as quoted above. These developments we will see are
incorporated into Aquinas’s account of conscience, especially as it relates to the natural law.
B. Aristotle and Conscience
The Classical author who is the most influential on Aquinas’s thought is Aristotle, and it
is my argument that of the Classical sources, Aristotle’s work contributed most significantly to
Aquinas’s theory of conscience. Such a consideration is not typically explored by scholars, as
many believe that Aristotelian natural right and Aquinas’s natural law are based upon two
opposite sources, viz. natural insights and observation of the world and special revelation,
respectively. Ross J. Corbett puts it succinctly, “Natural law does require…that its contents be
knowable by natural lights, meaning without special revelation.” 36 But is such a ‘natural law’
found in Aristotle’s work? The key discussion on natural law and natural right is found in
Aristotle’s treatment of political justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle states
that “What is just by nature in the political sense can be subdivided into what is just by nature
and what is just by convention.” 37 What is just by nature, while “not dependent upon any human
opinion for its being right,” 38 is “nevertheless changeable, as are all things human.” 39 For
Aristotle, what is just or right by nature is tied to a particular regime, and while it may change,
35
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there is a regime that is best by nature in all circumstance. The critical point here is that natural
right is tied to political justice. 40 Unlike natural law, natural right as it is contingent upon
political regime; it is changeable, and further, it is not necessarily accessible to all and may not
necessarily inform moral choices. For example, Ross Corbett writes, “Not all morally serious
people would agree that it was originally a matter of indifference whether one sacrificed a goat
or two sheep (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1134b 25-35). All morally serious people do agree, on the
other hand, that some things are just wrong. The question is, what are they, and how do we
articulate them?” 41
Aquinas supplies an answer in synderesis, or the special natural habit by which we know
the first practical principles. 42 This special natural habit informs our conscience by working to
“induce to good and prevent evil.” 43 However, Harry Jaffa and other scholars find this claim
untenable, pointing out that Aristotle simply does not use the term synderesis (or more properly
syneidesis) and, Aristotle has a very different notion of natural right than Aquinas’s natural
law. 44 Jaffa points to Aquinas’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Again, let us consider
the passage from Book V where Aristotle distinguishes between natural right and legal right.
Both are contained in political justice. Aristotle’s text reads: “What is by nature just has the
same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just.” 45 In his
commentary on just this sentence, Aquinas interprets Aristotle in the following manner:
First [Aristotle] explains natural justice in two ways: in one way according to its effect or
power, saying that that justice is natural which everywhere has the same force and power
to induce to good and prevent evil. This happens because nature, the cause of this justice,
40
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is the same everywhere among all men…. In the other way he explains this justice
according to its cause, when he says that natural justice does not consist in what seems to
be, i.e. it does not arise from human conjecture but from nature. In speculative matters
there are some things naturally known, like indemonstrable principles…. Likewise in
practical matters there are some principles naturally known as it were, as evil must be
avoided, no one is to be unjustly injured, theft must not be committed and so on… 46
Aristotle of course makes no mention in this passage or in any previous or subsequent part of the
Nicomachean Ethics that natural justice induces to good and prevents evil, nor that there are
naturally known principles of practical reason to direct human beings in practical moral matters.
Jaffa accuses Aquinas of imputing his own religiously-based agenda of natural law onto
Aristotle. The evidence of synderesis or of natural law, Jaffa argues, is simply not present in
Aristotle’s corpus. What is most troubling for Jaffa is the statement of a natural and
unchangeable notion of good. If the good is unchangeable, then a statesmen will be rendered
unable to respond to situations that may require him to “reluctantly [deviate] from what is
normally right in order to save the cause of justice and human itself.” 47
Mary M. Keys argues that Aquinas’s version of natural law (including the natural habit of
synderesis by which we know its unchangeable principles) owe more to the Patristic (and
especially Augustinian) tradition than to Aristotle because of the insight of man’s transpolitical
end. 48 Vernon Bourke more emphatically states that the synderesis principle stating that “good
should be done and evil avoided” is found in the Scriptures in Psalm 33:15: Diverte a malo et fac
bonum. Bourke argues that the first thinker to ascribe this rule to the content of synderesis is
Alcuin, who drew from Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 33 in his Ennartiones in Psalmos.
46
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Thus, he concludes that the underlying formulation of synderesis must be attributed to
Augustine, rather than to Aristotle or any other pre-Christian thinker: “It seems that people not
influenced by the Bible have little to say about the synderesis rule. One may wonder, then, just
how ‘natural’ is our knowledge of this basic imperative.” 49While the exact formulation “pursue
good and avoid evil” may not be found in Greek philosophical sources, one may point to Plato’s
Republic, specifically the myth of Gyges (Book II, 359c-362a), the myth of Er (Book X, 614b621d), and indeed the entire life of Socrates as a witness to pursuing what is good and avoiding
what is evil. In Aristotle’s work, we see in the opening lines of the Politics and the
Nicomachean Ethics, respectively, an emphasis on the human pursuit of the good:
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a
view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think
good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which
the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than
any other, and at the highest good. 50
and
Every art or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every
action and choice seem to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well defined
as the things at which all things aim. 51
Here we see Aristotle emphasizing the primacy of good in practical matters. Further, Bourke
does not address the connection that Thomas Aquinas makes between the principle of synderesis,
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human inclinations, and human experience. Perhaps Aquinas’s treatment of these components
will make the synderesis principle, natural law, human choice, and even conscience more
generally applicable to common human experience than they might initially appear to be.
Michael B. Crowe acknowledges some key elements of Aristotle’s thought to Aquinas’s
formulation of synderesis and conscientia, but argues that this contribution is limited:
Most closely concerned with the development of natural law theory are some of the
general positions adopted by Aristotle in epistemology. There is his conception of the
intellectus agens as a natural light which enables us to have right knowledge of the first
principles. With this may be compared the doctrine concerning the intuitive reason
brought into play in the acquisition of the first principles of moral reasoning. There is
here some affinity with the scholastic teaching on synderesis and the habit of first
practical principles but, as will be seen, it cannot be pushed too far. 52
For Crowe, this affinity with synderesis in Aristotle comes from Aquinas’s using an Aristotelian
argument to prove that it cannot err. For example, in De Veritate, Aquinas answers the question
regarding whether synderesis can err with the following argument:
Consequently, all changeable things are reduced to some first unchangeable thing.
Hence, too, it is that all speculative knowledge is derived from some most certain
knowledge concerning which there can be no error. This in the knowledge of first
principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by
reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected. If error could take
place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of knowledge which follows. As
a result, for probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent
principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are
examined, so that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all good. This is
synderesis, whose task is to warn against evil and incline to good. 53
According to Crowe, the argument that Aquinas gives to prove of the existence and infallibility
of synderesis is decidedly Aristotelian, but the terminology is not found in Aristotle. Given this
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preponderance of evidence that illustrates the idea of conscience not being present in Aristotle
(and perhaps even inimical to Aristotle’s work as Jaffa suggests), how may it be argued that
Aristotle’s influence is an essential part of Aquinas’s theory of conscience?
Some scholars, such as Hayden Ramsay, suggest that perhaps this matter warrants
another look and a different approach. He does not argue that the word synderesis can be found
in Aristotle or that moral principles are both naturally known and unchangeable in Aristotle’s
moral theory: to do so simply cannot be verified. It may be helpful to recall that much of the
development of Aristotle’s moral theory develops because of his objection of Plato’s
identification of virtue and knowledge. Charles McCoy explains:
Plato was prompted to hold the Doctrine of Ideas because he had observed that all
knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, and that since it is a fact that
things understood in the intellect are understood under conditions of immateriality and
immobility, it seemed to him that things must similarly exist in themselves. The
consequence of this view was that all knowledge was reduced to a kind of metaphysics,
which itself bore the imprint of purely logical being. Now the contribution of Aristotle
was to show that while it is true that all knowledge takes place through some kind of
similitude, the conditions of immateriality and immobility under which the intellect
receives the species of material and movable bodies does not imply that these latter are
themselves without matter: for what is received by the knower is received according to
the mode of the recipient. 54
To illustrate the point, there exists no over-arching, unchangeable Form of Humanity, but only
individual, embodied, concrete particular human beings. We only experience particular human
beings, but somehow we understand that each person falls into the category of human being and
not into the category of cat or of tree. What might such an approach to human knowledge have
to do with morality?
To begin to answer these questions, it is worth noting a similarity between Aristotle and
the Christian theologians who developed the theoretical language of conscience. The theoretical
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framework of conscience develops as an attempt to reconcile a tension between human
knowledge, human action, and human choice. A key text in Scripture that theologians point to is
Romans 7:15, “For that which I work, I understand not. For I do not that good which I will: but
evil which I hate, that I do.” The theory of conscience progresses along this investigation of the
interior separation in the human psyche between knowledge and action, or to put it another way:
it is a confrontation with the problem of evil experienced both in oneself and in society. This
tension is explored in Plato’s work as well as in the work of Aristotle. Aristotle investigates this
problem when he examines the topic of ‘moral weakness’ in book VII of the Nicomachean
Ethics. Aristotle here critiques the Socratic-Platonic view that “no one acts contrary to what is
best in the conviction that what he is doing is bad, but through ignorance of the fact that it is
bad.” 55 In other words, in his investigation of moral weakness, Aristotle criticizes the Platonic
connection between virtue and knowledge; only those who truly have no knowledge of what is
good will act contrary to it. Rather, he recognizes, much like the Pauline insight, that those who
are morally weak are capable of “[deliberation] but do not abide by their decisions.” 56 Thus,
questions about the nature of conscience are explored because of the problem of evil: how is it
that evil exists in the world if we know what is right? How does evil exist in me when I know
what is right? Further, what sources exist to avoid evil and to enable individual to pursue good?
How does our knowledge affect our choices and our actions?
This experience of evil in the world is a common human experience, and the language of
conscience was used even by the ancients to explain and to explore it. Recall that C.A. Pierce
documents an extensive use of the term syneidesis and its grammatical variations in ancient
Greek popular culture. Marietta states that it is a way of knowing. Perhaps, instead of
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contrasting natural right to natural law and in doing so conclude that Aristotle does not posit a
concept of synderesis, or any knowledge of the first practical principles, we may consider
Ramsay’s approach to the investigation of conscience, viz. that on closer examination, “we may
find that conscience is ultimately grounded not in Christian theology and Stoic morals, but in
logos itself, the experience of reason as the Greek and later philosophical traditions understood
this.” 57 It is this sense of reason— a robust reason that is capable of discerning good and bad,
right from wrong and choosing actions in accordance with that discernment—that establishes the
theoretical foundation for moral actions, and more specifically, for conscience. This classical
understanding of reason, shared with many thinkers like Aquinas, points to an “experiential order
that has been there all along.” 58 The ‘experiential order’ is guided by conscience, and although
Aristotle never explicitly mentions the nomenclature of conscience, many important foundational
elements of it are established in his work. First, in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, there is
an emphasis on the interiority of the human person and on how an individual’s internal order of
the soul affects the order of a political society. The notion of conscience as Aquinas develops it
shifts to focus on the interiority of the human person, “where that individual is always
responsible to others, whether individuals or communities.” 59 This point is easily discerned, as
Aristotle himself tells that the student of politics must know about the interior workings of the
human soul, and offers his reflections on the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics as a prologue to
his Politics. 60 Before inquiring into what the best regime might be, one must know something
about what the best human being and the best human life ought to be. Aristotle inherits this
theoretical framework from both Plato and Socrates before him. Second, Aristotle’s
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philosophical anthropology that a thing’s nature (and more specifically—a person’s nature) is
teleological, and that it “not only provides the end to which a thing is directed, but also the
sources from which a thing achieves its telos: things that exist by nature have interior principles
ordering them toward their ends.” 61 For example, Angela McKay argues that Aquinas’s
understanding of nature, for which he depends heavily on Aristotle, provides critical insight on
this point, because “for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, nature provides things not merely with the end
that they are ordered to, but with the very principles that allow them to arrive at their ends.” 62
One could argue that these principles are contained in the primary level of conscience,
synderesis, which orders a human person to his end. Finally, the very idea of a moral law that
has its foundation in rational directedness to pursue goods that promote human flourishing and
human happiness is heavily drawn from Aristotle; this makes the human good intelligible, and
especially influences Aquinas’s understanding of practical reason and the virtue of prudence.
Let us first consider Aristotle’s view of nature. Angela McKay builds her case for an
Aristotelian foundation of synderesis by turning first to Aristotle’s Physics and to the
Aristotelian account of nature that underlies Aquinas’s own formulation of human nature. For
both Aristotle and Aquinas, everything that exists in nature contains “a principle and a cause of
being moved or of rest in the thing to which it belongs primarily and in virtue of that thing, but
not accidentally.” 63 There is a final cause or end to which everything in nature tends. In his
commentary on the Physics, Aquinas states, “It is of the nature of an end for the sake of which
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something comes to be.” 64 Thus, the end of something is the very reason for a thing’s existence.
However, nature itself contains those principles of motion and rest that direct a thing to its end,
“To truly understand what it is for something to have a nature, one must understand nature not
only in terms of a thing’s end, but in terms of nature’s ability to direct them to their ends.” 65
What might this look like in the context of human nature?
First, Aquinas, like Aristotle, defines the human person as a rational agent whose actions
tend toward some end, i.e. human beings are by nature teleological creatures. He cites
Aristotle’s Physics, giving the familiar argument that “all things contained in a genus are derived
from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations.” 66 Aquinas
further explains how a human being acts toward an end and precisely what principle exists in the
human person directing him toward his end, “Now man differs from irrational animals in this,
that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions are properly called human of which
man is a master.” 67 By what means is a human person capable of being ‘master of his actions’?
According to Aquinas, a person is master of his actions through the exercise two faculties, viz.
the reason and the will. Let us concentrate first on reason. According to Aquinas, reason is a
power of the soul that is synonymous with the intellectual power that functions “by way of
inquiry and discovery” to advance “from certain things simply understood–namely, the first
principles; and again by way of judgment returns by analysis to first in principles in the light of
which it examines what it has found.” 68 First principles are the beginning points of human
inquiry, for “they are from the beginning and cannot be reduced to anything previous.” 69
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Further, human reason is a principle of action by which human beings act to achieve their end.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains:
Now, there is no question that intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, because they
think ahead of time in their intellects of the things which they achieve though action; and
their action stems from such preconception. This is what it means for an intellect to be
the principle of action. Just as the entire likeness of the result achieved by the actions of
an intellectual agent exists in the intellect that preconceives it, so, to, does the likeness of
a natural resultant pre-exist in the natural agent; and as a consequence of this, the action
is determined to a definite result. 70
However, it is not by rational powers alone that a human person is moved toward his end. Free
will (which will be addressed in the subsequent section of this chapter on Augustine’s
contribution to conscience) directs the rational animal toward his end, as the will, according to
Aquinas, is connected to reason by its function as the rational appetite. 71 David Burrell
succinctly explains:
Willing is for Aquinas a rational appetite. Humankind’s inclination to its proper end
follows upon a person’s grasp of that goal…. This appetite for a goal follows upon
perceiving that something is a desirable end, but perceiving alone could not generate the
wanting. In this respect, will and intellect remain distinct. As Aquinas sees it, willing is
meant to incline towards the goods which reason indicates. 72
What has not yet been determined, however, is precisely the end to which reason and will
direct the human person. Following Aristotle, Aquinas determines that the final end and
perfection of the human person is happiness, “Now a man’s excellence is in proportion,
especially, to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e., those goods by
which he has a certain share of happiness.” 73 Some of those goods by which a human person
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attains happiness are the virtues. 74 But the question arises, how are the virtues present in the
human person? According to Aristotle, virtues are not present in the human person by nature,
although he states that “we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them, and habits
bring this ability to completion and fulfillment.” 75 Aristotle does not give any specific
explanation about precisely how human beings are equipped by nature to receive the virtues
(particularly the moral virtues), and Aquinas develops this further by proposing that “in man’s
reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge
and action (i.e. first principles of speculative and practical reason respectively), which are the
nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues.” 76 Human beings have a natural aptitude for virtue,
and the special habit of practical reason, which guides human beings about what to be done, i.e.
human action, is called synderesis. Synderesis then becomes for Aquinas the starting point or the
“foundation for [practical] reason to rest upon;” 77 it is part of that which guides human beings
toward their end. Since synderesis is a special natural habit, it includes those principles that
enable human nature to attain its proper end. As Angela McKay concludes, synderesis “provides
the explanatory force behind man’s natural desire for the good of reason, and it is this natural
habitual knowledge that provides the foundation for all further reasoning about moral matters. It
is primarily this natural habitual knowledge, together with the light of reason, that enables man
to create in himself the dispositions that order him toward the good of reason.” 78
Let us next consider Aquinas’s emphasis on human reason as the starting point for moral
knowledge and action. This is a critical point, as Aquinas, drawing from Aristotle, emphasizes
that what is good is both knowable and intelligible. Yet, if we accept that all human beings
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possess knowledge of certain universally intelligible moral principles, then we have to grapple
with the problem of moral evil. For example, consider Aristotle’s account of the incontinent
man in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle makes a distinction between the man who
is self-indulgent and the man who is morally weak or incontinent: “For a self-indulgent person is
led on by his own choice, since he believes that he should always pursue the pleasure of the
moment. A morally weak man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it,
nonetheless.” 79 Aristotle attempts to explain the division in the morally weak person between
knowledge of a moral good and the inability to act according to one’s knowledge, which he
states is “the defeat of reason in moral weakness.” 80 To put this into perspective, it will be
helpful to briefly outline the structure of the human soul and more specifically the activity of
human reason in the soul according to Aristotle.
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits that the soul consists of two basic
elements, the rational and the irrational. These two basic elements exists in a hierarchy with the
rational guiding the activities of the soul (activities such as choice and deliberation). The
irrational is subdivided into the vegetative, the appetitive or irascible (i.e. the passions) and
reason is further subdivided into two component parts, viz. the dianoetic or deliberative faculty
and the noetic faculty by which man grasps first principles. Corresponding to these two parts of
the soul are two sets of virtues, the moral virtues, which are attained through experience and
habit and restrain the irrational part of the soul; and the intellectual virtues, which are attained
through education and learning and form the rational part of the soul. 81 The specific nature of
the human person is reason, as reason differentiates human beings from all other beings. Reason
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guides human beings by “[exhorting] them to follow the right path and to do what is best.” 82
Thus, we have an important emphasis on reason’s ability to guide human beings in practical
matters by doing something very akin to the role of conscience: an exhortation to follow what is
right and best. This sounds similar to the Thomistic formulation that synderesis induces to good
and murmurs at evil (instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo). 83
But Aristotle is perhaps not as clear about a natural habit of containing the first principles
of practical reason. He is clear that there is a part of the soul (nous in Greek and intellectus in
Latin) that contains the first principles of speculative reason, and he does make a distinction
between nous and the kind of deliberative function that directs practical matters. He posits that
“there are three elements in the soul which control action and truth: sense perception,
intelligence (nous), and desire.” 84 Aristotle points out here, however, that sense perception,
intelligence, and desire direct both our actions and truth. He goes on to explain:
Of these sense perception does not initiate any action. We can see this from the fact that
animals have sense perception but have no share in action. What affirmation and
negation are in the realm of thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the realm of desire.
Therefore since moral virtue is characteristic involving choice, and since choice is a
deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true
and the desire correct. This then is the kind of thought and the kind of truth that is
practical and concerned with action. One the other hand, in the kind of thought involved
in theoretical knowledge and not in action or production, the good and the bad state are,
respectively, truth and falsehood; in fact the attainment of truth is the function of the
intellectual faculty as a whole. But in intellectual activity concerned with action, the
good state is truth in harmony with correct desire. 85
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Aristotle gives several important elements here that Aquinas develops. First, he draws a parallel
between the function of nous, that by which we know the first principles of speculative reason,
and the function of what Aquinas calls synderesis, that by which we know the principles of
practical reason. Affirmation and negation in the realm of nous are parallel to pursuit and
avoidance in the realm of human actions or praxis. This very language of pursuit and avoidance
certainly illustrates that for Aristotle, the language of moral choice and guidance for human
action is a rational activity. Therefore, reason provides a fundamental moral framework as
rational norms that direct pursuit of human goods. However, as Douglas Kries points out, reason
cannot initiate action on its own; it needs something more. 86 Aristotle introduces two other
elements: choice and desire. Moral actions involve choice, which Aristotle defines as a
deliberate desire. Further, he connects the attainment of truth in speculative matters with the
attainment of good in practical matters and connects truth and good action with the disposition of
an appropriately ordered desire that pursues a good or avoids what is not good. While moral
actions are ultimately grounded in reason, they require that which is not rational, desire, for their
attainment. But this desire must be appropriately ordered through reason, thereby establishing a
rational foundation for moral inquiry and pursuit of human goods.
There is another important piece of evidence that points toward foundational ideas about
conscience in chapter 8 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is a passage wherein Aristotle
explains the distinctions between practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis), intelligence (nous),
and scientific knowledge (episteme), 87 and it is perhaps the foundation upon which Aquinas
builds the idea of synderesis as the special habit containing the first principles of practical
reason. Aristotle writes:
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They [scientific knowledge and practical wisdom] have some agreement with
understanding [i.e. intelligence]. Understanding indeed concerns those principles
requiring no proof. But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, an object not of
scientific knowledge but of a kind of sense—not that by which we perceive proper
sensible—but the sense whereby in mathematics we perceive the external triangle (to
which we conform our reasoning). 88
Aristotle seems unclear on the exact relationship between these three modes of knowledge and
Aquinas interprets him as explaining that, “both science (episteme) and prudence (phronesis) are
receptive of, or in contact with understanding (nous), i.e. have some agreement with it as a habit
of principles.” 89 Here Thomas gives no further explanation except in saying that understanding
“concerns certain principles or ultimates” that are “indemonstrable…[and] cannot be established
by reason but become immediately known in themselves.” 90 Prudence, on the other hand, deals
with “a singular practicable that must be taken as a principle in things to be done.” 91 Aquinas
makes no mention however of synderesis as that which contains the first indemonstrable
principles of practical reason. All that Aquinas has established here is that understanding (nous)
and prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis) are somehow receptive of one another by having
‘some agreement” as a “habit of principles.”
If we turn to the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas gives a more detailed explanation about the
relationship between prudence (phronesis) and understanding (nous). In the Secunda Secundae,
he explicitly asks the question, “Whether understanding [i.e. nous] is a part of prudence?” 92 In
the third objection to this article, Aquinas points precisely to Book VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics, “Prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethics vi, 7) whereas understanding takes
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cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is
not a part of prudence.” 93 In the corpus of the article, Aquinas explains:
Understanding denotes here…the right estimate about some final principle, which is
taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which
are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from
some understanding. Therefore, since prudence is right reason applied to action, the
whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence. 94
Interestingly, Aquinas does not use the language of synderesis in this passage, and it is yet to be
determined how prudence and synderesis work together to direct human action. What we see
here is further evidence of a rational basis for morality, and one that is known naturally to all
human beings. Since prudence (or practical wisdom) exercises the faculty of reason, it must
‘proceed from some understanding.’ He goes on to explain how this process occurs, and in this
passage we do see a variation of the language of synderesis (i.e., pursue good and avoid evil),
although it is here lumped together with nous, whereby we know the first speculative principles:
The reasoning of prudence terminates…in the particular matter of action to which…it
applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued
from a universal and from singular proposition. Wherefore reasoning of prudence must
proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this
belongs to the understanding (nous) which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know
naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as
‘One man should do evil to no man,’ as shown above. 95
This passage is reminiscent of Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
whereby he states that prudence and nous are somehow receptive of one another, but he still does
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not go into depth about the role of synderesis. The relationship between understanding (nous),
practical wisdom (phronesis) and synderesis still remains to be determined.
What has become evident from the preceding analysis is that for Aquinas, our
consciences, guided as they are by nous, phronesis, and synderesis are “not just knowledge of
propositions about morality.” 96 They inform our actions and choices, require a kind of desire to
move us into action, and enable us to pursue our good and final end—happiness. While even a
cursory glance at the sources certainly proves that Aristotle does not use the terminology of
synderesis or syneidesis, there is a foundation in Aristotle’s work that lays an essential
foundation for Aquinas’s development of conscience and the over-arching principles of natural
law. It does not mean that Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the natural law, but rather that his
work is not inimical to such a development. Aquinas certainly had textual evidence upon which
to base his assertion that there exists a natural habit by which we know the first principles of
practical reason. Further, developing a theory of conscience to help describe theoretically and
conceptually the function of a common human experience does not have to be an aberration of
what Aristotle intended to do. In fact, it is by following Aristotle’s own methodology, with a
basis in human inclinations and experience, that Aquinas is able to do so. However the lack of a
terminology being found in Aristotle must necessarily point us beyond him. Aquinas provides
not simply “another way to read Aristotle, but a way to think with Aristotle and beyond him.” 97
Let us then turn to consider those thinkers ‘beyond Aristotle’ who have also importantly
contributed to Aquinas’s development of conscience.
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II. Theoretical and Historical Background
A. Patristic Sources: Origins of ‘Synderesis’ in the work of St. Jerome
When we consider the Scholastic version of conscience, we must begin by understanding
the term synderesis, as we have now established that the Scholastics debated and developed the
idea of conscience within the framework of these two terms synderesis and conscientia and how
they are related to one another. According to scholars, the debate about the relationship between
synderesis and conscientia predates Thomas’s work and “that the medieval debate was originally
spurred by the introduction of the strange term synderesis into the conversation, and that the term
entered the discussion by means of an enigmatic passage in Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel. 98
As we know, the term synderesis is of rather obscure origins because it is a corruption of the
Greek term syneidesis. Scholars such as D. Odon Lottin and Jacques de Blic have shown that the
corruption took place somehow in the copying of Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel. 99
The passage from Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel is from the beginning of the book of
Ezekiel in the Old Testament. In the first chapter, Ezekiel describes a vision from the God of
Israel wherein he sees a creature with four different faces and four wings. The creature is
comprised of four faces, that of a man, a lion, an ox (or calf), and over all of these, an eagle. The
passage reads as follows:
And as for the likeness of their faces: there was the face of a man, and the face of a lion
on the right side of all the four: and the face of an ox, on the left side of all the four: and
the face of an eagle over all the four. 100

98

Kries, Douglas. “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (‘Synderesis’) in Jerome’s Ezekiel’s Commentary.”Traditio.Vol.
57 (2002), 67.
99
Greek word and meaning from Davies, W.D. “Conscience.” The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, 672. On
the corruption of the term, cf. Jacques de Blic. “Syndérèse ou Conscience?”Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique. 25:
1949.146-157 and D. Odon Lottin. Psychologie et Morale Aux XII et XIII Siècles. Louvain, Belgium: Abbaye du
Mont César. Vol. II, 1948. Cf. pp. 103-105.
100
Ezekiel 1: 10. Similitudo autem vultus eorum. Facies hominis et facies leonis a dextris ipsorum quatouor, facies
autem bovis a sinistris ipsorum quatuor, et facies aquilae desuper ipsorum quatuor. Latin from Jerome’s Vulgate
and English translation from Douay-Rheims.

79

Jerome immediately gives an interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision following the Book of
Revelation, viz. that the four faces are symbols referring to the four Evangelists, Matthew, Mark,
Luke, and John. 101 He then references alternative interpretations by those who follow the foolish
wisdom of the philosophers (‘philosophorum stultam sequuntur sapientiam’) and by many who
joined with Plato (‘plerique juxta Platonem’). Douglas Kries suggests that Jerome identifies
those following the foolish philosophers with those following Plato; however that evidence is not
clear in Jerome’s text. Who may be such followers of Plato? According to Kries, Origen
adopted Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in his own theological anthropology and connected
with the Pauline anthropology of spirit, soul, and body in 1 Thess. 5:23. 102 Kries then makes a
connection between Origen’s theological anthropology and Plato’s tripartite division of the soul.
Kries argues his case by explaining that in the following passage from Jerome, Jerome is actually
referring to Origen’s Platonic interpretation of this passage, which he himself translated from
Greek into Latin. 103 The passage reads:
And most, following Plato, assign the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts of the
soul—which he calls the logikon, the thumikon, and the epithumetikon—to the human, the
lion, and the calf. They posit reason, reflection, mind, deliberation, and wisdom as the
same power and place it in the citadel of the brain. But savageness, anger, and violence,
situated in the gallbladder, they place in the lion. Next, lust, avarice, and the desire for all
the pleasures they place in the liver, that is in the calf, who cleaves to the works of the
101
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qua victim voluptatibus vel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare sentimus. Quam
proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus, ded tria errantia corrigentem, quam in Scripturis interdum vocari
legimus spiritum ‘qui interpellet pro nobis gemitibus inerrabilibus’ (Romans 8: 26).
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earth. And in the fourth part, which the Greeks call syneidesis, above and beyond these
three. This is the spark of conscience, which is not extinguished even in the breast of
Cain after he was ejected from paradise. It is through this that, occasionally having been
deceived by an imitation of reason itself when overcome by the pleasures or by fury, we
realize that we ourselves sin. This fourth part they refer especially to the eagle, which
does not mix with the other three but corrects them when they err… 104
Jerome never names Origen in this passage, nor refers to any specific passage from his work, and
his reasons for including this interpretation seem unclear, since earlier in the passage he seems to
endorse the interpretation of the four creatures representing the four evangelists.
Whether Jerome cites this interpretation approvingly or disapprovingly is unclear from
the text. Whatever his intentions were, Jerome preserves a very influential philosophical and
theological anthropology, and he particularly preserves an important element of Origen’s
anthropology that tremendously influences the Scholastic ideas about conscience. The Platonic
division of the three parts of the soul Jerome explains as corresponding to three symbolic
creatures: reason with the man; the ‘spirited part’ with the lion; and the passions with an ox or a
calf. But above and beyond all of these is the eagle, the ‘spark of conscience’ that does not mix
with reason, the ‘spirited part,’ or the passions, but rather corrects them when they are in error.
In a homily on this passage of Ezekiel, Origen makes this same argument, although he does not
here mention syneidesis, “By ‘man’ its rational part is being indicated; by ‘lion’ its irascible part;
by ‘calf’ its desirous part. But the ‘spirit’ who presides to help…is over all three faces. For in
another passage the eagle is declared, so that through the eagle he signifies the presiding spirit of
the soul.” 105 The eagle that presides over the soul appears to have pride of place, even over and
above human reason. Conscience is thus elevated as an important component part of the human
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person—of the human soul, and much of the Scholastic debate centers upon how it relates to the
other parts of the soul.
The Scholastics examine conscience while grappling with the problem of human
fallibility and the problem of evil. They sought to understand how human beings could live
moral lives and how those lives were to be constituted. According to D.O. Lottin, the first of the
medieval Scholastic scholars to refer back to this passage of Jerome is in 1152 AD by Peter
Lombard, although he never used the term synderesis. Peter Lombard instead refers to
conscience as the “scintilla rationis” or the ‘spark of reason’ that was not eradicated even in Cain
after he slaughtered his brother. 106 Thus, even in Cain, the first murderer and fratricide, this
‘spark of reason’ that is that which makes him aware of the evil he has done. Conscience, then,
becomes connected with human reason. While Jerome (and perhaps Origen) refers to the
scintilla conscientia, conscience is transformed by the Scholastics into the scintilla rationis or
the ‘spark of reason’. This change should be noted, especially when we consider that according
to Jerome, conscience rules over and above human reason. What conscience becomes for the
medieval Scholastic has thus shifted from what Jerome has described. About a decade after
Peter Lombard, a certain Magister Udo returns to this passage in Jerome and uses the word
synderesis to name that ‘higher reason’ that even in Cain could not be extinguished. 107 In Udo,
as in Peter Lombard, synderesis is a kind of higher reason, differing slightly from the OrigenJerome characterization of it as something separate from reason. This shift is also worth noting,
as Augustine attributes the knowledge of our conscience to a higher reason. I have argued above
that Aristotle contributes a rational basis to morality, and although he makes no explicit mention
of conscience. In this next section, I will show how it is St. Augustine who connects conscience
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with human reason and how Augustine another critical component part to conscience, viz. a
theory of free will.
B. Augustine’s Contribution to Conscience
Of the Patristic scholars who contributed to Aquinas’s theory of conscience, Augustine is
perhaps the most significant. Aquinas quotes Augustine (among others) work in his treatment of
synderesis and conscientia in De Veritate and in the Summa Theologiae, and Augustine had
exceptional authority among the Scholastics, much of which was transmitted through Peter
Lombard’s theology textbook the Book of Sentences. The content of Lombards’s text was
heavily drawn from St. Augustine’s work, and Aquinas had to teach and write a commentary on
Lombard’s Book of Sentences as a prerequisite for attaining the equivalent of his doctorate in
theology between 1254 and1256. 108 However, Augustine himself wrote no treatise on
conscience and never addressed it systematically—although the theme of conscience can be
found throughout his scholarly work, his pastoral homilies and Scriptural commentaries, and
even in his personal correspondence.
According to Augustine, conscience can either be good or bad, that is to say, it can
approve or disprove of a person’s moral actions and choices. In a letter to Caecilian, in which
Augustine chastises him for a friendship with a corrupt and murderous wealthy count, Augustine
strongly admonishes him that the “conscience of a wicked man, with its dread and penal
shadows, outweighs not only all prisons, but even all hell.” 109 In contrast, a person with a good
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conscience remains luminous and pure, even in the face of grave evil perpetrated against him. 110
A good conscience is reward enough to a person of good moral character. 111 Thus far, we see no
explicitly remarkable development of conscience in Augustine. However, let us examine further
how Augustine treats conscience in Book I of the City of God. The first ten books of this work
are a scathing critique on the Roman way of life and of the pagan notions of religion, virtues, and
philosophy. To this effect, Augustine makes a radical critique of the revered virtue of Lucretia,
the great Roman heroine who committed suicide when she was violated by the son of King
Tarquin. Rather than suffer the public shame of rape, Lucretia commits suicide. Augustine
rebukes this action arguing that such a punishment for evil acted against her and without her
consent does not serve justice. Perhaps, he says, she was not innocent and actually consented to
the violation. Thus, Augustine argues, “If she was adulterous, why praise her? If chaste, why
slay her?” 112 Augustine turns the discussion to her own interior conscience to reveal her motives
for suicide: “She killed herself for being subjected to an outrage in which she had no guilty part,
it is obvious that this act of hers was prompted…by the overwhelming burden of her shame.” 113
This shame Augustine attributes to her pride, which made her refuse to “exhibit to men her
conscience.” 114 Augustine speculates that because of her pride, Lucretia commits yet another
more grievous crime in her suicide, and he contrasts Lucretia’s prideful disposition and faulty
judgment of conscience with those of Christian women who suffered similar violations and who
“declined to avenge upon themselves the guilt of others, and so add crimes of their own to those
crimes in which they had no share.” 115 These women, argues Augustine, rather than commit the
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crime of suicide, are consoled by the peace “within their own souls, in the witness of their own
conscience.” 116
The preceding example illustrates that Augustine turns pagan virtue ‘on its head’ and
makes the case that it is not virtue at all—a theme he continues to expound at length in the City
of God. He argues that a good conscience is enough to give one peace in her own soul, so long
as she is not complicit with evil, even an evil as horrific as rape, which often carried with the
added violation of public shame. Ernest Fortin explains that Augustine’s radically shifts the
meaning of conscience to something which,
Rules all man’s life, [and] it represents a higher form of justice and makes demands that
are both extensively and intensively more stringent than those of ordinary human justice.
It applies not only to such actions as the law may prescribe or forbid but to the totality of
man’s external actions and encompasses even his secret thoughts and desires. For, in
order to be truly virtuous, it is not enough to perform that one perform the right deeds; he
must also perform them for the right motives, and over these the human law has no
power. 117
The central political insight is that human law becomes limited in a way that Augustine’s pagan
predecessors could not have comprehended or anticipated; “civil society is displaced as the locus
of virtue and the object of man’s deepest and most noble attachments…. It ceases to, as it had in
the pagan scheme, the sole horizon lending meaning and substance to the highest activities
undertaken by its citizens.” 118 By this account, Augustine’s contribution to conscience has a
revolutionary political impact. Let us consider in more detail how Augustine achieves it.
Augustine maintains that conscience exists in all human beings, and Augustine connects
conscience both to human reason and to the desires of the human heart. Augustine believes that
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the promptings of conscience cannot be eradicated from the souls of human beings, a view that
his contemporary Jerome shared, and Aquinas adopts:
[T]here is no soul, however wicked, which can yet reason in any way, in whose
conscience God does not speak… For who but God has written the law of nature in the
hearts of men?— that law concerning which the apostle says: “For when the Gentiles,
which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not
the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their
hearts, their conscience also bearing them witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile
accusing or else excusing one another, in the day when the Lord shall judge the secrets
of men.” And therefore, as in the case of every rational soul, which thinks and reasons,
even though blinded by passion, we attribute whatever in its reasoning is true, not to itself
but to the very light of truth by which, however faintly, it is according to its capacity
illuminated, so as to perceive some measure of truth by its reasoning… 119
Augustine offers evidence from St. Paul’s letter to Romans 2:14-15, a verse repeated throughout
the work of the Scholastics to explain the natural law. In a lengthy letter written to his friend
Hilarius in 414 AD, Augustine expounds the connection of the natural law to reason:
Since there is a law in man’s reason, written by nature in the heart of everyone [i.e. each
person] who enjoys the use of free will, and this law suggests that a man do no evil to
another which he would not wish to suffer himself, therefore according to this law all are
transgressors, even those who have not received the law of Law given by Moses, of
whom the Psalmist says: ‘I have accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators’ (Ps.
118.119)…. But, all the sinners of the earth become prevaricators by transgressing
against the [natural] law which is found in the faculty of reason of the rational soul in all
who have attained the age of reason. 120
In order to ascertain Augustine’s meaning in this passage, let us consider briefly his
philosophical anthropology.
Augustine divides the human person into the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ man. The outer man
refers to “anything in our consciousness that we have in common with animals,” i.e. sensation,
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bodily growth, movement etc. 121 The inner man contains the mind or reason, man’s differentia
specifica, and through which he contemplates the Divine. Augustine divides the functions of the
mind into higher and lower reason, sapientia and scientia. Scientia is knowledge pertaining to
temporal matters, and sapientia is “the loftier reason” or ‘higher reason’ that makes “judgments
on these bodily things according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings.” 122 The loftier reason
is able to contemplate “intelligible and unchanging truth” and can apply that truth to temporal
matters. 123 Augustine describes this process as partnership that parallels the Christian doctrine of
the Trinitarian nature of God.
Just as among all the beasts there was not found for man an assistant like himself, and
only something taken from himself and formed into a consort could fill the bill, so too
our mind, with which we consult the highest and innermost truth, has no assistant like it
in the part of the soul we have in common with the beasts, for making use of bodily
things in a way to satisfy the nature of man. And therefore something rational of ours is
assigned the duty of this work, not in the sense of being divorced from the mind in break
of unity, but as derived from a helpful partnership. 124
The ‘helpful partnership’ according to Augustine is between the memory, the intellect
(understanding), and the will. 125 Augustine adds two new elements to conscience, viz. memory
and will. Memory and conscience will be discussed in the last chapter, so let us consider for the
present conscience and will, and specifically for Augustine, free will.
In his treatise On the Free Choice of the Will, Augustine begins his Socratic-styled
dialogue with his interlocutor Evodius asking whether God causes evil in the world. Augustine
argues that human beings are able to choose freely whether to direct themselves toward eternal
truths or temporal goods, and “the eternal law demands that we purify our love by turning it
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away from the temporal things and toward what is eternal.” 126 Again we see the division
between that which eternal and unchanging and that which is temporal and changeable. For
Augustine, willfully pursuing misdirected desires constitutes evil doing, but this is not God’s
doing. In a later addendum to this work, Augustine writes, “it is indeed by the will that we sin or
live rightly.” 127 However, Augustine contends that no efficient cause for evil can be found in the
will. Evil deeds are committed by an act of will, but “it is not efficient but deficient, as the will
itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is,
that which has less being—this is to begin to have an evil will.” 128 Turning from a higher good
(for Augustine, that which is eternal) toward a lesser good (that which is temporal) constitutes
evil. Aquinas picks up Augustine’s deficient understanding of evil. According to Aquinas, all
beings by nature seek that which is good for them. Underlying Aquinas’ assertion that all beings
tend toward some good is the first premise of the natural law known by the habit of synderesis
that “good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.” 129 He states:
But all things are known to flee from evil; in fact, intelligent agents avoid a thing for this
reason: they recognize it as an evil thing. Now, all natural agents resist corruption, which
is an evil for each individual, to the full extent of their power. Therefore, all things act
for the sake of a good. 130
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According to Aquinas, that which is good is the same as that which exists. Thus, goodness and
being are convertible terms. Something exists insofar as it tends toward that which is good as
“every action and movement are seen to be ordered in some way toward being, either that it may
be preserved in the species or in the individual, or that it may be newly acquired. Now, the very
fact that of being is a good, and so all things desire to be.” 131 Aquinas’ understanding of being
and goodness as convertible terms leaves the problem of evil with only one solution, viz. that
evil has no existence in and of itself, a view he shares with Augustine. Like Augustine, he
contends that moral evil occurs in an act of the human will.
The will, according to Aquinas is man’s free elective power, whereby he “desire[s]
something for the sake of obtaining something else.” 132 In order to freely choose to pursue good,
the will must be informed by right reason. Right reason is habituated through the exercise of
virtue, “the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action,
but are inclined differently to many; but they are determined to acts by means of habits. . . .
Therefore, human virtues are habits.” 133 Just as virtue habituates right reason, so vice habituates
faulty reason. Thus, moral evil is a defection of the will, and it is the result of an improperly
formed rational capacity, which informs the will and presents to the will something considered
good, for “evil does not result from an agent cause, unless because it is deficient in power, and to
that extent it is not efficient.” 134 However, this defect in the will “is voluntary, for to will and
not to will lie within the power of the will itself. . . . Yet, such a defect of ordering is not a moral
evil, for, if reason considers nothing, or considers any good whatever, that is still not sin until the
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will inclines to an unsuitable end.” 135 One way to prevent defection of the will is a proper
education that is aimed at formation of character, and particularly of their moral conscience. In
De Veritate, Aquinas distinguishes between a false conscience and a correct conscience
(conscientia, not synderesis). He writes that, “A correct conscience binds absolutely and
perfectly…. But a false conscience…binds with some qualification and imperfectly…. For one
can and should change such a [false] conscience.” 136 This distinction will be examined in the
following chapter.
One final point on Augustine’s contribution to conscience: he does not give a systematic
explanation about the relationship between reason, will, memory, and conscience, but he does
give us a vision of man’s moral life in very political terms. Perhaps Augustine most famously
declares this in his City of God:
Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self,
even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of
self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks
glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. 137
It is noteworthy that Augustine mentions conscience in this passage. Citizenship in the city of
God glories in the one who is the witness of human conscience, and conscience is hegemonic in
the city of God. Augustine describes human existence and salvation in political terms—
specifically as a kind of citizenship. Yet, because of human sinfulness, made possible because of
free will, the political realm will always be imperfect and laden with evil. Augustine goes to
great lengths to discuss the evils of political life – even family life and friendships suffer because
of sin. Wars, famines, disasters, all are a result of sin and characteristic of the city of Man. The
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earthly city is by its nature limited in its scope and accomplishments. Yet, Augustine does not
leave man destitute with no hope. The city of God is not of the world, but the Incarnation has
brought its order (the order of grace and redemption) to the world. The city of God is in fact the
best regime, although it is not achievable through any earthly politics. Only the city of God
offers true peace, true justice, and true virtue. 138 Further, the city of God is open to all men on
account of their free will, their properly ordered love, and their fundamental nature as imago Dei.
Each person, according to Augustine, is made in the Trinitarian image of God and is
capable of choosing to do good or evil—because of the freedom of will that was given to each
person as part of his nature. 139 For Augustine, as well for Aquinas, human beings are ordered to
a specific end—the happiness that is only found in the city of God. In the world, this city is not
to be found in its perfection. Human beings are endowed with tools—among them are free will,
reason, memory, and conscience—to help them choose what will enable them to become citizens
in the city of God; all of these tools are themselves free gifts of grace, according to Augustine.
Thus, human happiness and the highest end exist in their fullness only outside the earthly city.
Augustine locates the best regime outside the earthly city, which necessarily limits what the
earthly city can accomplish. In doing so, he leaves the individual free to pursue that which will
make him truly happy, viz. love of God, and he therefore leaves the state free from having to
provide every human good. Drawing from Christian revelation, Augustine builds an important
part of the foundational framework from which Aquinas draws to explain the relationship
between human reason, natural law, and conscience. In the next chapter, we will examine the
texts in which Aquinas develops his own theory of conscience, drawing from and incorporating
these Classical and Christian elements that have been outlined.
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Chapter III: Conscience in the Early Work of Aquinas: Scriptum Super Libros
Sententiarum and De Veritate 1
“St. Thomas’ doctrine of conscience indicates the road we must take to avoid the pitfalls of both
subjectivism and a rigorous legalism. It gives unity to man’s intellectual and moral life.” 2
“From all eternity the world has lain in God’s hand. From eternity He ordains the whole and the
individual—the individual, that in conjunction with all other individuals it may build up the
whole; the whole, that it may become the foundation, content, and task of the individual.” 3
I. Introduction: Aquinas on Man and Politics
Now that we have examined some of the sources from which Aquinas constructs his
theory of the human person, and specifically of conscience, we turn to the works in his corpus
where he explicates his understanding of conscience. Thomas Aquinas outlines his most mature
account of conscience in the Summa Theologiae in two significant places. 4 First, he discusses
conscience in the Treatise on Man (I, Questions 75-102) and secondly in his discussion of human
action in the Prima Secundae. The placement of both these treatments of conscience is
significant for our inquiry, as it situates the importance of conscience in illuminating Aquinas’
philosophical anthropology. 5 While Aquinas in these instances is investigating the interiority of
the individual human person, we will also examine more particularly how his theory points
toward the necessity of human relationships for individual conscience. Aquinas discusses the
function of synderesis again in the Treatise on Law (I-II, Questions 90-108), which also places
his theory in the context of his understanding of law. The context of conscience in the Treatise
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on Law is in the discussion of the natural law, which continues to be debated within our political
discourse, especially regarding the social and moral issues and the role of law in defining or
promoting them. The place of his theory of conscience within the context of natural law will
also be critical to our examination. To get a better sense of Aquinas’s understanding of law, let
us first consider his brief but substantive account of human nature at the beginning of his
political treatise De Regno. This consideration will give an overall context to help conceptualize
Aquinas’s contribution to politics and to highlight the significance of his theory of conscience.
Aquinas wrote De Regno to the King of Cyprus likely around 1267. 6 The work was not
completed by Aquinas, and it does not contain the typical Thomistic academic disputations.
Rather, it “pays more attention to the particularities of actual life than to abstract, universal
political formulas.” 7 Aquinas wrote this little treatise around the same time as he began his
Aristotelian commentaries, and he draws heavily from Aristotle’s understanding of human
nature. 8 Aquinas begins the treatise with the Aristotelian assertion that all things are ordered
toward an end, as he views all nature, including human nature, as teleological. Further, Aquinas
argues that, “some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by
the most direct route.” 9 It is the light of reason (lumen rationis) that acts as man’s directive.
(Aquinas also uses the image ‘light of reason’ to describe synderesis, the primary level of
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conscience). However, it is not by the light of reason alone that human beings attain their final
end:
Wherefore, if man were intended to live alone…he would require no other guide to his
end. Each man would be a king unto himself under God, the highest King, inasmuch as
he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason given him from on high. Yet it
is natural for man…to be a social and political animal, to live in a group. 10
Aquinas maintains that human beings have some knowledge of what is good by means of reason
(although not by reason alone); man is uniquely a rational animal. But as a rational animal, man
has not been endowed with all that he needs for survival. Instead, he has been given reason, by
means of which he is able to learn how to provide for himself. Yet, “one man alone could not
sufficiently provide for life, unassisted.” 11
According to Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology, each human person is in need of
others, at least at a very basic level, i.e. human beings need each other for the bare necessities of
life. But Aquinas goes further: man qua rational animal needs relationship with other human
beings:
Man…has natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his life only in a
general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things
necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles. But it is not possible for
one man to arrive at a knowledge of these things by his own individual reason [emphasis
mine]. It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist
his fellows. 12
Aquinas gives two significant points: first, human beings attain knowledge by means of
reasoning about natural principles. This assertion is the conceptual foundation for Aquinas’s
understanding of the natural law. Second, the reason of any one person alone is insufficient – he
needs other human beings, that is to say, he needs other rational beings. Alasdair MacIntyre has
10
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called this philosophical anthropology one that views human persons as ‘dependent rational
animals.’ 13 We shall further explore MacIntyre’s idea toward the end of the chapter.
Additionally, this necessity for human beings to live in community with others is linked to the
common good and political governance, “For where men are together and each one is looking
after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an
agency to take care of what pertains to the commonweal.” 14 Aquinas further asserts that political
society is most fitting to the proper end human beings when it is “a multitude of free men,”
oriented together toward the common good. 15 Aquinas emphasizes the multitude of free men
and the common good, thereby creating a critical linkage between a political society oriented to
the common good, human freedom, and law. The question for us to consider is how Aquinas’s
understanding of conscience might illumine this linkage without subordinating the common good
to the freedom of the individual person or vice versa.
To consider briefly Aquinas’s political ideas in our own context, many argue that
American constitutionalism was established upon the tenets of the natural law is the foundation
for both the common good and the protection of individual freedom. For example, the
Honorable Thomas J. Brogan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey from 1933 to
1946 wrote that:
The basis of our democracy is the dignity of the person and his inalienable right to
liberty. Our government was established for the express purpose of protecting these
13
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rights, and our Constitution and Bill of Rights give eloquent demonstration of that fact. In
a word, the Declaration of the Founding Fathers and our Constitution and Bill of Rights
established a jurisprudence in this Country based on Natural Law. 16
Ellis Sandoz concludes similarly:
It should be said that the Bill of Rights to the Constitution as conceived and adopted
illustrates some higher law perspectives. It is substantively part and parcel of a tradition
of common law liberty and natural law productive of what we refer to as
constitutionalism or rule of law. 17
It is the stance of the natural law tradition, the tradition of the lex-ratio, that human beings by
their nature, that is, by their common rational and political nature, share knowledge and
universal inclinations that guide their moral actions. For Aquinas, that by which human beings
both know and subsequently act upon these inclinations is what we call conscience. However,
for Aquinas, conscience does not mean either the universal knowledge of all objective good or
the “sweeping annulment of norms and the constant extension of individual liberties to the point
of complete emancipation from all order.” 18 Rather, his theory of conscience, and especially his
understanding of the freedom of conscience necessitates both individual and collective
responsibility which makes “possible the human coexistence of freedoms.” 19 This is the critical
linkage between common good and human freedom that we seek to illumine in Aquinas’s work.
In each of these places where Aquinas discusses conscience, he engages the difficult
questions of man’s knowledge of moral truths that are meant to guide his choices and actions. In
the natural law tradition, it is the conscience that is considered the means by which a person
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“comes to know the basic principles of right and wrong.” 20 Thus, for the student of political
science, these questions pertaining to conscience are especially salient for understanding
Thomas’ treatment of the natural law, of law more generally, and of the common good, which
according to Aquinas is the proper end of a political society. Aquinas offers the natural law
teaching not for providing an account of the best political regime, but rather “to give an account
of the principles that should inform the moral actions of individuals.” 21 His starting point for
political theory is not with the regime type, but rather with the interiority of the human person,
particularly of synderesis, the habit by which human beings know the first principles of the
natural law. Thus, it will be particularly significant for us to investigate Thomas’ treatment of
conscience as it is situated in the Treatise on Law in the Summa Theologiae.
However, the Summa Theologiae is not the first place Aquinas introduces conscience, nor
is it the text wherein he gives the most comprehensive discussion. The first significant
discussion of conscience is in his commentary Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, or the
Commentary on the Book of Sentences, which was equivalent to Aquinas’s doctoral dissertation.
TheBook of Sentences by Peter Lombard was used in the medieval universities and particularly at
the University of Paris as the textbook for advanced theology students. In this early work,
Thomas begins to develop his ideas more in line with those of the then emergent Aristotelianism
and less in the medieval university’s traditional thought of Neo-Platonism and Augustinianism. 22
This work, according to M.D. Chenu, provides the student of Aquinas with an “internal
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[elaboration] of his thought at work,” especially as it develops in the Disputed Questions
(Quaestiones disputatae) and in his commentaries on Aristotle. 23
It is in one of his ‘disputed questions’ where we find the next treatment on conscience by
Aquinas, viz. the Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate), written from 1257-1259 when
Thomas was a Master of Theology. De Veritate, according to Vernon Bourke, illustrates the
breadth of knowledge that Aquinas had assimilated as a young professor:
The Bible, ancient classical writers, many Patristics and early medieval authors,
contemporary theologians and chroniclers are perhaps to be expected. But Aristotle,
Porphyry, Boethius, and a dozen other philosophers now fill his pages. Nor does he
neglect the Jewish and Mohammedan writers: Maimonides, Avicebron, Isaac of Israel,
Algazel, Avicenna, and Averroës. 24
In De Veritate, Thomas “is developing his own explanations of reality, knowing, willing, and of
truth and goodness,” and he dedicates two rather extensive questions to conscience. 25 There is
another, less studied place where Aquinas treats the topic of conscience, viz. in his commentary
on St. Paul’s letter to the Romans. According to Thomist scholar Jean-Pierre Torrell, Aquinas’s
commentary on the scriptural letter to the Romans contains perhaps his most important teachings
on conscience, although there is no scholarly consensus on the time period when this particular
commentary was written. 26 His scriptural commentaries on St. Paul’s writings were written in
two periods of Aquinas’s life: between 1259 and 1268 and then again toward the very end of his
life, between the years of 1272 and 1273. 27 Jean-Pierre Torrell argues that Thomas probably
composed this commentary on Romans in the latter period toward the end of his life, and James
23
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Weisheipl concurs that it was likely written between 1270 and 1272. 28 The commentary on
Romans is an important text to examine not only because Aquinas discusses conscience, but also
because he discusses the natural law and its theological grounding in St. Paul’s letter to Romans.
In each of his discussions of conscience, Aquinas categorizes it as constituted by two
distinct ‘levels,’ synderesis and conscientia. The Greek term synderesis, as previously
explained, remains untranslated in English and is found primarily in the New Testament writings
of St. Paul as syneidesis, although it also appears in Classical Greek philosophy and in the Greek
Patristic Church fathers. 29 To summarize the previous chapter, the use of synderesis and its
grammatical variations by the Classic philosophers confers an awareness (consciousness) and a
sense of remorse or approval for a past action called ‘judicial conscience,’ that is to say; it is
what judges an individual’s past actions, but does not necessarily have the connotation of a guide
to choosing right action. The corresponding Latin term used by the pre-Christian Romans,
conscientia, is used more frequently and is used especially by Cicero and by the Epicureans. 30 It
is not until St. Paul uses the Greek term in his writings that it takes on a much more politically
significant meaning:
In eight places [in St. Paul’s writings], however, we encounter something quite new. In
the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the problems of certain individuals’ scruples
concerning the right course of action leads St. Paul to use the phrase, ‘Their conscience is
uneasy, doubtful;’ the context shows that this defective condition is the product, not of
timidity, but of ignorance too. Being a conscience, it imposes a rule of conduct; yet for all
that it may be mistaken. Here then are two new features in the use of the word
28
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‘conscience’: that of having authority to legislate; and that of being subject to error. . . .
St. Paul, then introduces an entirely new phase in the history of the term ‘conscience’ in
moral theory, and two new features characterize his use of it. First, it is to play a directive
role before an action takes place. In the pagan writers conscience did not appear on the
scene until after the action was performed, and its role was purely judicial; but in St.
Paul, conscience is credited with a legislative function, and it induces and obligation in
the proper sense. Second, conscience is fallible: the directions it issues may be
mistaken. 31
According to D’Arcy, St. Paul’s usage revolutionizes the meaning of conscience that was handed
down to the Scholastics. Instead of a purely judicial or past-oriented function, conscience
becomes a guide, a consultant for future action. This change in meaning and usage of the term
was then further developed by the early Patristic scholars such as Jerome and Augustine. The
directive role of conscience is based upon a philosophical anthropology that views the human
person as free to pursue his own ends by virtue of his reason and free will.
This chapter will consider Aquinas’s two earlier discussions of conscience. First, I will
examine the early development in Thomas’s earliest major work, viz. Scriptum super Libros
Sententiarum written from 1254-1256. Second, I will analyze how his thought develops in his
significant and very extensive treatment of conscience in De Veritate, composed from 12561259. This work is a set of academic disputations wherein Aquinas formally answers questions
put forth by students and colleagues in the university. Through the examination of Aquinas’s
theory of conscience, we will identify how the foundation of the idea of “freedom of conscience”
is established in Aquinas’s work, as rooted in his understanding of the human person. For
Aquinas, this freedom stems from a common, shared rational nature that not only enables human
beings to discern together the common good, but also requires mutual respect for the judgments
of individual consciences. His view, as we shall see, differs greatly from current connotation of
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‘conscience’ in political discourse. Much of contemporary public discourse views the individual
conscience as comprised of “emotional tendencies and spontaneous or environment-induced
feelings which often escape rational control.” 32 Under this definition, the claim of freedom for
conscientious choice or objection diminishes, as to allow such freedom would be seen as an
irrational imposition of one person’s choices onto someone else’s. And in contemporary
American political discourse, this logic is increasingly cited as justification for the legislative and
judicial decisions on the more contentious ‘moral’ issues such as abortion, the definition of
marriage, depictions of violence in the media, etc. Further, as Roger Trigg points out, the
“inherently subjective associations of ‘conscience’… cannot be allowed to get in the way of the
alleged objective status of the rights and dignity of humans.” 33 However, ‘irrational’ or
‘inherently subjective’ is far from Aquinas’s description of conscience, and more importantly, it
is far from his understanding of why conscience is free. In fact, as we shall see in the following
sections, in each of St. Thomas’s works where he addresses the topic of conscience, what is
emphasized is the role of reason for the proper functioning of conscience, “’in pura ratione
consistit.’” 34 Thus, this analysis of these two earlier texts wherein Aquinas develops his own
theory of conscience, viz. the Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De Veritate, will seek to
clarify the role of reason in the function of conscience and how ‘freedom of conscience’ is
understood by Aquinas’s rendering.
II. The Structure of the Soul and of Moral Thinking for Aquinas
In each of Aquinas’s major discussions of conscience, we see the classification of conscience
as two-fold, constituted as synderesis and conscientia. Although this classification did not
originate with Aquinas, his development of the two constituents of conscience was quite radical;
32
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“We shall find that, by espousing the cause of conscience, [Aquinas] broke with the common
opinion of his immediate predecessors.” 35 To better understand how Aquinas espouses the cause
of conscience and development of conscience, let us first consider the medieval framework
within which he approaches the topic of conscience. 36 According to Eric D’Arcy, the debate
about the nature and function of conscience before Aquinas’s contribution on the topic hinged on
the interpretation of two texts, one from St. Paul and one from St. Augustine. The question that
these medieval scholars explored was the extent of conscience’s freedom and authority. The text
from Paul is from Romans 14: 23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” which was interpreted by the
13th century Scholastics to mean that anything that is not in accordance with the faith is against
conscience and therefore sinful. 37 The other text was from one of St. Augustine’s sermons,
which reads: “The command of a subordinate authority does not bind if it runs counter to the
command of a superior in authority; as for instance, if the proconsul were to enjoin what the
Emperor forbade.” 38 The dominant interpretation of this passage was that conscience has no
authority when a superior authority would contradict its promptings. For the medieval
theologian, this passage was taken to illustrate that the commandments of God supersede those
of individual conscience. The debate thus turned on the questions: To what degree does
conscience bind? What is the authority of conscience especially in relation to the law of God?
Of Aquinas’s immediate predecessors and colleagues, some argued that conscience never binds
and some that binds only provisionally. 39
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Of those who believed conscience never binds, the common opinion was that it does not
bind in so far as it erroneous, nor in so far as it is a conscience. “In so far as it is erroneous, there
is no obligation to follow it…. In so far as it is a conscience, there is no obligation to follow it,
for conscience as conscience induces no obligation.” 40 For those who asserted that conscience
only binds provisionally, they argue that conscience only binds in morally neutral acts.
According to St. Bonaventure, one of Aquinas’s contemporaries, the obligation of conscience
only binds when its dictates follow the will of God. 41 Thus far, it would seem that the dictates of
conscience ought to make no difference since the will of God always determines how human
beings ought to act. Albert the Great, Aquinas’s mentor and teacher, made one important
contribution to the conscience debate, viz. that:
[A]ny account of conscience must study the subjective factor…. Albert sees that any
question of conscience turns attention to subjective states as well as objective matters; he
breaks very new ground by claiming that the answer to the question is to be given, not in
terms of true or false, but in terms of the subjective firmness with which the judgement
of conscience is held. 42
Albert the Great, Aquinas’s teacher and mentor, for the first time in the debate about conscience,
emphasizes the interiority of the individual person in order to judge the moral gravity and the
authority of the dictates of conscience. 43 However, it seems by the description above, one that
emphasizes on the subjective state of a person’s conscience, might seem to imply that conscience
is simply arbitrary subjectivism. How ought we to interpret this development in the debate?
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It will help clarify the significance of this development first to explain how Aquinas
outlined the different component parts of the human person, particularly those of the soul and its
different functions, and then to explain his understanding of the structure of moral choice.
First, Aquinas views the human person as consisting of a unity of body and soul. The body and
soul are not two separate entities, but rather a “substantial unity” that comprises human nature.
The human soul is particular – a rational soul – and as the form of the body it gives the human
person his uniqueness qua man. 44 Aquinas makes a distinction between the body and soul, for
example, “Although it is a form united to the body, the human soul nevertheless transcends all of
corporeal matter, and consequently the soul cannot be brought to actual existence from the
potency of matter by motion as are other forms that are immersed in matter.” 45 Following the
new Aristotelian schema, the different elements of the soul would be classified either as a power,
a habit, a law, or an action. 46 Aquinas, following Aristotle closely, conceptualizes different
faculties or powers (potentia) of the soul based upon the operation of each part, viz. vegetative,
sensitive (i.e. related to the senses), appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. 47
The soul contains certain natural powers or capacities (potentia) that are distinguished by
the function they carry out. 48 In the human person, Aquinas explains, “there exists…an
operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by a
corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the rational soul.” 49 According to Aquinas, there
exists a hierarchy of these powers of the soul. He explains:
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Now it has been shown above that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds
of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the
medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers as active
principle and as final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together
with a body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect while the receptive
principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede
the others in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others…. For we
see the senses for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way around. 50
It is important to note that the powers of the soul are natural, i.e., that they exist as a constitutive
element of our human nature. Further, nature ordains a hierarchy with the rational or intellectual
power as the highest power of the soul. There are natural and innate, and Aquinas makes a
distinction between these powers (potentia) and learned capacities, which he calls habits
(habitus). 51 Aquinas defines a habit as a quality or “a disposition whereby that which is
disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another.” 52
Habits are deemed good or bad depending upon whether it is suited to the nature of a thing; “if
we add well or ill, which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the qualities
relation to the nature, which is the end.” 53
However, Aquinas is careful to add an essential point, viz. that habits, though usually
learned or acquired qualities or dispositions, can also be natural. He explains:
One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as
the faculty of laughing is the natural to man, and it is natural for fire to have an upward
tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato
to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective
temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two
ways: first because it entirely is from the nature; secondly because it is partly from the
nature and partly from an extrinsic principle…. Thus, then, if we speak of habit as
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disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the
foregoing ways. 54
The natural habit of the intellectual power, according to Aquinas, is the understanding of first
principles. 55 This assertion is an important component of Aquinas’s theory of conscience, as
shall be shown—especially in his explanation of synderesis for he proves that it is a habit of
practical reason by drawing a parallel to the habit of speculative reason (i.e. understanding).
Another important element of Aquinas’s discussion of habit is his understanding that when it is
“directed to operation…[it] is a perfection of a power.” 56 For Aquinas, synderesis is a natural
habit and conscientia is an act following from a judgment of reason. Thus, Aquinas describes
human nature—and more particularly moral choice and action within the context of the
perfection of a power of the soul, viz. human reason. Robert Pasnau explains:
Aquinas conceives of…our ethical development as having two parts: a study of our
innate capacities [potentia] and a study of our [natural] and acquired dispositions
[habitus] for various actions…. Aquinas views the study of human nature as primarily a
study of moral psychology. The nature of human beings is determined by our ultimate
end, a beatific vision that requires the perfection of our intellectual and appetitive
faculties. 57
Understanding these terms help to clarify the significance of Aquinas’s contribution to the
definition of conscience, for in most of the works where he discusses conscience, he usually
begins by engaging in the debate about how to classify its component parts.
For Aquinas both the appetitive and intellectual powers are directed in their operation
toward perfection. Aquinas does not make a distinction between reason (ratio) or the intellectual
powers, i.e. the power of understanding—the intellect (intellectus):
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Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if
we consider their respective actions. For to understand (intelligere) is simply to
apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing to another, so as
to know intelligible truth…. Man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by
advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning,
therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to
possession…. [H]uman reasoning (ratiocinatio), by way of inquiry and discovery,
advances from certain things simply understood (intellectis)—namely, the first principles;
and again by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in light of which it
examines what it has found. 58
Conscience (synderesis and conscientia) is rooted in the intellectual powers—thus they are
connected to reason. In particular, Aquinas contends that the “first principle in the practical
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that good is that which all things seek after.” 59
The natural habit by which human beings know the first principle of practical reason is
synderesis. The judgment of practical reason take place according to “what immediately
precedes and generates action…[namely] that form of deductive reasoning which commentators
[of Aristotle] have called ‘the practical syllogism.’” 60 While Aristotle himself does not use this
expression, the use of the syllogism to explain moral action, the medieval schoolmen drew drawn
from his work. For example, in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes what is
called the syllogism in the following terms:
There is one judgment that is universal; and another concerned with particulars that are
properly the objects of sense. However, since one formal reason is present in such
judgments, the mind necessarily comes to a conclusion, while in the practical order it
must immediately be directed to operation.” 61
In the matter of a practical reason—a decision that may involve the use of conscience, the major
premise of a syllogism is a ‘first principle,’ or something that is ‘simply understood’ by a person
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as self-evident. A particular experience or situation is included in the minor premise of
syllogism. There are those who find this structure of practical reason objectionable, stating that
the “practical principles form a closed, consistent deductive system, beginning with a priori first
principles concerning the essence or nature of man. These principles are objectively valid,
independently of the desires and judgments of human agents.” 62 However Aquinas, as a student
of Albert the Great, turns the study of ethical action toward the interior movement of the
individual person—particularly to the freedom of the individual person. It would be unjust to
charge him with such an accusation that his understanding of moral action entails a ‘closed,
consistent deductive system’ imposed on human beings.
Rather than a closed system of objective principles imposed on human beings, Aquinas
sees moral choice as a process of reasoning that must take into account the particulars of a given
situation. Yet, human beings are not left without any means to evaluate the particulars of a
situation. The structure of moral choice in the form of a syllogism helps to illumine Aquinas’s
own understanding of conscience and its relation to practical wisdom and prudential judgment.
According to Aquinas, through a process of reasoning that includes a “way of judgment [that]
returns by analysis to the first principles in light of which it examines what it has found,” a
conclusion is reached as to a course of action. 63 Kevin Flannery describes the practical
syllogism as “reasoning about goods” that has a particular logic and structure to order those
goods and produce a conclusion as to how we act with respect to those goods. 64 He gives the
following example of a practical syllogism: Premise 1: Covering leads to need-satisfaction.
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Premise 2: Cloak leads to covering. Conclusion: Thus, cloak leads to need-satisfaction. 65 In this
particular example, the movement is toward the first premise, that is, to satisfy a need. It is a
bottom-up movement, rather than a top-down movement wherein ‘a priori first principles
concerning the essence or nature of man’ determine the outcome. The practical syllogism is also
‘defeatable’ by extraneous factors, for if “all the cloaks are contaminated with poisonous insects
[then] practically speaking, one in not bound to get a cloak.” 66 The structure of practical reason
is more closely connected to human experience and is good-preserving rather than necessarily
truth-preserving (as is the goal of theoretical reason). 67 But this does not mean that practical
reason has no concern with truth seeking. It is critical to understand that practical reason still
does “depend upon the first principles—which are the ends, i.e. the goods that humans seek.” 68
The goods that humans seek are not unconnected to the truth about their nature and essence, and
prudential judgment and the careful considerations of conscience aid the individual human
person in discerning what goods ought to be pursued or avoided. Indeed for Aquinas, practical
knowledge seeks truth as it relates to action. 69 Let us then turn to Aquinas’s particular
discussions of conscience for Aquinas’s argument on this connection.
III. Thomas’s Early Development of Conscience: Conscience in the Scriptum Super
Libros Sententiarum
In his first major scholarly endeavor, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Aquinas
considers the nature and function of conscience in two places: the first in a discussion of free will
and the second in a question regarding willing good or evil. Both of these treatments of
conscience appear in the second book of his commentary, which treats human nature, and
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specifically ‘corporeal nature.’ 70 The placement of his argument within a context of free will is a
significant detail, as in later work, Aquinas places his discussion of synderesis and conscientia in
a broader discussion about human reason. However, reason and will are intimately related for
Aquinas, as the will chooses what reason proposes to it as a good to be pursued. Aquinas’s
initial focus in this text is to determine whether synderesis and conscientia are to be classified as
a power, a habit, or an act, classifications of the functions of parts of the soul that were drawn
from the newly translated Aristotelian texts. How both synderesis and conscientia were
classified mattered significantly in the medieval debate, as the classification of conscience stood
at the center of man’s moral knowledge, choice, and responsibility. In this early work Aquinas
embeds his treatment of synderesis into the framework of higher and lower reason and of free
choice of the will, emphasizing contribution of Augustine’s work. 71
Yet, according to scholars, this work already deviates from the dominant Augustinian
hermeneutic of theology that was the norm in the medieval universities. 72 We will examine
several ways in which Aquinas deviates from the Augustinian tradition by emphasizing
Aristotelian insights, particularly insights about the nature and function of reason. His Scriptum
Super Libros Sententiarum is one of the first works wherein he begins to bring the Augustinian
tradition into conversation with Aristotelian principles on the topic of conscience; “the young
Aquinas…feels that he has to present and somehow defend St. Augustine’s views, but he also
takes care to introduce various explanations from the Aristotelian tradition.” 73 However, the
concept of synderesis was not explicitly present in Aristotle’s work, making Aquinas’s task of
70
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classifying it according to the Aristotelian typology (i.e. power, act, or habit) a difficult one.
Aquinas ultimately concludes that it must be a habit, but he remains timid about proclaiming so
in this work. Russell Hittinger explains: “For his part, Thomas concluded that synderesis is not a
power (intellect) or an act of the power (conscience) or the norm of action (natural law) but
rather an innate, habitual disposition to grasp the first principles of the natural law.” 74 And this
classification has important implications:
This was a deft interpretation, allowing to Thomas to avoid conflating innate habits with
innate knowledge. Like other medieval masters, Thomas knew that, for Aristotle, the
intellect does not naturally know anything without experience of extramental reality,
beginning in the senses. Seeing that he couldn’t front-load knowledge of moral
principles ahead of experience, he hit on the solution of positing [synderesis as] a habit. 75
While Aquinas’s ultimate conclusion that synderesis is a habit is clearly stated in his later works,
his argument here is unsure, stating that it is either a habit or a faculty endowed with a habit. 76
He makes a similar comment in the following article where he argues that conscientia is an act,
and explains the relationship between the natural law, synderesis, and conscientia: “And
according to this way it is clear, just as they differentiate synderesis, natural law and conscience,
because natural law names the very universal principles of justice, but synderesis, indeed, names
the habit of the principles or the power with the habit; but conscience, in fact, names a certain
application of the natural law to something needing to be done through the method of a certain
conclusion.” 77 Although he seems to waver on the precise nature of synderesis (i.e. whether it is
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a power or habit), Aquinas makes two significant shifts in the medieval debate about conscience.
First, he emphasizes that synderesis is connected to the reason, and not to the will. Reason
judges whether a good should be pursued and then presents this good to the will, “the will is not
moved to something desired without something being set forth by the apprehension…. But
reason demonstrates the intention of good or evil. Whence, since the act of the will is specified
by its object, it is fitting that the act of the will proceeds according to the judgment of reason and
conscience.” 78 This shift allows him to make this link between natural law and conscience,
which Aquinas fortifies in the Summa Theologiae.
With respect to the second aspect of conscience, viz. conscientia, we see that Aquinas
states clearly in this early work what he maintained throughout his later ones: conscientia is an
act. Drawing from Book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas describes the structure
of moral reasoning as syllogistic. Synderesis provides the major premise; the minor premise is
supplied by what he calls ‘superior or inferior’ reason; and the conclusion of the syllogism is ‘the
consideration of conscience.’ 79 This consideration of conscience is an act that applies what
Aquinas calls ‘universal knowledge” to a particular situation. 80 According to L.J. Elders, the
major innovation that Aquinas makes in this work is his insistence that conscience is dependent
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upon reason. 81 Aquinas treats this issue when he asks whether an erroneous conscience is
binding; in other words, if our conscience judges incorrectly, are we morally bound to act
accordingly? Aquinas’s starting point is that our will orients us toward the good—but the good
as it is presented by reason. Conscientia, according to Aquinas, is a dictate of reason that moves
the will toward what has been apprehended as a good to be pursued. 82 Thus, when conscience
has judged that an act is morally good, the judgment is binding because to act against it is to act
against what has been judged as good. Aquinas places tremendous gravitas upon the judgment
of the individual human person. However, his conclusion about whether an erring conscience is
binding is somewhat unsatisfactory. He contends that if someone has judged in their conscience
that something ought to be done (even if it is wrong), he must do it or else he sins. He writes,
And, therefore, if someone does something which is evil in itself, and which erring
reason judges good, he does not evade sin. But if he does not do it, he also falls into sin
because one defect of goodness suffices for that by which one is called evil, he will either
choose against a goodness that is good in a certain sense inasmuch as it is apprehended as
good by the reason, or he will choose against a goodness that is good in itself. 83
His solution to this moral dilemma is unsatisfactory; the man with an erring conscience should
simply put aside the error. How this putting aside the error is to come about, Aquinas does not
elaborate. However, despite these less than satisfactory conclusions, we should not “overlook
the striking points in the treatment of…conscience” that Aquinas does put forth this work. 84
Aquinas posits an important new principle, viz. “the will is to be judged by the standard of the
81
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good as subjectively apprehended, not as it is objectively in itself.” 85 Let us turn to consider how
Aquinas develops this new understanding of conscience in De Veritate.
IV. De Veritate: Conscience, Reason, and the Supremacy of Conscience
In his series of academic disputations on ‘truth,’ Disputed Questions on Truth (De
Veritate,), Aquinas gives his most extensive treatment of conscience and makes some significant
shifts in his theorization. First, unlike in his Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Aquinas
places his discussion of synderesis and conscientia immediately following his discussion on
reason rather than as connected to free choice. It is the emphasis on reason that makes Aquinas’s
theory truly a novel approach—a point we will consider in light of Aquinas’s understanding of
the human person. 86 Aquinas begins by again addressing the topic of whether synderesis ought
to be considered a power or a habit. He is more conclusive in De Veritate than he was in
Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum: synderesis is a habit and not a power:
If synderesis is a power, it is either cognitive or tends to action. But it is clear that it is
not simply cognitive from the fact that its act is to incline us to good and warn us against
evil. Therefore, if it is a power it will tend to action. But this is obviously false, for the
powers which tend to action are adequately divided into the irascible, the concupiscent,
and the rational. And synderesis is distinguished from these. 87
The distinction is an essential one. A habit, while it can be natural, still requires development,
experience, and learning. Aquinas’s understanding of conscience as pertaining both to the
dignity of the individual person and to the relational element of human nature hinges on whether
synderesis is a habit or a power. Let us first consider how Aquinas makes his case. It is the role
of synderesis to murmur against evil and to urge toward good. It is not a power, Aquinas argues,
but it is associated with human reason, “for reason itself urges to good and speaks out against
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evil. Therefore, synderesis is in no way a power.” 88 Drawing from Aristotle, Aquinas argues
that “just as in the operative part of the soul synderesis never errs, so in the speculative part
understanding never errs.” Put differently, Aquinas argues here a parallel between practical and
speculative reason, “Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative
merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes.” 89
So far, Aquinas’s theorization remains in the realm of analyzing the individual human
soul, particularly human reason. But Aquinas then makes an interesting turn his argument, a turn
that points to an important relational aspect of conscience. He draws upon Dionysius’s account
of participation. Dionysius says that “divine wisdom ‘joins the ends of nobler things with the
beginnings of lesser things.’ For natures which are ordained to one another are related to each
other as contiguous bodies, the upper limits of the lower body being in contact with the lower
limit of the higher one. Hence, at its highest point a lower nature attains to something which is
proper to the higher nature and shares in it imperfectly.” 90 Aquinas then uses this theory to relate
human nature to angelic nature. Angelic nature knows immediately without any need for “the
movement of reason;” but human nature needs attains knowledge of truth through investigation
of reason. 91 However, Aquinas argues that human beings share some participation in this angelic
or intuitive and self-evident way of knowing “according to what is highest” in human nature and
by means of which human beings “[know] some things at once and without investigation,” even
while still needing to receive some things from sense experience. 92 Angelic nature contains both
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speculative and practical reason, as since human beings come into contact with this angelic
nature, it too must have both a speculative and a practical component. Aquinas explains:
Hence it is that human nature, in so far as it comes into contact with the angelic nature,
must both in speculative and practical matters know truth without investigation. And this
knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which follows, whether speculative
or practical, since principles must be more stable and certain…. This knowledge must be
habitual so that it will be ready when needed…. Thus, just as there is a natural habit of
the human soul though which it knows principles of the speculative sciences, which we
call understanding of principles, so, too, there is in the soul a natural habit of the first
principles of action, which are the universal principles of the natural law. This habit
pertains to synderesis. This habit exists in no other power than reason. 93
This passage points to several important components of Aquinas’s theory of conscience. First,
significantly, he makes the case for its being a habit based on the participation of human nature
in something other than itself, thereby connecting synderesis to something outside the individual
human person (thus addressing the problem of conscience as radical autonomy).
Again, we see Aquinas’s emphasis on synderesis being a natural habit of reason. But we
see even more clearly the implications of this emphasis. Aquinas argues for the existence of
synderesis as a habit of practical reason by drawing from the Aristotelian assertion that there
exists a habit of speculative reason, viz. understanding, by which we know the first principle of
non contradiction. Further, this habit of practical reason enables us to know the universal
principles of the natural law, which include “the eternal norms of conduct.” 94 Is Aquinas
arguing for a universal knowledge of all moral truth that is to regulate human conduct? Aquinas
argues that synderesis is an infallible habit:
In all activities nature intends what is good and the conservation of the things which are
produced through the activity of nature. Therefore, in all the works of nature, the
principles are always permanent and unchangeable and preservative of right order. For,
as it is said in the Physics: ‘Principles should be permanent.’ For it would not be possible
93
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to have any stability or certainty in things which flow from principles if the principles
themselves were not firmly established…. This is the knowledge of first general
principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by
reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected. If any error could
take place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of the knowledge which
follows. 95
If synderesis is a natural habit that guides human action by urging it toward good that can never
err, is Aquinas naïve enough to believe that human beings agree on moral issues at all times?
How would he account for the many disagreements and rival conceptions of what is good in
contemporary society? Does an habitual grasp of first principles translate into a universal code
of moral principles? This critique is frequently leveled at Aquinas’s natural law theory, as
history and experience prove otherwise. Twentieth century Thomist and natural law proponent
Yves Simon was concerned that, especially after the Second World War, the revival in natural
law theory could easily become ideological; “Against such powers of destruction we feel the
need for an ideology of natural law…. There is a tendency to treat in terms of natural law
questions which call for treatment in terms of prudence.” 96 Simon’s words are as true today as
when he wrote them in the late 1950’s. He stresses the importance of prudence, another critical
component of Aquinas’s theory of conscience that Aquinas, a component that Aquinas
emphasizes in the Summa Theologiae. Yet, Aquinas does not argue that the natural habit of
synderesis necessarily yields a universal morality or even a shared sense of the common good;
“the agent needs the facts drawn from experience and inquiry; conclusions need to be framed in
the manner of adequate propositions; and conclusions need to be applied to facts. Moreover, all
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of these need the institutions of moral training.” 97 These institutions of moral training point the
individual human person beyond himself toward the family, friendships, civil society, and
community toward a relational aspect to conscience that informs the individual human person
about the norms of moral conduct.
While Aquinas contends that synderesis can neither err nor be extinguished in a person,
persons are still capable of differing about concepts of the good and can be mistaken in
judgment. Aquinas reiterates this parallel between speculative and practical matters, “Just as in
speculative matters, although a mistaken reason starts from principles, it does not derive its
falsity from first principles, but the wrong use of the principles, so the same thing also happens
in practical matters.” 98 For an error to occur or for a wrong moral choice to be made, synderesis
itself does not fail, but rather the principles provided by synderesis are wrongly applied in a
particular situation. This application of the principles of synderesis is the act of conscientia.
Aquinas first characterizes the relational aspect of conscience, explaining that, “Knowledge
which consists in comparison is actual knowledge. But conscience denotes knowledge with
comparison. For one is said to be conscious (conscire), that is, to know together (simul scire).” 99
In his brief etymological discussion, Aquinas comes closer to pointing toward a relational aspect
to conscience. Aquinas then explains that there are several ways in which conscientia is
commonly conceptualized. That conscientia is considered ‘knowledge together with’ points
beyond the individual human person.
Yet, conscientia is said to be the consciousness or awareness of an act that was done, and
it is also considered to be that which judges whether an action is right or wrong. When we speak
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of conscientia in this latter sense, Aquinas states that it functions in two ways. First, it is that by
“which we are directed through the habit of scientific knowledge to do or not to do
something.” 100 It also functions as a judge of past action, again “with reference to the habit of
knowledge” that is supplied by synderesis. 101 Aquinas thus acknowledges both the judicial and
legislative functions of conscience:
But we must bear in mind that in the first application, in which scientific knowledge is
applied to an act to know whether it has taken place, it is application to a particular act of
sensitive knowledge, as of memory, though which we recall what is done, or of sense,
through which we perceive the particular act in which we are now engaged. But in the
second and third applications, by which we deliberate about what should be done, or
examine what has already been done, that operative habits of reason are applied to the
act. These are the habit of synderesis and the habit of wisdom, which perfects higher
reason, and the habit of scientific knowledge, which perfects lower reason. Of these,
either all are applied at the same time, or only one of them is applied. 102
Aquinas identifies conscience with reason, but he uses the terminology ‘higher’ and ‘lower’
reason, following the distinction made by Augustine. Aquinas distinguishes between higher and
lower reason according to whether a particular nature is higher or lower than the rational soul:
“There are certain natures higher than the rational soul, and certain natures lower.” 103 While
reason is one unified power (not several):
The soul has a different relation to both types of things, and from this the different
functions are derived. For it is called higher reason in its reference to higher natures,
either as contemplating their nature and truth in themselves, or as receiving from them
intelligible character and a kind of model for activity. It is called lower reason in so far
as it is directed to lower things either to perceive them through contemplation or to
manage them through activity. Both types of nature, however, the higher and the lower,
are perceived by the human soul in their common character of intelligible, the higher in
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so far as it is immaterial in itself, and the lower in so far as it is divested of matter
through the activity of the soul. 104
The exercise of conscience can apply to matters either of higher or lower reason, and it is
through conscience (conscientia) that “the knowledge of synderesis and of higher and lower
reason are applied to the examination of a particular act.” 105
If synderesis cannot lead a person astray, how does Aquinas reconcile that human beings
certainly do not agree about certain moral goods, and can themselves err in their moral
judgment? It is through this very application of the knowledge that synderesis supplies for a
particular circumstance that conscientia is liable to err. Attachment to certain bad habits or
passions can cause an error in judgment. For example, an intemperate desire for food can cause
one to eat more than he should, even if he knows it is bad for his health. Aquinas explains,
“Error, however, can occur in this application in two ways; in one, because that which is applied
has the error within it, and in the other, because the application is faulty.” 106 He contends that
the syllogistic structure of moral reasoning can err either from a faulty premise or from a faulty
construction of the syllogism. However, Aquinas is quick to add that the error occurs in only
one of the premises, since synderesis, which provides the first principles, cannot err. 107 Aquinas
explains:
We must remember that in some things conscience can never make a mistake, namely,
when the particular act to which conscience is applied has a universal judgment about it
in synderesis. For, as in speculative matters, error does not occur when we are dealing
with particular conclusion which are derived directly from the universal principles and
expressed in the same terms—as for instance, no one is deceived in the judgment: “This
whole is greater than its part,” just as no one is deceived in the judgment: “Every whole is
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greater than its part”—so, too, no conscience can err in the judgments: “I should not love
God” or “Some evil should be done.” 108
If one’s conscience can be in error, does that judgment still bind a certain action? If, for
example, a person with all sincerity of conscience believes that taking the life of someone else is
truly a good to be pursued, is such a judgment binding? Aquinas argues that a judgment of one’s
conscience, even if it is in error, is binding. If one acts against a false conscience, he sins,
because even though his conclusion was wrong, his acting against his conscience violates his
integrity. However, even if he acts in accordance with a false conscience, he also violates his
integrity since his act was still wrong. Aquinas gives a scriptural example: “In John 16:2 we
read: ‘The hour cometh, when whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God.’
Therefore, their conscience told those who killed the Apostles that they would please God by this
action. But this was a mistake.” 109 If those who acted in this manner were mistaken, how could
not committing murder be a violation of their consciences and therefore a bad act? Or, as
Aquinas puts it, how could such a faulty judgment of conscience bind this kind of action? In
both instances, a wrong is being committed against an individual or against the common good.
How does Aquinas reconcile such a tension?
Aquinas takes up this challenge by considering how an exterior thing is bound, “for he
who is bound must necessarily stay in the place where he is bound, and the power to go off to
other places is taken away from him.” 110 If the judgment of conscience (whether it is correct or
erroneous) is binding, then its power to bind “has place only in things which are necessary with a
necessity imposed by something else.” 111 Conscience cannot bind by coercion, because coercion
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“has no place in movements of the will, by only in physical things, because by its nature the will
is free from coercion.” 112 Aquinas emphasizes the free will of the human person; even if his
judgment is erroneous, his interior freedom by his nature must remain intact. Yet, a judgment of
conscience still imposes necessity. How does conscience impose necessity? According to
Aquinas, the judgment of conscience binds because of the knowledge of achieving some good or
avoiding some evil, just as “no one is bound by the command of a king or lord unless the
command reaches him who is commanded; and it reaches him through knowledge of it.” 113
Thus, we are prompted to consider the very real possibility of ignorance or of erroneous
knowledge. How and why would the judgment of conscience based on false knowledge or
ignorance impose necessity on a person? In the ‘difficulties,’ 114 Aquinas gives a seemingly
impenetrable argument: God’s law always trumps false conscience; one must obey a higher
authority (such as an emperor) over a lower authority (such as a proconsul). The authority of
conscience is lower than God. Thus a mistaken conscience could never be above the law of God.
But Aquinas argues to the contrary, arguing “sin is principally in the will [and anyone] who
decides to transgress a divine commandment has an evil will.” 115 Thus, if a person acts
knowingly against conscience, this is evil. However, if his conscience judges incorrectly
“whether in things intrinsically evil or in anything at all,” and he “believes that what is opposed
to his conscience is contrary to the law of God,” but disobeys his own conscience, he has still
acted with an evil will. 116 The authority of one’s individual conscience, at least as Aquinas is
presenting it here, seems to trump even a divine command, for in not following one’s conscience
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one violates one’s own integrity with respect to what one considers intrinsically evil. However,
Aquinas makes a very important remark, almost in passing: “Accordingly, although such a false
conscience can be changed, nevertheless, as long as it remains, it is binding” [emphasis mine]. 117
Aquinas argues unapologetically for the respect for the judgment of the individual
person’s conscience, as he views that person’s judgment in accordance with their personal
freedom and moral integrity. But he recognizes the very real possibility that any one person’s
sincere and conscientious judgment can be wrong. He explains the error in the context of the
syllogism; one can wrongly apply a premise for many different reasons. Even if some are not
convinced about the syllogistic structure of moral reasoning with the knowledge of first
principles and the major premise of the syllogism being supplied by synderesis, we can recall the
example of Eichmann as one who judged wrongly about what was morally good. 118 We can also
consider those who defended moral societal evils such as slavery or genocide as having a faulty
or even a defective conscience. However, a faulty conscience can be changed. How does one
change a false conscience? I argue that it is precisely here (i.e. change of an erroneous
conscience) that the relational aspect of conscience is critically important. I turn to Alasdair
MacIntyre’s analysis in Dependent Rational Animals to explain this importance.
MacIntyre, like Aquinas and Aristotle, begins with an underlying vision of the human
person’s nature as teleological, rational, and political: each human person by his nature is
ordered toward a particular end, he is endowed with reason to judge by what means to attain that
end, and he lives in community with other human persons seeking their final end, viz. beatitudo
that according to Aquinas, consists of relationship with God. He calls this human condition
dependent, rational animality. Human beings exist in a state of dependency on other human
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beings for the fulfillment of their needs and flourishing, and, in a particular way, they are
dependent upon others to help them become ‘independent practical reasoners.’ Aquinas shares
this vision of the human person as existing in a state of dependency, that is, that man is by nature
a rational animal and by means of this status he has need of relationship with other human
persons. 119 To become an ‘independent practical reasoner’ means to be able:
To evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask, that is, whether what
we take to be good reasons for action really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability
to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as to be able to make rational
choices between them, and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to
enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our
desires must be directed, and if necessary, reeducated, if we are to attain it. 120
Young children of course need to rely upon the guidance of parents and teachers to help them
develop their capacities for independent practical reasoning as they grow and mature. However,
since human judgment is always subject to error, even once a person has become ‘an
independent practical reasoner,’ one still needs the help of others to help correct erroneous
judgments. The social relationships that we have with families, friends, colleagues, and fellow
citizens enable us to have either a confirmation or a challenge to our own judgments by those
who know us well. 121 To put this in another way, the formation of an individual conscience does
not happen in isolation—we live in communities with others with whom we have relationships.
The formation of one’s conscience, of both synderesis and conscientia is connected, at least on
Aquinas’s account, to our practical reason. And “practical reasoning is by its nature, on the
generally Aristotelian view…reasoning together with others, generally within some determinate
set of social relationships. Those relationships are initially formed and then developed as the
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relationships through which each of us first achieves and is then supported in the status of an
independent practical reasoner.” 122
MacIntyre, however, acknowledges that these relationships with others can lead us away
from becoming an independent practical reasoner; “defective systems of social relationships are
apt to produce defective character.” 123 There is a tension in MacIntyre: human beings are
dependent rational animals who must become independent practical reasoners in order to attain
their telos, but do so only in view of their continued dependence on others and with
consideration of the common good. Acknowledgement of dependence on others, however, in no
way attenuates human freedom, particularly the freedom of conscience. I argue that this
dependence is a constituent part of the freedom of conscience. Aquinas deals with this tension in
his final question on conscience in De Veritate. Here Aquinas asks the question whether one’s
conscience has more authority in indifferent matters than the command of a superior. 124 Aquinas
answers in the affirmative, placing the dignity and authority of an individual’s interior integrity
and judgment of conscience over and above the authority of a superior, “a spiritual bond is
stronger than a physical bond, and an intrinsic bond stronger than an extrinsic bond. But
conscience is an intrinsic spiritual bond, whereas the office of the superior is physical and
extrinsic, since all his authority is based on a dispensation which is limited in time.” 125 Although
Aquinas is speaking here in the context of a religious order, it is not difficult to imagine its
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application in political life. Aquinas here advocates for the respect for the interiority of the
individual human person, which no extrinsic authority can ever coerce. The dignity of the
individual conscience derives a person’s relation to the Divine. Aquinas states, “Even natural
habits exist in us because they were put there by God. Consequently since conscience is an act
proceeding from the natural habit of synderesis, God is said to have imprinted it in the way in
which He is said to be the source of all knowledge of truth which is in us. For God endows our
nature with the knowledge of first principles.” 126 However, in cases of a false conscience,
Aquinas asserts that although a false conscience still binds over a superior authority, “one can
and should change such a conscience.” 127 To change a false conscience, one may need the aid of
others; conscience should draw one out of oneself and toward others. The relational aspect of
conscience is derived from human relationships that enable us to develop the virtues in order to
become independent practical reasoners, particularly the virtue of prudence. In the Summa
Theologiae, Aquinas gives a much comprehensive account of prudence. We will next consider
the account of conscience and the relationship between its judgments and the virtue of prudence
as given in the Summa Theologiae.
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Chapter IV: Conscience, Law, Prudence, and the Common Good: Aquinas’s Account of
Conscience in the Summa Theologiae and Super Romanos
“Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every

governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are
subject to his government.” 1
“The interconnection between the whole and the individual—the bracing action exercised by my
individual development upon the structure of the whole, and the corresponding effect exercised by the
structure of the whole upon my individual development, as a result of God’s wisdom and love—is
Providence.” 2

I. Reason as the Basis for Moral Choice and Freedom
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of Aquinas’s major contributions to ethics in
general and to conscience more specifically is his emphasis that conscience is connected to
reason. Reason is the distinguishing characteristic or differentia specifica of the human person;
and it guides the human person in pursuit of his end. According to Aquinas, reason is the
summit of human liberty. 3 It is the role of reason “to advance from one thing understood to
another so as to know intelligible truth.” 4 Reason is a kind of movement in understanding and
directs the human person “by way of inquiry and discovery…[to] the first principles; and again,
by way of judgment, returns by analysis to first principles in light of which it examines what it
has found.” 5 By means of reason, human beings “hold dominion over [their] acts, moving
[themselves] freely in order to perform [their] actions.” 6 In Thomas’s schema, reason presents to
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the will ends to pursue by discerning goods and ordering actions according to this discernment.
Although the will freely chooses, Aquinas argues that the role of reason is primary in freely
ordering goods; thus we see how Aquinas argues that the summit of human liberty exists in
man’s rational nature. Oscar James Brown explains:
The cardinal role of reason within the creativity and self-motion that is free judgment is
radically imputable to the giveness of that hierarchical parallelism that obtains between
the set order of the psychic powers and the complex plurality (also objectively
observable) of available human goods – even strictly within the world of immanent or
secular values. It is reason’s lot, precisely to endeavor to order these several given goods
among each other, not by the purely arbitrary arrangements of a despotic rule, but, rather
in response to the order already discernible among the psychic faculties themselves – an
order that is given. 7
For Aquinas, the hierarchical structure of goods exists simply on account of the giveness of
human nature, “Now there is a certain order of these various things that are man’s goods, based
on the fact that what is primary is subordinated to what is more primary.” 8 The ordering of
goods leads human beings to their final end, which is happiness.
However, it is critical to understand Aquinas’s view of human happiness as man’s final
end. First, as discussed above, Aquinas posits a certain ‘giveness’ of nature, and that giveness
applies no less to the nature of human persons. This ‘giveness’ is on account of man’s
createdness, and it is not merely “order embedded in a species as though individuals are moved
by a kind of physical necessity.” 9 Instead, it is the recognition that the nature of the human
person “is not of his own making. Rather this particular is discovered through experience and
through the use of self-reflective intelligence [i.e. reason], which is already operative in man
between human freedom and Divine Providence. The work, and particularly this section, is very helpful guide to the
Thomistic understanding of human freedom.
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himself.” 10 Aquinas begins from a position of the human person as created, and he operates
within a metaphysics of participation with the Divine, that is to say, rational beings—human
beings, participate in the Divine Wisdom and Governance. 11 Although this metaphysics (and the
related theology and theological-philosophical anthropology) have largely been rejected by many
contemporary political theorists, it is still important to understand Aquinas’s position and to
discern whether this rejection is warranted or whether it might still be valid.
Aquinas views that the human person is created by “God, Who is all ways perfect in
Himself, and Who endows all things with being from His own power, exists as the Ruler of all
beings, and is ruled by none other. Nor is there anything that escapes His rule, just as there is
nothing that does not receive its being from Him.” 12 The human person, like all other created
beings, is ruled by the Divine. Further, human freedom is rooted in this Divine rule and in the
human person’s very created ‘giveness.’ Aquinas continues:
The result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on the
diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God’s products that, possessing
understanding, they bear likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only
ruled but also are rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed
toward a fitting end. 13
Because the human person is created and bears the Divine image, he participates in the Divine
governance by ruling over himself, a rule that leads him to direct the attainment of his own end.
But it is precisely on account of their unique participation in the Divine governance and with the
aid of God that human beings can achieve their end. The ‘fitting end’ toward which all human
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beings tend, according to Aquinas is defined in terms of relationship with the Divine. 14 Aquinas
explains that, “there must some union of things for which there is one end, as a result of their
being ordered to this end.” 15 Since all human beings have the same final end, they are thus
united to one another in several ways. Aquinas continues:
Thus, in a state men are unified by a certain concord, so that they may be able to
attain the public good, and soldiers in combat must be united and act with one accord,
so that victory, the common end, may be achieved. Now, the ultimate end, to which man
is brought with the help of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which is
proper to God Himself. Thus, this final good is shared with man by God. So, man
cannot be brought to his end unless he be united with God by the conformation of his
will. And this is the proper effect of love, for ‘it is proper to friends to approve and
disapprove of the same things and to be delighted in and to be pained by the same
things.’” 16
Not only are human beings united to other human beings as in a political society or as soldiers
fighting in combat, but each individual person is called into a relationship with the Divine; and
the Divine is a person, with whom man engages in a relationship formed by love, a relationship
that enables the human person to attain his final end.
It is my assertion that the human relationship with and dependency upon God that is so
central in Aquinas’s work also applies to human relationships. Human beings are united to
others, because each one has been given the same rational nature and has been given the same
Divine image. Thus, each individual human person has been given the same freedom for selfrule to pursue his end. 17 Each man as a rational creature is directed by God in a distinct way,
14

Aquinas states that the highest and final end for the human person is contemplation of God (Cf. Summa Contra
Gentiles, Book III, 1. Chapter 37. At first glance, this may not seem like relational terms. However, the
contemplation of God is based upon divine caritas, which draws the human person to God and enables the human
person to respond in love of God. Aquinas’s explanation of supernatural grace further illustrates the dependency of
the human person upon another outside of himself. See also Aquinas’s discussion of faith being formed by love in
the Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 4, art. 2.
15
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III, Chapter 151, 3.
16
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III, Chapter 151, 3. Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, 1165b, 27.
17
Cf. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III, Chapter 117.

130

with an emphasis on his own particularity, “the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as
is clear from what we have said. And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in
their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual” 18 Aquinas gives prominence to the
relationship of the individual person to God. He states:
God takes of each nature according to its capacity; indeed, he created singular creatures
of such kinds that he knows were suited to achieving the end under His governance. . . .
[T]he personal acts of a rational creature are properly the acts that stem off from the
rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetual existence, not only in
function of the species. . . but also in an individual sense. Therefore, the acts of a rational
creature are directed by divine providence not only for the reason that they are important
to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal acts. 19
But even as rational animals who freely order their own actions, human beings are unable to
achieve their final end solely by their direction of their own reason. For Aquinas, there is a
necessity for divine revelation and of grace for the individual to achieve his end.
But reason must also be trained to make judgments about man’s end, for since “a man
lives by reason, which he must develop by lengthy, temporal experience so that he may achieve
prudence.” 20 Aquinas explains:
Hence children must be instructed by parents who are already experienced people. Nor
are they able to receive such instruction as soon as they are born, but after a long time,
and especially after they have reached the age of discretion. Moreover, a long time is
needed for this instruction. Then, too, because of the impulsion of the passions, through
which prudent judgment is vitiated, they require not merely instruction by correction. 21
Aquinas illumines the human dependency upon others, particularly within familial relationships,
to inform and to develop capacities to reason and to make judgments. Parents are responsible to
form the reasoning capacities of their children, teaching them through instruction and correction
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about the appropriate manner of living. For, by forming their children in reason, parents instill
virtue in them, for “virtue consists in this: that both the inner feelings and the use of corporeal
things be regulated by reason.” 22 But does this same injunction apply to relationships among
adults—among friends or fellow citizens? Or, do human beings depend upon one another as a
means for forming their rational capacity and growing in virtue?
Aquinas answers emphatically in the affirmative, stating that “one may be aided to this
end by another man, both in regard to knowledge and to love. For men are of mutual assistance
to each other in the knowing of truth, and one may stimulate another toward the good, and also
restrain him from evil.” 23 What distinguishes Aquinas’s answer is his emphasis that human
persons depend on one another both in knowledge and in love, particularly with respect to
discerning good and evil. Human persons exist in relationship with one another, and because of
their shared nature, all are capable of participation in the divine vision of knowledge and love of
God. Again, Aquinas emphasizes the role of reason in this relational part of human nature, “it
pertains to a well-disposed intellect to bring men back to things that are proper goods for men,
namely the goods of reason. Consequently, to lead them away from these goods, by diverting
them to the least important goods, is the mark of an improperly disposed intellect.” 24 Aquinas
argues that despite a diversity of human types and abilities, each human person can “attain to the
vision of the divine substance [that is, man’s final end], and the inferiority of its nature is no
impediment.” 25 This assertion radically distinguishes Aquinas from the Classical tradition,
particularly Aristotle, from whom he draws so much in his own thinking about human nature. 26
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Aristotle also does recognize the necessity of human relationships for human flourishing, for
example, in the beginning of the Politics, he reflects on the essential role of friendship between
men and women to form the foundation of political life, viz. the family. Indeed, he recognizes
that every city exists as a partnership between persons for the sake of a common good. 27
Aristotle dedicates two books in his Nicomachean Ethics to the necessity of friendship for human
happiness, and he considers friendship to the basis for political society. 28 To be sure, Aristotle
recognizes the importance of man’s social and political nature.
However, for Aristotle, true friendship can only exist among the most virtuous men who
are equal to each other. So there can be no foundational friendship between human beings and
the Divine, as Aquinas holds. Further, we need to consider the characteristics of thespoudaios or
man of highest moral and intellectual virtue as described by Aristotle, viz. the megalopsychos or
the man who possesses magnanimity. For Aristotle, magnanimity is “the crown… as it were, of
the virtues: it magnifies them and cannot exist without them.” 29 What is the character of this
person? Aristotle describes him as:
The kind of man who will do good, but who is ashamed to accept a good turn, because
the former marks a man as superior, the latter as inferior. Moreover, he will requite good
with a greater good, for in this way he will not only repay the original benefactor but put
him in his debt at the same time by making him the recipient of an added benefit. The
[magnanimous] also seem to remember the goods they have done, but not those they have
received…. They listen with pleasure to the good that they have done, but with
displeasure to what good they have received. 30
Aristotle describes this person, one possessing the crown of the virtues with a character of radical
independence, one who scorns any notion of dependency on another. Dependency or aid
bestowed upon him is a mark of inferiority. He scorns his enemies, and if he is put in a position
27
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where he may need the aid of others, “he will not lament and ask for help.” 31 He is selfsufficient to the scorn of others. Although in Book IX, Aristotle states that even the most
supremely happy and virtuous person would still need friends, it seems as the megalopsychos has
need of others only so that he can assert his goodness, for he certainly does not receive material
goods or favors from others.
When we juxtapose this description of friendship and the virtue of magnanimity with
Aquinas’s understanding of the human person existing in relationship to God and others as part
of the giveness of their nature, it easy to see a more radical divergence between their respective
conceptions of human relationships. 32 But the question remains: how might this assessment
relate to conscience and to moral choice in general? Mary Keys points to a starting point for our
investigation:
There is [in Aquinas’s work] the ground-up moral phenomenology beginning from
natural law and rooted in what Aquinas terms synderesis and conscientia. The ethic
experience of each human being, Aquinas maintains, evolves in the context of an inborn
inclination toward good and aversion toward evil. Natural knowledge of the first and
very general precepts of the natural law enjoins personal rational reflection on human
relationships, social norms, and the example and advice of others, and one’s concrete,
lived experiences, to deepen one’s understanding of the requirements of virtue and
upright conduct and the connection of these with beatitude, happiness or flourishing. 33
Keys posits that Aquinas begins his investigation acknowledging the giveness of human nature
as endowed with a means, i.e. reason guided by synderesis and activated by conscientia, to
discern generally between good and evil and that part of man’s moral learning process involves
experience, relationships, and living in society with other human beings. Such will enable to
pursue and guide others in pursuit of both individual and common goods. Let us then turn to
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consider Aquinas’s discussion of conscience first within the Summa Theologiae and in his
scriptural commentary on St. Paul’s letter addressed to the Romans.
II. Freedom, Law, Practical Wisdom, and the Place of Conscience in the Summa Theologiae and
Super Romanos
A. Synderesis and Conscientia in the Prima Pars and in Super Romanos
As we turn to the analysis of conscience in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, it is worth
pointing out that Aquinas does not give in this work as extensive a discussion of synderesis and
conscientia as he does in De Veritate. Michael B. Crowe asserts:
In the Summa theologiae, in which St. Thomas rehandles so many of the concepts found
in his early works, one expects to find an extended discussion of synderesis. But the
term, outside of the single laconic article devoted to it, is scarcely referred to…. But
what is not found in St. Thomas prior to the Summa is an analysis of the general notion of
law. 34
And although Aquinas does not give as detailed an analysis of conscientia either, he makes
frequent mention of the ‘tribunal of conscience’ throughout the rest of the Summa, especially in
his discussion of the sacraments and his pastoral advice. Crowe argues that Aquinas’s lack of
careful attention to and analysis of the concept of synderesis signals that he has lost interest in
the concept and no longer finds it a significant component of moral theory. Crowe could be right
in this speculation, or Aquinas could have considered his in-depth analysis in De Veritate
sufficient, or, as Joseph Ratzinger points out, the precise meaning of synderesis has “remained
unclear…and for this reason became a hindrance to a careful development of this essential aspect
of the whole question of conscience.” 35 Although Crowe implies that Aquinas’s interest in
conscience declines with a shifting emphasis on lex, I argue that it is precisely this shift in
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emphasis toward lex that gives conscience its significance within Aquinas’s thought. Aquinas
makes an essential connection between the interiority of the human person, moral choice, human
freedom, law, and the common good. Let us then consider how he argues for this connection.
It will be helpful in our analysis to give a brief consideration to the overall structure of
the Summa Theologiae to contextualize Aquinas’s discussion of conscience in this work. It was
written as a textbook for beginning theology students; and as a work of the common medieval
‘Summa’ genre, it was intended to be “a synthesis comprising the whole range of Catholic
truth.” 36 Significantly, Aquinas began this work originally as a revision of his Scriptum Super
Libros Sententiarum, which Aquinas had considered to be “pedagogically deficient and
systematically incompetent.” 37 As a work meant primarily to address theological questions,
Thomas sets out his plan to treat first the things of God “not only as He is in Himself, but also as
He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures.” 38 Aquinas
proposes to first address knowledge of God, then the rational creature’s movement towards God
and then Christ, who according to his humanity leads the rational creature toward union with
God. 39 The outline he gives for the work will aid in understanding how he frames the question
of conscience. The first discussion of conscience is given in the Prima Pars (First Part) which,
according to Aquinas treats the “procession of creatures from God,” in particular their relation to
God as imago Dei. 40 His second treatment of conscience is found in the Prima Secundae (the
First Part of the Second Part), which treats human beings in relation to their final end (i.e.
beatitudo) and the means to achieve that final end. The first discussion of conscience in this
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section of the Summa Theologiae is found in the context of man’s means to his final end.
Synderesis and conscientia are mentioned in the Treatise on Law (in the Prima Secundae) in
questions relating to the natural law. Synderesis is also mentioned in the Secunda Secundae (the
Second part of the Second part) in the Treatise on Prudence. The discussion of conscience in
both the Treatise on Law and Treatise of Prudence are the two significant developments in
Aquinas’s theory of conscience upon which we will focus. 41
Aquinas’s first mention of synderesis and conscientia in the Prima Pars is placed in the
question addressing the intellectual powers of the soul. Interestingly, it comes immediately
following an article on whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. This
placement is significant, because in earlier works, Aquinas places synderesis and conscientia in
the less clear context of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ reason. 42 Aquinas does dedicate one article to
higher and lower reason in this same question, but he does not give nearly as extensive of a
treatment, nor does he describe the role or function of synderesis and conscientia in these terms.
When Aquinas addresses synderesis, he asks whether it is a special power in the soul. Aquinas
has now confidently determined that synderesis is not a power, but rather a habitus of practical
reason. Aquinas answers stating that since,
Man’s act of reasoning…is a kind of movement, [it] proceeds from the understanding of
certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on
the part of reason, as an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding of
those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which have discovered by
reasoning. 43
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Aquinas begins by explaining the act of human reasoning proceeding from first principles and
judging in a kind of movement to discovery. He then appeals to speculative reason to provide
the parallel framework for synderesis: “as the speculative reason argues about speculative things,
so that practical reason argues about practical things.” 44
Aquinas treats speculative and practical reason in the previous article and his discussion
there will help us to understand how is defining the role of synderesis. First, as discussed earlier
in this dissertation, Aquinas draws the categories of ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ reason from
Aristotle and his commentators. Aquinas considers whether the speculative and practical reason
is one and the same power or is two separate powers. If they are separate powers, one could
easily separate “the practical reasoning of agents in particular situation…and a theoretical [i.e.
speculative] knowledge of the human good…so that the latter cannot enter into the former, so
that reflective reasoning about the human good cannot become practically and immediately
relevant.” 45 What are the implications of such a separation? According to Aquinas, when we
make moral judgments, we begin from our practical, lived experience, “For [man] possesses
understanding and reason, and consequently he can grasp in what different ways a thing may be
good or bad, depending on its suitability for various individuals, times, and places.” 46 We
consider the particular situation to inquire, “what reasons we have for doing this rather than that
and whether they are sufficiently good reasons.” 47 Alasdair MacIntyre explains:
We shall find that the good reasons for doing this rather than that are also good reasons
for becoming this kind of person rather than that, for acquiring this or that kind of
character. Since what discriminates one kind of character from is how goods are rank
ordered by the agent, and since rank ordering of goods embodies some conception of
what the good life for human beings is, we will be unable to justify our choices until and
44
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unless we can justify some conception of the human good. And to do this we will have to
resort to theory as the justification of practice. 48
It is for this reason that Aquinas explains that “the speculative intellect by extensions becomes
practical.” 49 At first this statement may seem to contradict MacIntyre’s description, since he
describes a bottom-up method of moral judgment. However, Aquinas teaches that moral
judgment begins from practical experience, but we are not left entirely without first principles
from which we begin, and as the “speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends…to the
consideration of the truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to
operation.” 50 The practical intellect directs toward what it apprehends as a good to be pursued,
but the two, that is the speculative and the practical intellect, being one power, work together
since,
Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise, it would not
be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible.
Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of
good, for example, when someone desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical
intellect is good directed to operation and under the aspect of truth. For the practical
intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs truth known to operation. 51
For Aquinas, since the practical and speculative intellects are one power of the soul, although
distinguished by the end to which it is directed, that is goodness or truth respectively, these ends
include one another. Thus, the consideration of the good for the human person as MacIntyre
describes above is also something true about the human person. 52
Aquinas provides a particular natural habit that enables the human person to grasp first
principles, and he appeals to Aristotle’s assertion that since there is a special habit of speculative
48
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reason, viz. understanding of principles, then there is special habit of practical reason by which
we grasp the first practical principles, viz. synderesis. 53 It is the role of synderesis to incite
human beings toward good and to murmur against evil. 54 Aquinas’s choice of words in the
description (instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo) are significant. Synderesis is a directive,
but it does not contain specifics: it can only instigate or murmur. It is only by reason and free
choice that the human person executes a judgment in a chosen action. Since synderesis contains
only a general knowledge of universal principles, it cannot dictate the specifics of all moral law
for, “universals cause no movement, but particular things do, since actions go on in their area.” 55
Because it does not contain the whole of all moral law, Aquinas can confidently say that, “Those
unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they
are attributed to reason as to a power, and to synderesis as to a habit. Wherefore we judge
naturally both by our reason and by synderesis.” 56 We apply these judgments to particular
actions by means of conscientia.
Aquinas’s question dedicated to conscientia is the familiar issue of whether it is a power.
Given what he has answered in both Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De Veritate, we
can anticipate his answer that is an act and not a power. Since the very etymological root of the
word conscientia implies “the relation of knowledge to something,” Aquinas concludes that it is
an act. 57 He also briefly summarizes its various functions “to witness, to bind, or incite [and] to
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accuse, torment, or rebuke.” 58 Conscientia judges whether something should or should not be
done. In this way, Aquinas states, it can be confused with the habit, synderesis. But it also
examines what we have or have not done or whether we have done these actions well or ill, that
is, with a good or bad intention. Aquinas elaborates later in the Prima Secundae where
conscientia reappears in the discussion of man’s final end. The two articles are not explicitly
addressed to questions on conscientia, but rather they address the integrity of the will when it
makes a choice based on an errant judgment of reason. 59
In the Prima Secundae question 19, article 5, Aquinas addresses whether the will is if it
goes against reason, even when reason errs. Here, he readdresses whether an erring conscience
(i.e. incorrect reason applied to an act) binds a person. If the will chooses against the judgment
of conscience, even if it be a wrong judgment, the act is evil since the person chooses under the
auspices of violating his conscience. Aquinas begins his explanation by making a distinction
between three types of acts: acts that are intrinsically evil, acts that are intrinsically good, and
acts that are morally indifferent. He rejects the notion that if a person’s conscience errs for
example, commanding a morally indifferent act as an evil to be avoided, then their will has not
chosen to do evil if they perform the act so judged as evil. Aquinas turns us toward the
interiority of the human person, toward his own subjective judgment, to determine the rightness
or wrongness of an act. He explains:
And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by reason…from the very fact
that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes
evil. And this the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or
evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can receive the character of goodness
or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or
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that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason
apprehending it as such. 60
For Aquinas, to follow right reason is to follow the dictates of one’s conscience, as he defines
conscience as a dictate of reason. Reginald Doherty explains that this means “the error possible
to the intellect in proposing an object to the will is identified with an error of conscience, and
error already distinguished from the error of the judgment of election [i.e. choice]…, which [is]
caused by a disorder of the appetite.” 61 Thus, he can conclude that, “absolutely speaking, every
will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.” 62
In the next article, Aquinas addresses whether the will can ever be good if abides by an
erroneous judgment of reason. For it would seem that if the will is evil if it goes against an
erroneous conscience in a matter of intrinsic evil, then any choice made will always be wrong.
He states that the previous article asked whether an erroneous conscience binds our actions, and
this approach considers whether an erroneous conscience excuses when our judgment falls
short. 63 The answer hinges on whether a person is ignorant of something which would have
allowed him to form a proper judgment, for as “moral good and evil consist in action in so far as
it is voluntary…it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away
the character of moral good and evil.” 64 However, this excuse of ignorance does not apply if the
ignorance is willed, “if then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either
directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know…such an error of
reason or conscience does not excuse the will.” 65 What we see in Aquinas is a consistent
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argument that conscience is a dictate of reason “that results from the actual application of
knowledge to an act.” 66 Aquinas has described the judgment of conscience as the conclusion of
syllogism whose major is informed by the habit of synderesis, the habit containing the first
practical principles and the minor premise is provided by knowledge of particulars. Synderesis
both provides “the principles from which conscience concludes, [and also] govern[s] the
conclusion, conscience itself…. There are two effects of conscience. In the first place
conscience binds or obliges. Secondly, a quasi-effect or property of conscience is that it may
err.” 67 Aquinas has argued that even when the judgment of conscience is in error, it must still be
followed since,
Fundamentally conscience obliges because it brings the divine law into contact with
man’s acts. As a result, the binding power of conscience is the binding power of the
divine precept. Conscience then is a kind of subjective law. More proximately,
conscience obliges because the will is moved by and elects the objects presented by the
intellect…. It is conscience applying the law to an act which obliges man to act. 68
It is the connection that the human person has to something outside of himself that obliges his
conscience, viz. the divine law. Yet, conscience is still a kind of subjective judgment.
Aquinas examines this tension in his commentary on St. Paul’s letter to the Romans,
Super Romanos, with a few changes to his treatment in the Summa Theologiae. First, he makes
in this work no mention at all of synderesis, but discusses conscientia extensively. He does not
give a precise philosophical explication of conscientia as an act that applies the first principles of
practical reason to a particular situation. Rather, he discusses it within the context of St. Paul’s
pastoral letter the main subject of which is a theological issue, viz. the relationship between the
Jews and the newly converted gentiles with respect to following the rule of divine law of the
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Jews: “For the Jews objected to the gentiles that when they lived without God’s law, they
sacrificed to idols. The gentiles on their part objected to the Jews that even though they received
God’s law, they did not keep it.” 69 It is precisely this tension between the Jew and Gentiles that
leads Paul and his commentator Aquinas to reflect on the natural knowledge of right order given
to each human person. That Jewish and Gentile converts to Christianity came together to form a
new community of faith emphasizes the important relational dimension to their common life
together. How these two as historically antagonistic communities were to be united under one
faith in a transpolitical community was not an insignificant challenge in the early years of the
Christian church, and it has certainly had political implications.
It is by emphasizing their knowledge of God’s law through conscience that Paul seeks to
illustrate the participation of the Gentile converts in the life of God’s law, “For when the
gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; they, having not the
law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their
conscience bearing witness to them.” 70 Aquinas is careful not to argue that either Gentile or Jew
has no need for divine grace (i.e. the Pelagian heresy), but he quotes Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics in his explanation of this text. He argues that the Gentiles do have a natural knowledge of
the good insofar as,
They function as a law to themselves by instructing and inducing themselves to good
because the Philosopher says: ‘law is a statement laying down an obligation and
proceeding from prudence to understanding’…. Then when he [St. Paul] says ‘their
conscience bearing witness’ he proves his statement that work of the law is written in
their hearts by citing actions which announce its presence. First, he mentions those
actions, one of which is the witness of conscience. He touches on this when he says
‘their conscience bearing witness,’ conscience being the application of one’s knowledge
69
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in judging whether some action was good or bad to do…. However, no one can testify
that an action is good or bad, unless he has knowledge of the law. Hence, if conscience
bears witness about good or evil, this is a clear sign that the work of law has been written
on man’s heart. 71
In this instance, Aquinas argues that all human persons have a kind of natural knowledge of good
to be done and evil to be avoided, which he identifies as a knowledge of the law written into the
very nature of the human person. 72 He quotes, although does not necessarily explain, Aristotle’s
emphasis on prudence and understanding. This interpretation gives tremendous dignity to the
human person, who by his very nature participates in the governance of God. However, as in his
other writings on conscience, Aquinas emphasize that natural human reason is very easily
erroneous in its judgments, “man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal…from that fact
that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to the things which the flesh urges it.” 73 It is for
this reason that “[Paul] said to do what he understands not to be done, acting against
conscience.” 74 Aquinas explains the tension St. Paul experiences, “For the good which I will I
do not: but the evil which I will not, that I do,” 75 as a failure of reason to rule in the individual
human person. Aquinas writes:
But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in the light of what is proper to it, is not
inclined to evil, but insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire. Therefore, the doing
of evil, which reason does, inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed
principally to reason…but rather to the desire or habit in virtue of which reason is
inclined to evil. 76
Aquinas reconciles an erroneous judgment of reason with the sanctity of conscience, especially
the human participation in the eternal law.
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Toward the end of his commentary, Aquinas explicates an aspect of the relational aspect
of conscience as it pertained to the early Christian community, and this discussion merits our
critical attention. The fourteenth chapter of the letter to the Romans treats an issue that seems
almost incomprehensible to the modern reader, viz. casting judgment on a member of a
community on account of the food he consumes. Paul writes, “For if, because of food, your
brother be grieved, you no longer walk according to charity. Destroy not him with your food.” 77
Aquinas explains the meaning of this passage:
There were among the Romans some Jews converted to Christ, who distinguished among
foods according to the law; but others, having a perfected faith, used all food without
distinction, which of itself was lawful…. On this point it should be known…that the
Jewish people, boasting that they are God’s portion, call unclean the good which all men
use, e.g. the flesh of swine, hares, and food of that sort. Furthermore, the nations which
used such foods were not God’s portion; consequently, such food was unclean. 78
Paul admonishes the Jewish and Gentile believers not to scandalize one another by the food that
they eat, since they are now united in Christ. Aquinas takes his meaning even further by
showing the importance of community and relationships to the formation of conscience.
Aquinas notes that St. Paul asks his readers not to scandalize or cause one another to sin by their
actions; members of this new community of faith are responsible for one another and for the
interior good of other members. If another member of the community in their conscience truly
believes that eating a type of food violates the law of God, Paul asks his readers to abstain from
engaging in such behavior, even though in truth it does not violate God’s law, since the New
Law of grace has perfected the Old Law.
According to Aquinas, the judgment of an erroneous conscience is binding, since “the
binding force of even an erroneous conscience and that of the law of God are the same. For
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conscience does not dictate something to be done or avoided, unless it believes that it is against
or in accordance with the law of God. For the law is applied to our actions only by means of our
conscience.” 79 Aquinas identifies the law of God with a judgment of conscience; human beings
interpret and apply it by conscience. But Aquinas is not simply speculating on the binding
aspect of an erroneous conscience. Aquinas argues that if another’s conscience is in error about
a particular circumstance, such as the moral gravity of eating a particular food, then those whose
conscience guides them correctly are obligated not to engage in the offensive behavior, at least
until he can explain that it is not wrong since “someone can get rid of an erroneous
conscience.” 80 Aquinas explains that there is an obligation to inform the member of the
community with an erroneous conscience. In this particular case from the letter to Romans, he
writes that “not to discriminate among foods is a good work; therefore, it should not be avoided
just because someone with an erroneous conscience makes a stumbling block of it. For
according to this, Catholics would have to abstain from meat and marriage to prevent heretics
from being offended according to their erroneous conscience.” 81 Such an assertion has
tremendous political implications, especially in debates about how to legislate about moral
issues. It points to an essential tension in a political community, viz. the tension between the
individual and common good. Aquinas argues that the judgment of one’s conscience is his
application of the law of God within his life. It binds him under the penalty of sin. Yet, he must
also be attentive to the conscience of his neighbor-even if the conscience of his neighbor is
wrong. The obvious question is how do we know who has the erroneous conscience? The
particular case given in St. Paul’s letter to Romans, viz. the eating of certain foods, hardly seems
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to be a matter of moral consequence to most today; and in those religious traditions that do
distinguish certain foods to be in accord with or against the divine law no longer have much
public debate on the matter. Moreover, Paul’s advice here is to a spiritual community.
Let us, therefore, consider a more salient, political example—such as the question of the
definition of marriage—an issue increasingly subject to contentious public debate and legislation
in state governments and on the United States Supreme Court docket for the summer of 2013.
Robert Vischer points to a recent New Mexico case involving Elane Photography and a woman
named Vanessa Willock. Willock was seeking a photographer for her same-sex ceremony and
solicited the business Elane Photography for the job. Owners Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin
explained that they could not accept this job, since to support homosexuality was against their
deeply-held, conscientious religious convictions. In response, “Willock filed a complaint with
the [New Mexico] state human rights commission, alleging a violation of the state’s public
accommodation laws, which covers sexual orientation.” 82 Willock argued that she was in shock
and offended at the Huguenin’s conscience claims regarding her homosexuality, and the human
rights commission agreed with her. In this case, how might Aquinas’s ideas about conscience
apply? What are the criteria upon which one citizen’s conscience claims are trumped by
another’s? What is the responsibility of one citizen to another to inform them of an erroneous
judgment of conscience, while still respecting their subjective application of the moral law to
their own lives? How might Aquinas reconcile such conflicting conscience claims?
In the Super Romanos, Aquinas does point to one solution, although it hardly seems to be
consistent with political tolerance that is so vital for contemporary liberalism. He writes:
Among matters of faith some have not been perfectly manifested by the Church, as in the
early Church it had been perfectly declared to men that Jewish converts were not bound
82
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to observe the practices of the law…. Hence in cases of this kind it is enough for a man
to keep his faith between himself and God. Nor should he manifest his faith, if it
scandalizes his neighbor, except perhaps among those who have to decide about the faith.
But certain things of faith have been decided by the Church. In such matters it is not
enough to keep one’s faith between oneself and God, but one should confess it before his
neighbor, no matter what scandal might arise, because doctrinal truth must not be set
aside on account of scandal, just as Christ did not set aside the truth of his teaching just
because the Pharisees were scandalized. 83
Aquinas’s assertion may seem radical to the modern reader. But let us consider: the Huguenin’s
followed his advice. They argued that their conscientious, religious convictions teach the moral
wrongness of a certain behavior, i.e. homosexuality, and they openly confessed that conviction
openly to their neighbor in their refusal to photograph her commitment ceremony. Yet, Aquinas
hardly seems to be tolerant of those neighbors whose consciences may instruct them differently.
How would he recommend discernment of the correct judgment of conscience in the case of
Elane Photography? Elsewhere in his work, Aquinas takes up an issue that contradicts this
seeming intolerance. In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas examines the topic of religious
toleration. He answers questions regarding whether the religious rites of the Jews should be
tolerated and whether children of Jewish parents should be forced into baptism against the will of
their parents. In the first case, he answers affirmatively and negatively in the second case. He
cites natural justice and natural law as the primary reasons children should not be forced into
baptism. 84 In this case of conflicting religious beliefs, Aquinas seems to be much more tolerant
than what he says in Super Romanos. His conflicting approaches point to a tension between
individual good and the common good and between the responsibility of individuals to both
respect the consciences of others, but also to inform the consciences of others. Some criterion,
then, is needed upon which to make judgments about how to respect and to inform the
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consciences of others. Let us turn to the criteria that Aquinas discusses in the section of the
Summa Theologiae known as The Treatise on Law.
B. Conscience in the Prima Secundae Pars: The Treatise on Law
In the prologue to the Treatise on Law, Aquinas states that he will address the extrinsic
principles that influence human acts. Conscience (synderesis and conscientia), since it pertains
to the power of reason, is the intrinsic principle that guide human acts. However, since human
conscience is for Aquinas also the point of contact between the human person and divine law, it
also has an extrinsic component since “the extrinsic principle moving us to good is God, Who
both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace.” 85 At the beginning of the
Treatise on Law, Aquinas defines law in such a manner that we can anticipate that it is intimately
related to his understanding of conscience. Before Aquinas gives his definition of law, he
establishes four important aspects of law. First, it pertains to reason; second it is ordained to the
common good; third, it must be made by an authority entrusted to either “the whole people or to
someone who is the viceregent of the whole people;” 86 and fourth, it must be promulgated so that
all citizens know its contents. His argument about law being ordained to the common good is
particularly significant for our purposes. Aquinas argues:
The law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and
measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is
something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle
chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical
matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of
human life is bliss or happiness…. Consequently the law must needs apply principally
the relationship to happiness. Moreover since every part is ordained to the whole, as
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is part of the perfect community, the law must
needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. 87
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Aquinas begins his explanation of law and the common good by appealing to reason as the
principle of human acts. He then explains that the first principle in practical matters is the same
for all persons and it is their final end – happiness (beatitudo). Every human person makes
judgments about what acts to pursue based upon their seeking happiness. Since law directs
human actions, it must relate to human happiness and flourishing. But it cannot pertain to one’s
man’s happiness alone; rather law directs to the common good and happiness of all.
Earlier in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas has referred to conscientia as the law of our
intellect 88; conscience thus relates to reason as a law – and for Aquinas, law is ordained to the
common good. Law, then, according to Aquinas, is “an ordinance of reason for the common
good, made by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated.” 89 We can begin to
ascertain how Aquinas reconciles the individual subjective aspect of conscience with the
relational aspect of conscience through the connection to law. Aquinas theorizes that there are
four types of law, viz. eternal law, which governs the universe; natural law, which is derived
from the eternal law as it relates to rational creatures; human law, which is derived from natural
law as it relates to specific human communities; and divine law, or the revelation of God to man
where nature is insufficient, or put differently, it reveals the order of grace that perfects nature. It
is important to emphasize that the definition of law that Aquinas articulates refers to each type of
law that discusses. Eternal law is simply the rational guidance of God for the universe, but its
foundation is reason and not in will. Eternal law is intelligible to the human person, and in fact
the human person has a special mode of participation in the eternal law which Aquinas calls the
natural law, “A law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also as participation as in one
that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law unto himself, in so far as he shares in the
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direction that he receives from one who rules him.” 90 Let us consider how this understanding of
law more concretely relates to conscience.
As we have already seen, Aquinas defines the primary structural level of conscience,
synderesis, as a “special natural habit” whereby human beings recognize “first practical
principles, bestowed on us by nature.” 91 The first practical principle is the first premise of the
natural law, namely that good is to be pursued and evil is to be avoided. The natural law governs
rational creatures and it is inherent in the very substance of human beings by means of their
inclinations, since the natural law supplies human “inclinations to their proper acts and ends….
Wherefore it [i.e. the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it partakes of
a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.” 92 For Aquinas, natural
law applies the “the first principle of natural justice, which is to seek good and to avoid evil, [and
it] must primarily be determined by a rule which has reference to the whole state” and the whole
human community. 93 It is significant that the human participation in Divine Providence is a
participation that extends to each human person – for Aquinas, each person is created with the
same human nature that is oriented and directed by Divine Providence. Thus, we see both the
individual and relational aspect of law (and conscience) at work in Aquinas’s understanding of
conscience and natural law, since the natural law is a share in providence for the individual
person and for all persons.
But Aquinas has mentioned something else that figures importantly in his theory of
natural law, viz. inclinations: “Wherefore [the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal
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Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the
eternal in the rational creature is called the natural law.” 94 Human participation in the eternal
law is manifested by inclinations to acts and ends proper to human persons, and our very
participation relies upon something outside of ourselves that is “the light of natural reason,
whereby we discern what is good and evil…[it] is nothing else than an imprint on us of the
Divine light.” 95 These inclinations have an order to them that is based upon man’s nature, and
they are natural characteristics of man that point to the ends that he will endeavor to pursue in
accordance with reason. That end is good, which “is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an
end under the aspect of good.” 96 These precepts of the natural law are inclinations such as the
first inclination to pursue good and to avoid evil, and the inclinations based upon the first: selfpreservation, procreation, education, and a desire to know the truth about God and to live in
society. 97 Since human beings by nature seek to know the truth about God and live in society,
we see the foundation for the relational aspect of human persons, who, because he has:
An inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to
him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society:
and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live. 98
Aquinas explains this particular inclination as unique to man—and it relates to his specifically
relational nature. To know the truth about God and to live in society include one another as part
of man’s specific, rational nature.
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Thomas’ insistence that the natural law is functionally integrated with human reason is at
the center his theory of conscience since synderesis is the habit of practical reason by which we
know the first principles, and conscientia is the means of applying those principles. However
several perplexing problems seem to proceed from this particular theory, for example: If man
knows by his reason through the habit of synderesis the first principle of all moral action, how is
it that he can act erroneously? Aquinas has examined this theme in every treatment of
conscience throughout his corpus, and his answer reveals what seems to be an irreconcilable
tension. This tension is well illustrated in the Summa Theologiae when Aquinas poses the
question whether the natural law is the same in all men. He answers in the affirmative, stating
that “to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to be inclined to act according to reason.” 99 The natural law appeals to
common human experience, since the inclinations Aquinas describes are based in the very nature
of the human person. 100 However, since the natural law, known through the habit of synderesis,
concerns practical reason, “which is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions
are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more
we descend into matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.” 101 So, according
to Aquinas, although human beings have a natural understanding of what is right or true action,
the more they descend into matter of detail, the more likely they are to err. He gives the example
of the ancient Germans described in Caesar’s Gallic Wars who, since they share a common
human nature with other persons, should have known that theft was contrary to the natural law,
but they did not consider it an evil to be avoided. 102 Thus, the general first principles of the
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natural law, or primary precepts, are self-evident and not changeable. These are held and known
through synderesis. The application of the natural law to most cases—the secondary precepts
that contain “certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles” may not be
applicable to every particular instance. 103 One the level of the individual human person, this
application of the first principles is conscientia.
The natural law pertains to the individual good and to the common good, and it is
promulgated to the human person through the habit of synderesis that directs man’s ethical action
in concrete applications of conscientia. Aquinas has argued that synderesis only contains the
knowledge of general principles, and is therefore not fully equipped to dictate specific rules
regarding human behavior. Although its precepts are unchangeable because they are constitutive
of human nature, they must be applied to concrete instances through the judgment of conscientia.
Similarly, according to Aquinas, the natural law is unchangeable and it must be the foundation of
all human law, since general principles and inclinations are insufficient to make particular
determinations. Aquinas explains:
The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of Divine Reason, but
according to its own mode, and imperfectly…. On the part of practical reason, man has
a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not
as regards the particular determination of the individual case…. Hence the need for
human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law. 104
Although the natural law directs the whole of human life, “For his part, St. Thomas argues that
participation in the eternal law [i.e. natural law] includes individual judgment, social judgment,
and political judgment,” its generality makes it necessary for human beings to formulate human
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laws. 105 But even the natural law and the human law is not enough for the human person to
attain his final end and flourishing, for they are based upon human reason and “human reason is
not, of itself, the rule of things.” 106 Human laws cannot direct the interior acts of an individual
human person, even if their intended goal is to form good persons. 107
Moreover, the inclinations that are the basis of the natural law are ordered to the
fulfillment or telos of man’s nature, viz. happiness. Human actions are guided by reason and
will toward an end, “those things that are possessed of reason move themselves to an end;
because they have dominion over their actions through their free will, which is the faculty of will
and reason.” 108 The movement toward the last end is, according to Aquinas, a movement from
potentiality toward actuality; it is a movement that aims “so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is
left besides it for man to desire.” 109 The human person’s potential is actualized through the
fulfillment of his last end, which is common to all human persons. Aquinas explains, “Now as
the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any
individual to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the
will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.” 110 This final end consists in “perfect
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happiness” attained only “through union with God.” 111 The movement toward the last end is
man’s potential to be actualized through the exercise of right reason, a rightly-ordered will, and a
life of virtue. Aquinas explains that the human soul “is something existing in potentiality: for it
becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being
potentially virtuous.” 112 Aquinas recognizes that human persons can order themselves to lesser
ends, which are good in themselves but not the summum bonum, goods such as wealth, honor,
fame or glory, power, good of the body, pleasure, goods of the soul, or created goods. The final
end and actualization of the human person resides in none of these lesser goods, but rather in the
happiness (beatitudo) that is attained “by knowing and loving God.” 113
I have posited that for Aquinas, the rational capacity of one human being is insufficient to
reach his final end; he needs the guidance of fellow rational creatures to attain his end and to
actualize his potential, for “humans at times cannot flourish without arguing with others and
learning from them about human flourishing.” 114 I call this the relational aspect of conscience.
But Aquinas extends the argument further: human reason alone is not the rule of things. Reason
is prone to error, as is evident in Aquinas’s discussion of an erring conscience. Even though
Aquinas argues that by means of our conscience (particularly synderesis), human beings have
access to the unchangeable first principles of the natural law, our judgments often miss the mark;
reason can very easily be hindered from properly applying the principles of synderesis to
particular situations. But this is not a matter “of confusing law and conscience or of letting the
conscience be destroyed by the law. The conscience, in the face of the clearest and most
determinative law, always has the role and the value of interiorizing the law, to implant it by
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making it personal.” 115 It is at the level of “making it personal” that human beings tend to err for
a variety of reasons: attachment to a particular vice, the inability for human beings to know the
interior life of others, lack of knowledge of the facts, etc.
Yet, Aquinas also argues that it is precisely human reason that is the means of
participation in the rule of things—in the Divine Reason, “for the divine good is called the
common good in which all things participate.” 116 The Divine Reason is the transcendent source
of order in nature, including human nature. There is, then a tension in Aquinas’s thought: human
beings are prone to error in their rational judgments, but their rational capacity is the means by
which they participate in the Divine Reason that rules; human reason can err, and yet it is the
source from which the human person seeks and experiences his transcendent and transpolitical
end. As such, the judgments of conscience are to be respected, since it by means of conscience,
particularly synderesis, that the human person is most intimately connected to the Divine
Reason. Each human person participates in this Divine Reason. 117 As such, respect for
individual conscience is inseparable from respect for the relationships that inform our
consciences. The relational aspect of conscience does not just call human beings into
community with other persons, but also calls them into communion with the Divine Being, who
is the basis of their being and of their interpersonal relationships. All human beings participate
in the Divine Good, which is the basis of their common good because it is the basis of man’s
final transpolitical end:
Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does
not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body
politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and therefore
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every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God,
as far as the action itself is concerned. 118
Aquinas understanding of the human person promotes an essential limitedness to politics,
for “What pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government.” 119 There are some
aspects of the human person that simply cannot be governed or subjected to legislation, 120
particularly the interior life of the individual human person that is directed by conscience. The
freedom of conscience is a primary freedom for Aquinas, since it is a realm of human life that
cannot be dictated by any law because human law has no power over it other than unjust
coercion or violence. It is precisely for this reason that claims of conscience often clash with
political regimes: a good man in tyrannical regime will likely not be a good citizen, and indeed it
is quite likely that he will be an incarcerated citizen in such a society. However, there is
seemingly a tension in Aquinas’s view: for he does claim that human law binds a citizen in
conscience. This statement is qualified, however, for only just laws can bind the conscience of a
man—for these laws are in accord with right reason, which is the basis of morality. 121 For
Aquinas, conscience is that by which we seek and act upon the means to attain our final end, an
end that transcends any political regime. It is a natural habit of reason (synderesis) and the
application of that habit (conscientia) that enables human beings to become good. Conscience is
connected to a life of virtue for Aquinas, since the virtues are habits that enable human beings to
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become good, and we become virtuous by acting according to conscience. It is particularly the
virtue of prudence that is most closely connected to conscience since by Aquinas’s account both
prudence and conscientia “are practical judgments, both proceed in some way from synderesis,
and both are described in terms of the operative syllogism.” 122 Thus, we next turn to examine
Aquinas’s discussion of conscience and prudence in the Summa Theologiae.
C. Conscience in the Secunda Secundae Pars: Judgment of Conscience and the
Virtue of Prudence
There is an ambiguity about the difference between conscience and prudence in
Aquinas’s work since “Thomas never attempted to explain the relationship between these two
realities. He never mentions prudence in his questions concerning conscience, nor does he
mention conscience in the questions concerning prudence.” 123 For Aquinas, both conscience and
prudence relate to right reason. However, while Aquinas does not mention conscientia in his
discussion of prudence, he does mention synderesis, and in this way he does relate conscience to
prudence. Synderesis “moves prudence” to direct human action, and prudence then “decide[s] in
what manner and by what means” to act according to right reason in a given situation. 124 Like
conscientia, prudence belongs to the practical reason and Aquinas defines prudence as a virtue
that applies right reason to action. 125
In his analysis of prudence, Aquinas illustrates that in order for man to order his life in
accord with right reason, “it is necessary that [the intellect, will, passions, sense, and other
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faculties must] be governed by certain operative habits, the virtues.” 126 This governance is
achieved particularly through the virtue of prudence, which guides all the moral virtues by
assessing whether a human act is in accord with right reason. 127 However, for Aquinas,
synderesis is a necessary step in this determination:
In the first place then, moral virtue supposes the act of reason insofar as the tendency to
the end and to the good presupposes knowledge of the end and of the good. This
first function of reason, however, does not pertain to prudence, but rather to synderesis.
Synderesis provides the ends of the moral virtues. Prudence, however, is concerned not
with the ends of moral virtues, but with the means to those ends. 128
For Aquinas, synderesis supplies the very general first principles and inclinations, conscientia
applies the first principle and then makes a judgment about what should or should not be done,
and prudence dictates the particular means to carry out an action in accordance with right
reason. 129
Aquinas’s description of prudence sounds similar to the way in which he has defined the
function of conscientia: both draw from the first principles of practical reason contained in
synderesis to make a judgment on how best to act in a particular situation, on how to act with
right reason. Aquinas does make a distinction between them, but it is difficult for even the most
well-versed Thomists. Reginald Doherty explains:
Conscience is a norm of morality and St. Thomas treats it as such. It in some way
concerns the knowledge of the moral object which is necessary for a human act. The
problem of erroneous conscience is reduced to a problem of an error regarding the moral
object. When, however, St. Thomas begins to speak about the human act more in
particular and about virtue, he abandons the concept of conscience [conscientia], and
when it is a question of the intellectual elements of a singular human act, the entire
reference is to prudence…. Conscience is oriented to synderesis at its root and
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foundation, and the source of its proper effect, moral obligation. Prudence, on the other
hand, being oriented toward practical truth in order to produce operation, is focused upon
the rectified appetite as its principle and source of motion. 130
To make the relationship between conscience and prudence even more difficult, Aquinas
mentions the Aristotelian term synesis in connection with prudence. Synesis, he states, is a virtue
connected to prudence that “signifies right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence.” 131 It is a virtue that enables
one to exercise ‘common sense’ to form right judgments about “a thing just as it is in reality.” 132
A right judgment of synesis seems to occur prior to the exercise of prudence, as prudence
“commands aright” and gives the final word on the correct course of action to be pursued. 133 It
would seem that given the similarity between synderesis and synesis that Aquinas might connect
the two concepts here, but he does not make this connection here or elsewhere in the Summa
Theologiae. What are we to make of this relationship between synderesis, conscientia, and
prudence? The fine distinctions are difficult to grasp, and even Aquinas himself seems not to
have dedicated as much effort to explain this difficulty. Perhaps it will be helpful to consider
this problem in the context of the relational aspect of conscience that I have traced in Aquinas’s
thinking.
For Aquinas, the virtue of prudence is also other oriented; he argues that prudence is an
essentially political and relational virtue, “since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards
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not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.” 134 The
exercise of prudence is one critical expression of conscience in political life, since according to
Aquinas prudence and justice are political virtues par excellence. This is not to say that Aquinas
reduces either prudence or justice to their political expressions only. Rather, since these virtues
are directed to the common good, they are particularly important for politics. Even when
directed toward the individual, prudence still has a political component:
Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and
therefore it is proper to man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling
and governing…. Every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling
according to the judgment of reason. 135
It is the notion of a share in ruling or governance that makes prudence so essential, for it is by
means of self-governance that human beings participate in the Divine Governance, particularly
by taking part in the “dignity of causality.” 136 To explain what Aquinas means by this assertion,
let us consider that Aquinas compares prudence (prudentia) with Divine Governance, or more
properly, with Divine Providence (providentia). 137 Providence, according to Aquinas, comes
from porro videns, meaning “seeing from afar,” the same root from which prudentia is
derived. 138 Divine Providentia, by which God has ordered all things to their proper end,is
expressed in individual human persons through the virtue of prudentia insofar as it directs man
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to make judgments regarding his final end. 139 It is by their participation in the Divine
Providence, Aquinas argues, that God furnishes human beings with many of the necessary tools
to attain their good while also allowing them to remain free. Human beings participate in the
‘dignity of causality’ by exercising their freedom in their individual lives and in their
relationships and communities that shape the core of their convictions of conscience. It is this
share in the dignity of causality that gives the claim of conscience its place in politics as that
which both limits and challenges politics.
The exact philosophical distinctions between synderesis, conscientia, and prudentia,
although important, are not the focus of this study. 140 It is enough to know that they are essential
for how Aquinas understands not only human action, but also the dignity of human freedom.
These, viz. synderesis, conscientia, and prudentia, direct human persons toward their final end—
an end that cannot be determined or realized politically. Moreover, conscience, here being made
up synderesis and conscientia, is not simply subjectivity or opinion; it is grounded in and guided
by common human inclinations and experience, right reason, the pursuit of moral virtue, and it
requires a life guided by prudence, prudentia, in the fullest sense. Conscience points beyond
politics: it directs us out of ourselves and orients our actions with the consideration of others and
ultimately, according to Aquinas, with reference to a relationship to a Divine God with whom
human persons are drawn into a friendship of faith formed in charity, “since there is a
communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some
kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication….The love which is based
on this communication, is charity; wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for
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God.” 141 For Aquinas, conscience is the place of participation in this friendship and it is the
source of what binds human persons together in pursuit of the common good.
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Chapter V: Thinking Together about the Common Good: Toward a Renewed
Understanding of Conscience
“Caritas autem qua nos Deum diligimus, dicitur in cordibus nostris diffusa, id est quia ad
omnes mores et actus animae perficiendos se extendit.” 1
“The destruction of conscience is the real prerequisite for totalitarian followers and
totalitarian rule. Where conscience prevails, there is a limit to the dominion of human
command and human choice, something sacred that must remain inviolate and that in its
ultimate sovereignty eludes all control, whether someone else’s or one’s own. Only the
unconditional character of conscience is diametrically opposed to tyranny; only the
recognition that conscience is sacrosanct protects man from man’s inhumanity and from
himself; only its rule guarantees freedom.” 2
I. Politics and Conscience
In this examination of Aquinas’s theory of conscience, I have sought to construct
a holistic account of the development of his thought on the topic and in doing so, to offer
a renewed sense of the importance of conscience, particularly as expressed in politics,
such as respect for the freedom of conscience and the common good. The beginning of
this dissertation highlighted some historical and contemporary conflicts of conscience as
manifested in Nazi Germany (historical) and in American political discourse
(contemporary) such as conscientious objection to the recently promulgated HHS
mandate by individuals, religious institutions, and businesses, and the question of
homosexual marriage legislation. 3 We considered the origins of conscience conflicts,
which contemporary French scholar Pierre Manent argues can be summed up in a conflict
between human will and reason. In relation to the contemporary, liberal, democratic
regime, he writes:
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It is the fact that in the liberal state, in its first project, or primary purpose, wants
to institutionalize the sovereignty of the human will. Recognizing only free and
equal individuals, it has no legitimacy except that founded on their will: the
institutions of this state have for their raison d’être the manifesting of this will
through suffrage, then the putting of this will into action by representative
government. 4
Manent’s assertion that the bedrock of contemporary politics is both the emancipation of
the will and the imposition of the will institutionalized in a political regime at the expense
of reason. For the contemporary liberal regime, he argues that government based upon
consent is only legitimate in so far as it is the expression of the will of the citizens in the
regime, or at least of those who have the power to impose their will. 5 But Aquinas offers
a very different foundation that we have considered in this dissertation, viz. reason.
It is precisely because of the centrality of the will that contemporary political discourse
has a very difficult time discerning between conscience claims. For Aquinas, however, a
will not in accord with reason is a perversion of the will.
In fact, the discussion about how to decide the legitimacy of these claims seems
largely incomprehensible in the public sphere, and increasingly, at least in the United
States, this task is being relegated to the courts. In America today lawyers, lobbyists, and
amici curiae battle with claimants to decide whose conscience claim is most publicly
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palatable. 6 Conscience conflicts in public discourse today are particularly contentious
about moral and religious issues (e.g. school vouchers, school choice, religious freedom,
sex, marriage, adoption, and abortion). But there hardly seems to be much civil, rational,
public discourse on these matters beyond talking points or ideological commitments.
And without a rational public discourse, laws can easily become unjust. Aquinas
explains that “Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason
[emphasis mine]; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law.
But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not
of law but of violence.” 7 Some may argue that this inability to pass all encompassing
legislation about matters of conscience contributes to protecting the freedom of
conscience. We need to be sure that the account of conscience claims also dictates
“which claims of conscience are reasonable and which are not…. Apart from such an
account, talk of conscience will remain elusive and malleable,” 8 and conflicts will
continue to arise. To discern what claims should be considered worthy of protection by
the law or from unjust laws, Aquinas might argue, should be the role of prudence.
Moreover, Aquinas would not argue that every moral evil can be outlawed: “Human law
cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it
would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common
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good, which is necessary for human intercourse.” 9 The decision about what human evils
to outlaw is a matter left to prudential judgment, but prudence is oriented and guided by
synderesis as a kind of ‘first illumination’ of the principles of practical reason. 10
II. The Enduring Problem of Synderesis
We have seen Aquinas’s concept of conscience in its two-fold dimension,
synderesis and conscientia, with synderesis as a habit of practical reason by which we
know the first principles and conscientia that act by which we apply those principles to
concrete experience. Aquinas’s working out of this concept take into account many
aspects, such as how can human persons know the good and not always do what is good?
How is conscience related to other parts of the soul? Is our conscience simply innate
knowledge? How does conscience relate to law, to community, to God? What are the
constraints on conscience? Aquinas would not argue that conscience is synonymous with
personal preference, opinion, or a radically individual autonomy. His distinction of
conscience as synderesis and conscientia helps clarify some of these questions.
However, as many scholars have pointed out, synderesis remains an unclear concept, and
Aquinas himself seems to move away from using it in his later work. 11 Although it was
at Aquinas’s time a traditional word for describing an element of moral knowledge, there
is the problematic issue that synderesis is actually a deformation of a Greek word. Oscar
James Brown writes that:
Aquinas is not at all averse to that traditional manner of speaking, and he retains
the substance, at least, of the notion even in his later works–although no longer
9

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. I-II, Q. 91, art.4, Corpus. There is, therefore, an implication of
human progress in human knowledge and understanding for Aquinas; one that is based on his
understanding of the actualization of human potential.
10
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III, 80, §2.
11
Cf. Michael B. Crowe’s The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, Reginald Doherty’s The Judgments of
Conscience and Prudence, and Oscar James Brown’s Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas.

169

under the rubric of synderesis, a term he increasingly eschewed as he developed
doctrines of natural law and legal epistemology. In any event, St. Thomas was to
continue to make use of what he understood to be the content of the term
synderesis, namely, the natural habit of the first practical principle (or principles,
depending on whether it be viewed exactly or extensively). As such, synderesis
corresponds to the understanding (intellectus) of principles in the speculative
sphere in fact, synderesis is often similarly denominated (v.g. intellectus practicus
or, simply, intellectus)…. So then, it is this natural cognitive habit, divine
instilled and reaching to the plane of angelic intelligence, that contains the
‘universal principles of the natural law’ and precontains, in a manner of speaking,
the whole of the developing corpus of the quasi-legal conclusions of the natural
ethical reason. 12
Brown argues that Aquinas, while retaining the concept of synderesis, drops the use of
the term. There is, however, a transcendental dimension acknowledged by the
participatory rise to the dimension of ‘angelic intelligence’ regardless of whether the
terminology is dropped.
Douglas Kries finds the word term so problematic that he believes it should be
abandoned altogether by scholars who are serious about resurrecting a natural law
discourse that would enable the citizens of liberal regimes to think (or perhaps more
precisely, to reason) together again about the common good. 13 Moreover, Kries finds
Aquinas’s use of synderesis “scandalously democratic, for the knowledge of first
principles does not immediately depend on either the influx of increate light or the
educational conventions of the city.” 14 But it is precisely his pointing outside of the city
that is Aquinas’s great contribution to political philosophy—conscience limits politics.
One way in which conscience limits politics is expressed in religious liberty.
Since conscience is based upon a friendship between God and man, man’s participation
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in the life of the Divine, human persons will seeks to order their lives and their
communities according to their conscientious and religious convictions. It is critical to
remember that “religious liberty extends beyond the freedom to believe and worship as
one chooses.” 15 For Aquinas, conscientia is an act; it is an act that involves the exercise
of moral virtue and practical wisdom—it is an act that is lived in every day experience.
Thus, to live according to one’s conscience means not just belief, but action. This means
that the individual man’s exercise of conscience becomes social, political, and relational.
Since conscience points the individual human person both horizontally toward others in
his relationships and vertically toward his Divine Creator, it both limits and challenges
the power of political regimes. “Put simply, conscience means acknowledging that
man—oneself and the other—is a creation and respecting the Creator in him. This
defines the limit of every power and at the same time indicates its proper direction.” 16
Conscience is, as Vaclav Havel calls it, the very ‘power of the powerless,’ the only sure
means of resistance against political injustice. 17 Thus, “it is not just individuals that must
be immune from coercion, but also communities…not just in private, but in public; not
just in secret assent, but in open witness.” 18
But perhaps we are still left with many questions. A conscience claim is always
politically vulnerable, and perhaps with good reason, for “the more boldly men claim that
15
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conscience is, directly or vicariously, a divine lawgiver and the ‘spotless mirror of God’s
majesty,’ the more troublesomely aware they are they must become that this lawgiver
gives different laws to different men; this mirror reflects different faces.” 19 Conflicts of
conscience claims still remain, and attributing one’s conscience claims to the sacred
realm of God’s law certainly can and does lead to political violence. As discussed at
length in the beginning of this dissertation, conscience claims may seem to be either “the
principle of subjective self-will, taken as an absolute” or “the principle of incapacitating
the ego and substituting a generality of an outside ego.” 20 Claims of conscience are
therefore “to be made carefully and honestly, in the knowledge that what is great is
misused when it is called into action prematurely.” 21 Thus, “the concept of conscience
has to be purified constantly;” 22 it must be grounded in reason and its claims must be
made and heeded with respect to the natural inclinations of each human person’s unique
relationships as they inform their individual conscience.
Aquinas offers a grounding of conscience in common reason that is guided by
synderesis as a solution to such a problem. But we must also consider if Aquinas’s
assessment of conscience, particularly of synderesis is convincing—is the term too
philosophically imprecise to convince anyone that there is some kind of natural
knowledge of right that is grounded in common human experience and in reason? Can
we argue for a convincing reconsideration of the natural law without this account of
conscience as Douglas Kries suggests but does not develop? 23 Can a reconsideration of
how conscience relates to the natural law enable us to think and to reason together about
19
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the common good? Some scholars have pointed out that the term synderesis needs
further clarification and development. For example, J. Budziszewski describes
synderesis as ‘deep conscience’; he writes, “synderesis—some prefer to call it anamnesis,
remembrance—[…] might be called ‘deep conscience.’ Deep conscience is the interior
witness to the most general norms of practical reason.” 24 In this short passage,
Budziszewski points to two different ways of defining synderesis: anamnesis or ‘deep
conscience.’ While his explanation of the function of synderesis sounds familiar,
Budziszewski does not, however, tell us who prefers to call synderesis by another Greek
term anamnesis.
This suggested new term is found in a speech given by then Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger in 1991 to his fellow Catholic bishops. Though a speech given in a theological
context, Ratzinger’s reflections primarily address a philosophical investigation of
conscience. Following Aquinas, he too posits that conscience has two component parts:
The medieval tradition was right, I believe in according two levels to the concept
of conscience. These levels, though they can be well distinguished, must be
continually referred to each other. It seems to me that many unacceptable theses
regarding conscience are the result of neglecting either the difference or the
connection between these two. Mainstream scholasticism expressed these two
levels in the concepts ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia.’ 25
But synderesis, Ratzinger argues, “remained unclear in its exact meaning, and for this
reason became a hindrance to a careful development of this essential aspect of the whole
question of conscience. I would like, therefore…to replace this problematic word with
the much more clearly defined Platonic concept of anamnesis.” 26 Here, Ratzinger does

24

Budziszewski, J. The Line Through the Heart: Natural Law as Fact, Theory, and Sign of Contradiction.
(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 14-15.
25
Ratzinger, Joseph. “Conscience and Truth.” On Conscience.(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 30.
26
Ratzinger, Joseph. “Conscience and Truth.” Pp. 30-31. For the use of the term in Plato, Cf. Phaedo 72e
and 92d and Philebus 34c.

173

not give much of an explanation about how this concept is more clearly defined, but he
points to two passages, viz. Romans 2:14-15 and a passage from the monastic rule of St.
Basil to define what he means by anamnesis. 27 Ratzinger writes:
[Anamnesis] means that the first so-called ontological level of the phenomenon of
conscience consists in the fact that something like an original memory of the good
and true…has been implanted in us, that there is an inner ontological tendency in
within man, who is created in the likeness of God, toward the divine. From its
origin, man’s being resonates with some things and clashes with others. This
anamnesis of the origin, which results from the god-like constitution of our
being…is, so to speak, an inner sense, a capacity to recall. 28
Like Aquinas, Ratzinger follows a philosophical anthropology that views the human
person as constituted and defined by his relation to God and to others as imago Dei. He
proposes the word ‘anamnesis’ as a kind of ‘original memory’ of the good that exists in
each person by nature. It is an awareness or a ‘recollection’ of one’s origin that orients
the human person toward what is true and good. Ratzinger has called it a Platonic
concept, and it is used in the Phaedo first by Cebes to describe how Socrates has
described the process of learning and again referred to in this context by Socrates when
he speaks to Simmias about the immorality of the soul. 29 Thus anamnesis is a
recollection of what is somehow already known.
What are the implications of such new terminology for this level of conscience?
The term suggests a kind of ‘giveness’ or arche from which the human person is able to
reflect and to recollect based upon that reflection. To recollect suggests that there is in
fact something to be recollected—that is the giveness to which we refer. Of what does
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this giveness consist? We could look to Aquinas’s Treatise on Law for part of the
answer:
All those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their
contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of
natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in
man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with nature which he
has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the
preservation of its own being, according to its nature…. Secondly, there is in man
an inclination to things that pertain to him more specifically, according to the
nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this
inclination, those things which nature has taught all animals, such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring, and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper
to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live
in society. 30
Aquinas gives an account of self-evident inclinations as part of the giveness of man’s
created nature and as expressed in the natural law. He grounds these inclinations and the
natural law in God’s Providentia, the order of created nature, and man’s created
participation in Divine Providentia. But such a concept may be more difficult for a
secular political culture to grasp—how can a pluralist society agree on the nature and
scope of Divine Providentia? If a pluralist society and culture cannot accept the
grounding in a common and particular view of Divine Providentia, Aquinas’s pointing
toward the natural inclinations seem a much more reasonable starting point; and it is a
starting point that leaves human inquiry open to transcendence and inquiry about the
Divine, “there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about
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God, and to live in society.” 31 It is therefore natural for the human person to seek the
supernatural, the transcendent, the Divine.
Perhaps anamnesis is a more helpful term to explain the primary role of
conscience: we must first recall this very giveness in which the human person exists,
including his participatory role in the Divine. To explain how anamnesis might be more
instructive, I turn to political philosopher Eric Voegelin, who develops a theory of
consciousness in his work entitled Anamnesis. Voegelin, a German scholar who was
confronted with the Nazi regime, spent his career both diagnosing and seeking a solution
what he calls the ‘pneumopathology’ of modernity. 32 This ‘pneumopathology’ or ‘illness
of the spirit’ is the ideological thinking that willfully forgets and rejects the giveness of
the reality in which a human person both exists and participates in favor of its own
constructed (and distorted) view of reality. In the case of a willful forgetfulness, an
anamnesis of the giveness of reality is absolutely an appropriate solution. But what has
this to do with conscience? Let us return briefly to Aquinas.
Recall that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains Divine Providence in
terms of Divine governance, which is simply the rule and order of being, “it must be that
God, Who is in all ways perfect in Himself and Who endows all things with being from
His own power, exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is ruled by none other.” 33
Aquinas continues:
The result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on
the diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God’s products that,
31
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possessing understanding, they bear likeness and reflect His image.
Consequently, they are not only ruled but also are rulers of themselves, inasmuch
as their own actions are directed toward a fitting end. 34
Aquinas underscores that the human creature, who possesses understanding—intellectus
(i.e. the capacity for rational reflection) participates in the Divine Governance. It is
precisely a consciousness of the human capacity for rational reflection that, to turn back
to Eric Voegelin, is in need of being recollected. Voegelin describes this consciousness
as a “ceaseless act of expanding, ordering, articulating, and correcting itself; it is an event
in the reality in which partakes.” 35 There are several preliminary observations to make.
First, we note the similar root of the word conscience with Voegelin’s choice, viz.
consciousness. Both words imply something with knowledge; and Aquinas cites that a
kind of consciousness is linked to the term conscience. He explains:
Some say that conscience (conscientia) can have three meanings. For, at times it
is taken for the thing itself of which one is conscious, just as faith is taken for the
thing believed. Sometimes it is taken for the power by which we are conscious,
and sometimes for the habit. 36
Aquinas, of course, does not accept these definitions of conscientia, but instead defines it
as an act. Yet, he still retains the idea of conscientia as a kind of consciousness or
awareness of something:
But the name conscience, according to common usage, seems at times to be used
for the thing of which one is conscious, as when one says: ‘I will reveal my
conscience to you,’ that is, what is in my conscience. But this title cannot
properly be given to the power or habit, but only to the act. For all things which
are attributed to conscience fit only this meaning. 37
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Aquinas explicitly links conscientia with consciousness: “Hence to be conscious
(conscire) means to know together (simul scire). But any knowledge can be applied to a
thing. Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the act
itself.” 38 Voegelin describes consciousness in much the same way that Aquinas defines
conscientia, viz. as an act. 39 In both cases, however, there is something about which the
human person is conscious or aware. Aquinas calls this ‘something’ the first principles
of practical reason, the content of synderesis.
Like Aquinas, Voegelin also explicitly connects his theory of consciousness with
reason (which he calls the constituent of human beings at all times) and begins his
analysis of ethics and moral choice with concrete human experience. This emphasis on
experience is perhaps the most important component for Voegelin’s understanding of
human consciousness, and in this regard, both Voegelin and Aquinas rely upon the
Aristotelian tradition. 40 Voegelin theorizes that reason is,
The process in reality in which concrete human beings, the ‘lovers of wisdom, the
philosophers…were engaged in an act of resistance against the personal and
social disorder of their age. From this act [emphasis mine] there emerged the
nous as the cognitively luminous force that inspired the philosophers to resist and,
at the same time, enabled them to recognize the phenomena or disorder in the
light of a humanity ordered by the nous. Thus reason in the noetic sense was
discovered as both the force and the criterion of order. 41
Voegelin’s description of consciousness and reason emphasize the act of particular
human persons from which reason is expressed as being ‘cognitively luminous,’
something that enables human persons to resist disorder. In this context, Voegelin refers
particularly to Plato and Aristotle, whose philosophical inquiries emerge as a response to
38

Aquinas, Thomas. De Veritate. Q. 17, art. 1, Corpus.
Cf. footnote 27 supra.
40
See Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pages 34 and
64-66 where Voegelin discusses Aristotle’s grounding of his own theoretization in practical experience.
41
Voegelin, Eric. Anamnesis, 89.
39

178

a corrupt and crumbling Athenian polis. 42 Voegelin believed this analysis of reason
(nous) as a means to resist disorder to be particularly apt to his own time in the late
twentieth century, and perhaps it is still a message for us in the early twenty-first century.
Indeed, it is a message that all persons in all times are in need of hearing, viz. that reason
properly understood enables human beings to resist disorder in their individual lives, in
their relationships, and in their communities. Right reason properly orders conscience
(and the persons to whom those consciences belong) toward pursuing a life of virtue. But
let us give more attention to the idea of right reason.
According to Voegelin, a recollection of the entire scope of reason’s (nous or
noetic interpretation) ability to discern the truth about God, man, and society is necessary
to ensure a just political order. This is the content of anamnesis—recollecting what
reason is capable of achieving through participation; “the noetic exegesis lifts the logos
of participation into the light of consciousness by interpreting the noetic experience of
participation.” 43 Voegelin argues that a resurrection of reason’s capabilities, particularly
through a reconsideration of the Greek insights, will give reason its proper dignity of
seeking and knowing. Drawing from Aristotle, Voegelin asserts that man comes closest
to the transcendent divine through the exercise of nous:
A man whose activity is guided by intelligence (nous), who cultivates his
intelligence and keeps it in the best condition, seems to be most beloved by the
gods. For if the gods have any concern for human affairs—and they seem to
have—it is to be expected that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them,
and that is our intelligence 44
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Moreover, reason (nous) gives man his proper dignity, since “reason [is] the source of
order in the psyche of man.” 45 Reason as the source of order is on account of its “content
of openness toward reality.” 46 Voegelin continues—reason alone does not order the
human person. Rather, it is “the bond between reason and existential philia, between
reason and openness toward the ground.” 47 Voegelin’s language ‘the ground of reality’ is
what Aquinas calls the Divine, God. Thus, both thinkers reach the same conclusion—
reason is the means by which man participates in something other than himself. It
extends the human person beyond himself not only to others, but to the transcendent,
Divine source of his being through a between reason and philia (or, for Aquinas, caritas)
that directs all of our moral habits and choices through conscience. 48 This bond between
reason and philia or caritas necessitates an awareness in the human person about who he
is in his createdness—and that awareness can only occur in the context of right
relationship: with oneself, the Divine, and others. Man is pulled toward the divine
ground of his being, and it is through the exercise of his reason (nous) that he comes to a
greater degree of clarity and luminosity concerning the nature of his own existence and
his relation to the divine.
If the human person (or an entire society) turns away from the bond of reason and
love, then disorder, irrationality, and injustice result. According to Voegelin, such a turn
risks objectifying or ideologizing truth, since the human person always remains in tension
with his finite existence and his transcendent end. Voegelin describes this tension within
the context of political society:
45
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The tension in political reality, which historically produces the phenomenon of
the noetic interpretation, is not a thing about which objective propositions could
be formed. Rather, it must be traced back to its origin in the consciousness of
men who desire true knowledge of order…. The experience of concrete-human
order, too, is not of an object but itself a tension, insofar as man experiences
himself as ordered through the tension to the divine ground of his existence. 49
Voegelin refers to this process of objectifying the noetic insights of philosophy as the
process of ‘derailment,’ a process that is a “conscious, deliberate, and painstakingly
elaborated obstruction of ratio.” 50 The obstruction of ratio (i.e. reason) at the level of a
political society leads to a society that easily becomes subject to totalitarian ideologies. 51
Voegelin speaks with the authority of one who lived under and escaped Nazi Germany:
What we have to deal with is not the National Socialists and their heinous crimes,
nor the atrocities…these are all phenomena situated in the continuity and
causality of history; but our problem is the spiritual condition of a society in
which the National Socialists could come into power. 52
Aquinas points to the way in which such a spiritual condition can happen, and to how in
it can be prevented.
Aquinas, like Voegelin, grapples with the problem of evil, one that is both
individually and politically experienced as the obstruction of ratio, which leads to
disorder. According to Aquinas, moral evil resides in the human will, man’s free elective
power, whereby he “desire[s] something for the sake of obtaining something else.” 53
But, in order to freely choose to do those things which are good, the will must be
informed by right reason. Right reason is habituated through the exercise of virtue, “the
rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, but
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are inclined differently to many; but they are determined to acts by means of habits. . . .
Therefore, human virtues are habits.” 54 Just as virtue habituates right reason, so vice
habituates faulty reason. Thus, moral evil is a defection of the will, and it is the result of
an improperly formed or obstructed rational capacity.
One way to prevent defection of the will is a proper education that is aimed at
formation of character and virtue, of reason, and of conscience; and, as I have argued,
right relationship is a critical component of this formation. Through his participation in
the moral life, man is brought into the life of the community. But it also requires an everpresent awareness of the fundamental tension of the human person, viz. that the reality of
man is his orientation toward that which is beyond himself, whether it is through
relationships with other human beings, or a desire for communion with the Divine. The
two are intimately connected, and both call man to a life beyond himself, which in turn
calls him to pursue a vision of reality based on a primacy of morality and ethics. Both
also signal that every human person is part not only of a political community, a family, or
institutions of civil society, but also of a spiritual community that transcends any earthly
community. Aquinas calls this community the corpus mysticum, or the ‘mystical body of
Christ.’ He writes:
This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church's mystical
body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of
the mystical are not all together--neither as regards their natural being, since the
body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of
the world until its end--nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those
who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will
afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the
members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in
potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to
act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple
class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third
54
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by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole
time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. 55
Aquinas’s vision of a human community is one based in the reality of the Incarnation,
that is, of the Divine who became a human person and so radically transforms the
meaning of human relationships and of the relationship between God and man.
Augustine puts this idea into political language, calling it the tension between the
city of man and the City of God—two cities in which the every human person exists. The
city of man is by its nature limited in its scope and accomplishments. The City of God is
not of the world, but the Incarnation has brought its order (the order of grace, divine love,
and redemption) to the world. The bond of the mystical body of Christ—one that
includes all human persons in all times—is grounded in Aquinas’s view of the human
person exists under “the presence of God, and the presence of God in the world.” 56 If
these truths about the human person are not acknowledged, what ensues is a “spiritual
disorder [consisting] in the universal awareness of what ought to be done, combined with
the universal refusal to do it and the pervasive flight toward rationalizations. Without
this inner process of psychic disintegration, the external process of uninhibited political
destruction could never occur.” 57 The problem of moral evil (and in particular political
evil) is particularly difficult for contemporary, liberal political societies to confront
because of “the loss of contact with the ordering spiritual traditions of Western
civilization, and the resulting necessity of reestablishing the connection or discovering
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new spiritual sources of order.” 58 To resist political disorder calls for a recollection of
these spiritual sources—resistance calls for anamnesis.
III. An Anamnetic Politics: A Reorientation toward the Common Good
Let us consider this analysis into the context of conscience and political order.
First, we have considered the connection between anamnesis and reason. While, as many
scholars have rightfully pointed out, the term synderesis remains philosophically
imprecise, it is very clear by our analysis that this concept is connected to reason.
Synderesis has a very particular meaning for Aquinas, viz. the special natural habit by
which human beings know the first principles of practical reason. 59 Aquinas calls it a
natural ‘habit’ “to avoid conflating natural habits with innate knowledge.” 60 Does the
more Platonic term anamnesis run the risk of calling the content of synderesis innate
knowledge? By Ratzinger’s and Voegelin’s analysis, the answer is negative. For
Ratzinger, anamnesis is, “the capacity and disposition for observing all divine
commandments” and the “ontological tendency within man, who is created in the
likeness of God, toward the divine. From its origin, man’s being resonates with some
things and clashes with others.” 61 Like Aquinas, Ratzinger refers to anamnesis as the
primary level of conscience, and describes it as a disposition or a capacity, a tendency or
an inclination toward what is good and repulsion from what is not good. Aquinas, while
he does not expound a philosophical concept of anamnesis does recognize the importance
of memory (memoria) as a part of prudence—which is a virtue of practical reason which
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treats “contingent matters of action” “wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the
end.” 62 Aquinas’s emphasizes the important role of memory to guide human action
because it enables human beings to recall experience. He explains:
Prudence regards contingent matters of action… Now in such like matters a man
can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by
those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be
proportionate to their conclusions, and like must be concluded from like (Ethics,
vi). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of
cases[emphasis mine]…. Now experience is the result of many memories as
stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many
things. 63
Aquinas emphasizes the experiential basis as the starting point for moral knowledge and
action, recognizing that innate ideas or ‘those things which are simply and necessarily
true’ are not always an appropriate starting point for contingent, human matters. Thomas
understood “that a habitual grasp of first principles hardly constitutes a morality. The
agent needs the facts drawn from experience and inquiry; conclusions need to be framed
in the manner of adequate propositions; and conclusions need to be drawn from facts,” 64
because human actions always deal with particulars. The content of conscience
(anamnesis or synderesis in particular) provides a critical part of the framework in which
to analyze experience and to direct inquiry.
Similarly, Voegelin’s theory of consciousness as anamnesis is “a process which
we know from within” and has “the character of an inner ‘illumination’; i.e. it is not blind
but can be experienced in its inner dimensions of a past and future.” 65 The process of
consciousness is “the only experiential [emphasis mine] model to serve as the orientation
62
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point of the conceptual apparatus through which we must also grasp the processes that
transcend consciousness.” 66 Voegelin emphasizes that individual human beings only
have access to their own consciousness. Human understanding about reality is always
perspectival; man can never fully know all Truth, for his knowledge is experientially
based, and that experience is incomplete. It is prone to error and incorrect judgments just
as Aquinas describes. For Voegelin, the recognition of the incomplete knowledge of
Truth ought to guard human beings from subscribing to any particular dogmatic ideology
that claims absolute Truth. Human beings “cannot descriptively grasp ‘pure’
consciousness as process; rather [they] can only interpretively grasp a human
consciousness as consciousness in the body and the world.” 67 However, it must be noted
that Voegelin’s theory of consciousness does not end up in solipsism or autonomous
subjectivism—it too has a relational and transcendent component. What is common to
human beings is the life of the spirit that is to be sought within anamnetic consciousness;
it is the Heraclitean xynon, or the Christian understanding of man as imago Dei.
Voegelin states,
Through the life of the spirit, which is common to all, the existence of man
becomes existence in community. In the openness of the common spirit there
develops the public life of society. He, however, who closes himself against what
is common, or who revolts against it, removes himself from the public life of the
human community. 68
Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, like Aquinas’s theory of conscience, is one that aims
to illustrate the nature of the human person as oriented into relationships with others that
are ultimately based in the common pursuit of relationship with the Divine—which
Aquinas calls man’s final end and perfection. It constitutes an understanding of human
66
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relationships as communion wherein individuals who are “equal in dignity…are fulfilled
as persons in relationship to other persons.” 69 Neither consciousness nor conscience is an
object, but rather, the means by which human persons participate in reality, and are
oriented toward the common good, a common good that is lived “by flesh-and-blood
persons constituting the community. It is the well-being of those persons and their
families and other associations of persons…of which they are members.” 70
The essence of Voegelin’s theory of consciousness is anamnesis, for the very
modes of consciousness, according to Ellis Sandoz, are knowledge, forgottenness, and
recollection. Sandoz writes:
What is remembered. . . is what has been forgotten; and the troublesome task of
recollecting the forgotten must be assayed because it should not remain forgotten.
Through recollection of the forgotten that which ought to be remembered is
brought to the present of knowledge; and the tension to knowledge shows
forgotteness to be the situation of not-knowing, the ignorance (agnoia) of the soul
in Plato’s sense. Knowledge and not-knowing are situations of existential order
and disorder. What is forgotten can, however, only be remembered because it is a
knowledge in the mode of a forgottenness whose presence in forgottenness stirs
existential discontent in a man, and this discontent presses toward conscious
knowledge. Recollection [anamnesis] is, therefore, the activity of the
consciousness through forgottenness; and this means that the latent knowledge of
the unconscious is aroused through recollection and returned in an observable
manner into specific presence in consciousness where it is articulated…. [W]hat
is recollected that preeminently ought to be known (and not remain forgotten) is
the sources of man’s humanity and the order of society and history in
participatory attunement to the divine reality of the Ground. 71
According to Sandoz, what is ‘forgotten’ is what must not remain forgotten—it is the
reality of the human person’s participatory existence; man is the epitome of being, for he
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participates in all modes of reality from the highest to the lowest strata. 72 Human
participation in reality requires an openness to reality, in particular to the giveness of
human nature as oriented to a final transcendent end. If we consider the term anamnesis
as the primary level of conscience, then the primary act of conscience is one of
recollection. However, there is more work to be done to determine with greater
philosophical precision the full scope of implications for replacing synderesis for
anamnesis, for using a Platonic concept (anamnesis) for ultimately a Pauline concept
(syneidesis) albeit one whose spelling was corrupted. It is important to realize that
anamnesis is probably not a one-to-one substitution for Aquinas’s understanding of
synderesis, since for Aquinas, synderesis is a habit, and least by Voegelin’s description,
anamnesis itself is an act – an act of recollection. The impetus for the recollection is an
awareness, a consciousness of something other than oneself, stirred by an ‘existential
discontent in a man, and this discontent presses toward conscious knowledge’—
ultimately leading one on a search for the summum bonum. 73 What we can conclude is
that this recollection—an act of conscience—draws man out of himself and toward his
fulfillment in authentic relationship. No political regime has the power to interfere or to
dictate the act of conscience, even if there remains a central paradox that conscience is
constant need of purification and must continue to be corrected and expanded. 74 The
work of the purification of conscience is done largely at the level of concrete human
relationships and within the context of pre-political or extra-political institutions, e.g.,
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marriage, family, civic associations. Freedom of conscience is an important basis for
human freedom, and for self-government. In those places where law conflicts with the
claims of conscience, we should remember that, “’Law needs no human testimony; its
basis is above man, not in him. But when they are not in agreement, they can ask their
conscience for advice, and if they do so without hatred or rancor, their conscience will
help them.’” 75
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